Program on Southern

Politics, Media and

Public Life

School of Journalism

and Mass

Communication

The University

of North Carolina

at Chapel Hill

O C T. 2001 • NUMBER 29

Thad Beyle

Editor & Associate Director

beyle@ email. unc. edu

Ryan Thornburg

Managing Editor & Assistant Director

thornburg@ unc. edu

Ferrel Guillory

Director

guillory@ unc. edu

NC DataNet is a quarterly publica-tion

of the Program on Southern

Politics, Media and Public Life in

the School of Journalism and Mass

Communication at The University

of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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2 Incumbent Wins Set Record

3 Without Serious Challengers,

Incumbents Still Spend Big

4 A Decade of Spending in N. C.

Congressional Races, 1992– 2000

5 2nd District: Etheridge

Stabilizes Swing District

6 8th District: Incumbency Turns

Tight Race Into Easy Win

7 11th District: Incumbency

Overcomes Scandal

8 1st & 12th Districts: Incumbents

Survive Changing Districts

9 Congressional Delegation

Increasingly Diverse

10 Voter Turnout Growing Faster

Than Population

12 GOP Delegates More Loyal To

Party Than Democrats

16 Parties’ Paths to Helms Seat

In This Issue

L eg i s l at ive Votes Just the Start

O f Long Redistricting Pro c e s s

RYA N TH O R N BU RG, AS S I S TA N T DI R E C TO R

Every 10 years, redrawing of the North Carolina

congressional map changes the manner in whic h

the state is represented in Washington. The highest

turnover of the decade occurs in the election after

the lines are redrawn. During the 1990s, redistrict-ing

helped elect the centur y’s first black representa-tives

from North Carolina and

helped increase Republican rep-resentation

on the state and fed -

eral levels.

The redistricting process of the

last decade brought not just new

representatives, but an entirely

new way of drawing congres-sional

districts. Legal wrangling

replaced backroom deals as the

primary tool used to draw North

Carolina’s political boundaries.

The minority- majority districts

drawn up for the 1992 elections

didn’t have their final court rul-ing

until this year. Already, the

state is in federal court fighting

Utah for an additional congressional seat that

would raise the state ’ s total to 13.

This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting ,

registration and demographic trends that shaped

the political personalities of North Carolina’s con-gressional

districts during the last decade. It is this

data that will form the starting point for discussions

about next decade’s district lines. The sophistica -

tion with which political data is collected and ana-lyzed

– in addition to the le gal quarrels – is one of

the primary reasons that judges and computers

crowded in on the politics of the redistricting

process.

There is so much dispute o ver the meaning of the

census numbers that federal judges will almost cer-tainly

be the final arbiters of district lines. These

court hearings will look very much like those dur-ing

the 2000 presidential election, with mathemati-cal

experts explaining theories and attorneys argu -

ing about the correct legal appli-cation

of those theories.

The burdens placed on the poor

souls who were forced to count

chads on national television

were nothing compared to those

state lawmakers will face in their

attempt to put voters into new

districts. Just as Florida counties

each used different standards to

count votes, the federal govern-ment

has handed down conflict-ing

standards on how states

must draw their districts without

reducing the voting power of

racial or political minorities.

The math of the redistricting process seems simple

- one person, one vote - but it's at the beginning of

a long problem about how to distribute democracy

fairly. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights

Act, which forced states, including North Carolina,

that had suppressed African- American voter

turnout to get approval for their congressional

maps from the U. S. Justice Department.

Because most Democrats and Republicans don't

vote for each other and because many whites still

don't vote for blacks, lawmakers struggle to divine

S E E R E D I S T R I C T I N G ON PAGE 13 ›

This issue of DataNet looks

back at some voting, regis-tration

and demographic

trends that shaped the

political personalities of

North Carolina’s congres-sional

districts during the

last decade.

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 2 A AND PUBL IC LI FE

Incumbent candidates met with success in each of

North Carolina’s 12 congressional districts in 2000.

The state had not returned an entire dele gation to

Capitol Hill since congressional veterans swept

North Carolina’s 11 districts in the 1988 elections.

Although neither 2000 nor 1988 saw a victorious

challenger, the 2000

election season was less

competitive than 1988.

In 2000, each of the 12

successful candidates

won at least 55 percent

of his or her district ’ s

vote. As the table on

page 14 indicates, nine

of the 12 districts saw

“ strong” victories last

year, meaning that the

winning candidate gar-nered

more than 58.6

percent of the vote.

There were no “ close”

races in which the win-ner

took less than 55

percent of the vote. In

1988, the last year in

which incumbents

swept, three seats were won with less than 53 per-cent

of the vote.

In looking over the last decade, it is notable that

the 1992 and 2000 elections shared a lack of close

r a c e s. Howeve r, wh e re only half o f the districts we re

won by strong victories in 1992, thre e - q u a rt e rs we re

won by strong victories in 2000.

The lack of competitiveness across the state is n o t

without consequence. Several of the stat e’s districts

have come to be considered “ safe” for either

Democrats or Republicans. The 1st and 12th dis-tricts,

created as minority- race districts following

the 1990 census, are considered “ safe” by virtue of

the strength with wh i ch they are held by Democrat s.

In 2000, Eva Clayton carried the 1st District with 66

percent of the vote, and Mel Watt took the 12th

District with 65 percent. Both Democratic cong res-sional

and presidential candidates have uniformly

posted convincing victories in both districts over the

last decade.

The 4th District, located in the Tr i a n gl e, also ge n e r a l-ly

favors the Democrats in congressional elections.

All the same, the Democrats’ “ safety” in the district

was challenged in 1994 when incumbent Democrat

David Price was unseated by Republican ch a l l e n ge r

Fred Heineman. Despite significant Republican

inroads, the 4th District is closest in fo l l owing the

1st and 12th districts in support for Democratic

presidential candidates. But Gore and Clinton victo -

ries in the district were quite narrow in the last two

presidential elections.

At both the congressional

and presidential levels,

the Republicans find

more safety in the Old

North State than do the

Democrats. The 6th, 9th

and 10th districts have all

been Republican strong-holds

over the last

decade, as Republican

candidates for both the

presidency and Congress

uniformly won at least

58.6 percent of the vote

in each of the three dis-tricts.

The 5th District has also

emerged as a Republican

bastion. Rep. R i ch a rd

B u rr ’ s landslide victory

over Demo c r atic ch a l l e n ger Mike Robinson in 1998

helped to discourage any opposition in 2000. The dis-trict

has add i t i o n a l ly show n i n c reased support fo r

Republican pre s i d e n t i a l candidates. Where the elder

George Bush edged out Bill Clinton with 52.6 perc e n t

o f the vote in 1992, Dole wo n by a comfortable mar-gin

in 1996, and George W. Bush took the district

from Al Gore by a 25- point margin in 2000.

Republican Walter Jones Jr. has solidified his base

of support in the 3rd District, winning with more

than 60 percent of the vote in each of his three

bids for reelection since taking the seat from

Democrat Martin Lancaster in 1992. Jones’ contin-ued

success over the last decade combined with

strong showings by Bush, Dole and Bush has given

the 3rd District a decidedly R epublican feel.

Democrat Bob Etheridge has tightened his grip on

his 2nd District seat, as has R epublican Robin Hayes

on his 8th District seat. Etheridge has carried his

district with an increasingly large percentage of the

vote in each of his last three tries for office. Hayes,

on the other hand, secured a full 55 percent of the

vote in 2000 after winning with only 50.7 percent in

1998. In presidential races, the 2nd District suppor t-

Incumbent Wins Set Re c o rd in

2000 Congressional Elections

CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

1st open * * * *

2nd * open LOST * *

3rd * LOST * * *

4th * LOST LOST * *

5th * open * * *

6th * * * * *

7th * * open * *

8th * * * open *

9th * open * * *

10th * * * * *

11th * * * * *

12th open * * * *

LOST - incumbent lost 4 ( 7%)

Open - no incumbent running 7 ( 12%)

* - incumbent ran and won 49 ( 82%)

Total races 60

Success of Incumbents,

1992– 2000

S E E I N C U M B E N T S ON PAGE 14 ›

Despite the lack of competitiveness in North

Carolina’s 2000 congressional races, campaign

spending was nearly 18 percent higher than

in 1998, making it the most expensi ve set of

c o n gressional elections of the past decade. The

second most expensive congressional election

year was in the “ Republican Revolution” of

1994, when two Democratic incumbents wer e

unseated and three open seats filled.

The table “ Congressional Campaign Costs,

1992– 2000” details the expenditures of the

two major party candidates in each of the

past five congressional campaigns, including

primary and general elections. For purposes

of comparison, all dollar amounts for these

five sets of elections were converted to

November 2000- dollar equivalents using the

Consumer Price Index- Urban. i

The 2000 numbers indicate that challenger s

generally did not run big- ticket campaigns

last year, as incumbent spending accounted

for 73 percent of total expenditures during an

election season when six of the incumbent

winners actually spent less than they had in

1998. A clear exception to this was Democrat

Leigh Harvey McNairy’s ch a l l e n ge of Rep u b l i c a n

incumbent Walter Jones in the 3rd District.

McNairy, who spent $ 1.176 million, matched

Jo n e s ’ s spending ($ 1.267 million) almost dollar-for-

dollar, forcing the incumbent to spend

about double the amount he spent two year s

b e fo re. Despite losing the race by 24 perc e n t age

points, McNairy’s efforts did result in a 147

percent increase in the total cost of the race

for the district ’ s seat from 1998 to 2000.

The six representatives spending less on their

campaigns in 2000 than in their previous suc-cessful

bids for office were Eva Clayton ( D- 1),

Bob Etheridge ( D- 2), David Price ( D- 4), Richard

Burr ( R- 5), Howard Coble ( R- 6) and Mel Watt

( D- 12). Factoring out the unopposed victories of

B u rr and Coble, the four Democratic incumbents

ave r aged 27 percent margins of v i c t o ry, ranging

from Etheridge’s win by 17 points to Clayton’s

landslide 33 percent margin. Mike McIntyre

( D- 7) spent only 4 percent more in 2000 than in

1998. Cass Ballenger ( R- 10) increased spending

in 2000 by about 25 percent more than his

1998 expenditure level – but he still won by

40 points in 2000 after being unopposed in 1998.

O bv i o u s ly, continu e d big spending on the part

o f an incumbent in the absence of a leg i t i m at e

ch a l l e n ger still does its part to solidify a voter

base and deter future challengers.

Republican candidates outspent their Demo-c

r atic rivals by a 1.3- to- 1 spending ratio in 2000.

Republicans spent $ 7,573,174 to the Democrat s ’

$ 5,996,534. Pa rt of the reason Republicans spent

so mu ch was that two Republican incumbents,

Richard Burr in the 5th District and Howard

Coble in the 6th District, had no Democratic

o p p o n e n t s. If t h e re had been Democratic com-p

e t i t i o n and money in these two races the

m a rgin between the two parties spending leve l s

would have narrowed considerab ly. For ex a m p l e,

the 12 Republican candidates for the 12 seats

spent an ave r age of $ 631,098 per seat while the

10 Democratic candidates for the 10 seats

they contested average was $ 599,653.

Without Serious Challenge rs,

Incumbents Still Spend Big

CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

Total # ofGeneral $ Spent

District $ Spent Election Votes per Vote

8th 2,759,169 203,464 13.56

3rd 2,442,940 198,455 12.31

11th 2,910,673 266,377 10.93

2nd 1,248,193 251,838 4.96

Avg. 1,130,809 231,650 4.88

9th 1,096,896 264,220 4.15

1st 481,401 189,168 2.54

12th 481,401 209,144 2.30

5th 421,060 185,855 2.27

4th 727,485 325,870 2.23

7th 432,143 229,666 1.88

6th 301,790 215,085 1.40

10th 266,557 240,658 1.11

Total 13,569,708 2,779,800

SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina

State Board ofElections

Congressional Campaign Costs:

2000 Primary & General

District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average

1st 691,264 509,709 368,281 713,415 481,401 552,814

Winner, % ii D 99% D 96% D 91% D 96% D 99% 96%

2nd 792,111 1,929,890 1,995,540 1,545,816 1,248,193 1,502,310

Winner, % D 72% R 44% D 41% D 76% D 73% 61%

3rd 973,718 1,665,920 712,244 987,408 2,442,940 1,356,446

Winner, % D 70% R 34% R 94% R 67% R 52% 63%

4th 566,413 1,103,931 2,425,272 1,785,821 727,485 1,321,784

Winner, % D 97% R 28% D 54% R 98% D 94% 74%

5th 875,588 1,762,592 996,688 621,050 421,060 935,396

Winner, % D 73% R 49% R 79% R 98% R 100% 80%

6th 574,337 411,949 599,383 426,331 301,790 462,758

Winner, % R 94% R 100% R 94% R 100% R 100% 98%

7th 337,411 1,073,132 928,679 416,471 432,143 637,567

Winner, % D 94% D 90% D 60% D 100% D 99% 89%

8th 872,145 1,162,139 797,624 1,688,926 2,759,169 1,456,001

Winner, % D 85% D 68% D 79% R 77% R 70% 76%

9th 331,549 878,947 689,382 796,717 1,096,896 758,698

Winner, % R 88% R 89% R 90% R 96% R 90% 91%

10th 374,770 260,019 296,207 213,895 266,557 282,290

Winner, % R 92% R 100% R 93% R 100% R 100% 97%

11th 2,040,307 1,885,675 596,549 1,242,399 2,910,673 1,735,121

Winner, % R 74% R 62% R 91% R 71% R 65% 73%

12th 624,658 315,041 174,834 1,085,947 481,401 536,376

Winner, % D 95% D 95% D 96% D 63% D 75% 85%

TOTAL 9,054,271 12,958,945 10,580,681 11,524,195 13,569,708 11,537,561

Winner, % 86% 60% 69% 79% 73% 73%

Avg. per seat 754,523 1,079,912 881,723 960,350 1,130,809 961,463

NOTES:

i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each ofthe years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$

= 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To convert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the

2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 ofthe 2000$; 1994$ = .852 ofthe 2000$; 1996$ = .886 ofthe 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of

the 2000$.

ii Winner, % = party ofthe winning candidate and the percentage ofthe district total spent by the winner.

SOURCES: Almanac of American Politics; Federal Election Commission; the North Carolina Board ofElections

Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000 i

S E E S P E N D I N G ON PAGE 5 ›

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 4 AND PUBLIC L IFE

After the 2000 elections, we can now look at

the decade of spending in congressional races

following the 1990 U. S. census and the various

redistricting plans used in the period. Using the

same 2000- dollar equivalent data for those five

s ep a r ate elections we find the fo l l owing pat t e rn s :

• Between the 1992 and 2000 elections, the

cost of these five sets of 12 elections incre a s e d

by nearly 50 percent, from $ 9.054 million

in 1992 to $ 13.570 million in 2000. The

ave r age cost per seat moved from $ 755,000

in 1992 to $ 1.131 mil-lion

in 2000, with an

average cost per con-gressional

seat of

about $ 961,000 during

the decade.

• There are now five

“ million- dollar” con-gressional

seats in

North Carolina –

seats in which the

average cost of elec-tions

over the decade

was more than a

million dollars ( 2nd,

3rd, 4th, 8th and

11th), and nearly a

sixth ( 5th at

$ 935,396). There is

a “ three- quarter-million-

dollar” seat

( 9th), three “ half-million-

dollar” seats

( 1st, 7th, 12th), and

nearly a fourth ( 6th

at $ 462,758). The

final 10th seat has

been a “ quarter-million-

dollar” seat

with the incumbent

Cass Ballenger ( R)

winning each of the

five races.

• Money and winning

go hand- in- hand in

these races as the

winners of the

decade’s 60 races

outspent their

opponents by nearly

a 3- to- 1 ratio.

Incumbents espe-cially

benefit from this as was clear ly seen

in the 2000 elections when all races were

won by incumbents, and they outspent

their challengers by a 3- to- 1 ratio. And 13

of the 20 most expensive races over the

decade were won by incumbents.

• Wi n n e r ’ s spending has accounted for 73 per-c

e n t of the total spending in these 60 races.

The specific year range around that 73 per-cent

figure is instructive. The high point

was in 1992, when winners’ bank accounts

overwhelmed their opponents by making

86 percent of the campaign expenditures.

This was the year when e very candidate

faced the first newly drawn districts since

1981. The low point of 60 percent was in

1994, when there were three open seats

and two incumbents were defeated, so fi ve

of the 12 winners were not incumbents .

• T h e re has been a shift in the party spending

tied to the increasing Republican strength in

these races. In the 1992 elections, Democrat s

outspent their Republican competitors by a

3- to- 2 ratio, but in the 1994 elections the

D e m o c r atic adv a n t age dropped to a 1.3- to- 1

ratio. Then in 1996, the Republicans gained

the upper hand and outspent their Demo-cratic

competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio. This

Republican advantage dropped off to a

1.1- to- 1 ratio in 1998 and then increased

slightly in 2000 to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio.

• Twenty of the 60 races cost more than $ 1 mil-l

i o n. They ranged from the $ 2.911 million

high in the 2000 8th District race to the

$ 1.073 million 1994 7th District race that

was Charlie Ro s e’s last hurrah. Several tre n d s

are visible. 1994 was a very expensive year

as seven of the 20 most expensive races

occurred then. The 1998 and 2000 elections

each had five $ 1 million- plus contests. The

2nd and 11th districts each had four of

their five contests in this high price level,

while the 4th and 8th districts had three

of their five there. The four races in which

an incumbent was defeated and three of

the six open seat races were also million-dollar-

plus specials. As already noted, 13 of

the 20 high- price races saw incumbents

win, some quite easily. Only two of these

races saw the winning margin in single

digits. The bottom line is money and

incumbents working together for the

future. n

A Decade of Spending in N. C.

C o n gressional Ra c e s, 1992– 2000

TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D

CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R , UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

Rank Dist. Year Amount Type Outcome Pts

1 11th 2000 $ 2.911 In. Taylor- R reelected 12

2 8th 2000 $ 2.759 In. Hayes- R reelected 11

3 3rd 2000 $ 2.443 In. Jones- R reelected 24

4 4th 1996 $ 2.425 In. Heineman- R defeated 10

5 11th 1992 $ 2.040 In. Taylor- R reelected 10

6 2nd 1996 $ 1.996 In. Funderburk- R defeated 7

7 2nd 1994 $ 1.930 Open seat R won 12

8 11th 1994 $ 1.886 In. Taylor- R reelected 20

9 4th 1998 $ 1.786 In. Price- D reelected 15

10 5th 1994 $ 1.763 Open seat R won 14

11 8th 1998 $ 1.689 Open seat R won 3

12 3rd 1994 $ 1.666 In. Lancaster- D defeated 6

13 2nd 1998 $ 1.546 In. Etheridge- D reelected 15

14 2nd 2000 $ 1.248 In. Etheridge- D reelected 17

15 11th 1998 $ 1.242 In. Taylor- R reelected 15

16 8th 1994 $ 1.162 In. Hefner- D reelected 4

17 4th 1994 $ 1.104 In. Price- D defeated 0.8

18 9th 2000 $ 1.090 In. Myrick- R reelected 39

19 12th 1998 $ 1.086 In. Watt- D reelected 14

20 7th 1994 $ 1.073 In. Rose- D reelected 4

KEY:

Amount = cost ofcampaigns in 2000$ ( millions)

Type = In. – incumbent; Open – no incumbent in race

Pts. = point margin ofvictory or defeat

Most Expensive Congressional Elections, 1992– 2000

Year Dems. Reps.

% %

1992 60 40

1994 56 44

1996 40 60

1998 47 53

2000 44 56

K E Y: aThese perc e n t ages are of the two - p a rty spending

in the races. Third- party and independents’ spending

not included.

Partisan Spending in 1992–

2000 Congressional Races a

For the third time in a row, incumbent Bob

Etheridge won the 2nd Congressional District

in North Carolina. Although Etheridge is a

s t rong candidat e, the 2nd District has been

known to switch between Democrat and

Republican in any given year. Nationwide,

Democrats needed to win seven extra seats to

regain power in the U. S. House of

Representatives. Many closely watched the

race between Bob Etheridge and Doug

Haynes because any seat’s shift could a ffe c t

the congressional balance of p owe r. Wi t h the

state clearly favoring Bush, the Democrats

needed another way to gain support.

Bob Etheridge defeated Doug Haynes with 58

percent of the vote. Although new to the con-gressional

race, Doug Haynes still garnered 41

percent of the vote, showing the volatility of

the 2nd District voters. Haynes, a Republican

from Rocky Mount, attempted to link himself

to presidential candidate George W. Bush in a

m ove to use Bush’s popularity in North Caro l i n a

to gain support. He wanted to make funda-mental

ch a n ges in areas such as tax policy and

e d u c ation. He supported giving school districts

the power to spend money as they see fit.

Haynes told supporters that, in general, he

supported Bush’s policies and would push for

them in Congress; understanding the conserv-ativeness

of the 2nd District.

Haynes is a former John Locke Foundation

re s e a rcher who is known for his strong opinions

t h at he is not afraid to express. Soon after

winning the primary, Haynes challenged

Etheridge to a series of debates. He quickly

wanted to gain the support of the undecided.

He ch a l l e n ged Etheridge to speak on educat i o n ,

one of the main points of contention betwe e n

the two candidates.

In an early campaign ad, Haynes used Etheridge’s

stance on education against him. Haynes is

shown reading a quote from the News &

Observer where Etheridge had pushed for

Congress to assist in school renovation e ven

when the local area has rejected the bond

issue. Haynes stated that Etheridge belie ved

the voters were dumb and challenged the

voters to reject someone who did not believe

in their ability to think for themselve s. Hay n e s’

top priorities included moving power away

from Washington and into states, and creat-ing

a fairer tax code .

Bob Etheridge is a conserv at ive Democrat wh o

uses his beliefs to his advanta ge. In the past

three congressional elections, it has been dif -

ficult for a Republican to defe at him since many

o f his ideals are not too far from their own. The

fo rmer N. C. Superintendent of Public Instru c t i o n

strongly supports the reform of educa-tion.

In one television ad, he shows what

seems like a jail cell, but in reality it is a

trailer t h at has been at t a ched to an ove r-c

rowd e d s chool. He implores vo t e rs not to

let ch i ld ren continue to learn in these con-d

i t i o n s. Besides improving education,

Etheridge said he looked to help North

Carolina farmers, i m p rove safety and sup-p

o rt tech n o l o g i c a l advances.

With Gore’s popularity down in North

Carolina, Etheridge looked to separate

himself from the presidential candidate,

as did many Democratic candidates.

With Durham County removed from the

2nd District, many people felt a large base of

Democratic supporters for Etheridge had

been lost. Etheridge instead focused on the

m a ny undecided vo t e rs living in the 2nd District

who account for its voting unpre d i c t ab i l i t y. He

maintained contact with the strong Democrat i c

voters but pushed hard with mailings and

phone calls to win the votes of those who

were not sure. These independent voters were

m a i n ly white and in the middle- income range.

He looked to extend his presence in the com-munity

by participating in walks around

counties. Volunteers would hand out leaflets,

and Etheridge would meet and g reet con-stituents.

Etheridge’s top priorities include

improving education and protecting the

retirement security of the elderly.

In the 2000 election, voters in Wake and

Johnston Counties made up nearly 55 percent

of the district’s electorate — and the voters

there supported Etheridge. Wilson County,

with only 5 percent of the district’s voters,

was the strongest supporter for Haynes. With

the exception of Wilson County, Etheridge was

the victor in all other counties. The 2nd

District has always gone through periods of

change of political party leadership. In 1996,

Etheridge b e at incumbent Republican Dav i d

F u n d e r b u rk by less than 10,000 votes. His vic-tory

in 1998 was by nearly 44,000 votes.

In the 2000 election, perhaps the strangest part

of the campaign was the difference in money.

Etheridge raised approximately $ 1,030,216 to

Haynes $ 237,248. With a just over a fifth of

the incumbent’s budget, Haynes still manage d

to gain a sizeable amount of the vote; falling

s h o rt of E t h e r i d ge by 43,722 vo t e s. This should

send red flags to the Democrats that the wave

of support in the 2nd District may be coming

to an end. But the shape of the current 2nd

District is also coming to an end, which could

revive competition. n

2nd District: Etheridge Stablizes Swing District

JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

County Etheridge Jackson Haynes Totals

Dem. Lib. Rep. # %

Wake 61.8 1.1 37.2 95,482 37.9

Johnston 52.7 0.7 46.6 41,920 16.6

Nash 55.5 0.5 44.0 31,003 12.3

Harnett 59.6 0.7 39.6 24,455 9.7

Lee 59.1 1.0 40.0 16,054 6.4

Franklin 59.9 0.7 39.4 16,038 6.4

Wilson 48.9 0.5 50.6 10,997 4.4

Sampson 61.2 0.5 38.4 9,196 3.7

Granville 56.6 0.8 42.6 6,693 2.7

Totals 58.3 40.9 0.8 251,838 100.0

SOURCE: State Board ofElections

2nd District, by County

Total spending in the stat e’s three most ex p e n-s

ive 2000 congressional races topped $ 2 million

e a ch. The $ 2.911 million race in the 11th District

between incumbent Charles Taylor ( R) and

Sam Neill ( D) was the most expensive. Taylor

outspent Neill by a 1.8- to- 1 ratio and re t a i n e d

his seat with a 13- point margin. These two can-d

i d at e s spent $ 10.93 per vote in the general

election – yet that was less than the $ 13.56

spent per vote in the 8th District race and the

$ 12.31 spent per vote in the 3rd District race.

The 8th District race between Republican Ro b i n

H ayes and Democrat Mike Taylor was the second

most expensive race, costing $ 2,759,169 as

H ayes tried to ach i eve his first reelection. Haye s

outspent Taylor by nearly a 2.4- to- 1 ratio and

retained his seat by a 11- point margin. But as

just noted, the cost per vote in this race was the

most of any of the 12 races. The 3rd District

Jones- McNairy race also topped the $ 2 million

mark at $ 2,442,940, as the candidates spent

$ 12.31 per general election vote.

Two other races topped $ 1 million in cost last

year. In the 2nd District, incumbent Bob

E t h e r i d ge ( D) outspent ch a l l e n ger Doug Hay n e s

by a 3.2- to- 1 ratio while retaining his seat by a

17- point margin. In the 9th District, incum -

bent Republican Sue Myrick outspent chal-lenger

Edward McGuire by a 14- to- 1 ratio and

won reelection by 39 points. The ye a r ’ s barga i n

s e at belonged to incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R-

10), whose campaign spent only $ 266,557 to

win a 39- point margin race. n

i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of

1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each of the years

were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541;

1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To con vert these

to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$

value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 of the 2000$; 1994$ =

.852 of the 2000$; 1996$ = .886 of the 2000$; and

1998$ = .942 of the 2000$.

› S P E N D I N G F ROM PAGE 3

The 2000 congressional election in District 8

provided another entertaining contest, as te x-tile

heir Robin Hayes and attorney Mike Taylor

went toe- to- toe for a rematch of their 1998

race. The district has a history of conservative

voting and traditional politics. Democratic

c o n gressman Bill Hefner held the seat betwe e n

1974 and 1996, winning consecutive — and

sometimes close — elections.

In 1998, most analysts thought Ha yes, the

Republican nominee for gove rnor in 1996, wo u l d

easily defeat relative newcomer Mike Taylor

because of H aye s ’ s name recognition and mon-e

t a ry strength as heir to the Cannon Textile

Mills fortune. Many Democrats felt Taylor had

no ch a n c e, and the party gave little personal or

financial support to his campaign. Meanwhile,

Hayes outspent Taylor 3- to- 1 and benefited

from campaign visits from Newt Gingrich and

Dan Quayle. However, Taylor stunned the

experts by gaining 48 percent of the popular

vote; Hayes won by a mere 3,378 votes.

In 2000, both sides geared up for what was

expected to be a hotly contested race. The

two major factors that helped T aylor compete

in 1998 were still relevant in 2000. First, the

1998 redistricting plan mandated by the U. S.

Supreme Court increased overall Democratic

registration in the district two points to 69

p e rcent, and it increased the number of A f r i c a n

American vo t e rs from 21 percent to 25 perc e n t .

Second, higher turnout among Democrat s, and

particularly African Americans, was expected

yet again in such a hard fought contest.

The Democratic Party recognized that 2000

offered a prime opportunity to unseat Ha yes,

and it poured monetary and personal re s o u rc e s

into the district. Nationally known Democrats

s u ch as House Minority Leader Rich a rd Gep h a rd t

of Missouri and Minority Whip David Bonior

of Michigan appeared on behalf of Taylor. The

D e m o c r atic Congressional Campaign Committee

in Washington contributed more than $ 600,000

for Taylor’s effort. Taylor spent more than

$ 700,000 during his campaign. Republicans

countered by sending Speaker of the House

Dennis Hastert, former presidential candidate

John McCain, Sen. Jesse Helms and NRA presi-dent

Charlton Heston to the district. Hayes

spent more than $ 1.5 million in 2000. In 1998,

the candidates spent a total of $ 1.5 million, but

in 2000 they spent a combined $ 2.25 million.

Somewhat surprisingly, the 2000 election was

a bigger victory for Hayes, who won with 55

percent of the vote compared to his winning

with just 50.7 percent of the vote in 1998.

Voting turnout was considerably greater in the

2000 presidential year race [ 203,464 total vo t e s ]

than it was in the 1998 U. S. Senate year race

[ 133,124 total votes]. This was a 53 percent

increase of more 70,000 votes. So running at

the same time George W. Bush was winning the

state seemed to help Hayes in his successful

bid for reelection.

The competitive nature of the 8th District race

provided some interesting and occasionally

amusing moments. When Gephardt spoke in

Ja nu a ry to Cab a rrus County high school students

on behalf of Taylor, Hayes showed up at what

was supposed to be an all- Democratic event,

causing a stir and no small amount of t e n s i o n .

In Fe b ru a ry, a national TV ad from the American

D a i ry Association praised “ the power of ch e e s e ”

in an imagined campaign pitting fake presi-dential

candidates John Hayes and Peter

Taylor, as well as Bob Dole. The ad depicted

cheese- lover Peter Taylor as a hero and

cheese- hater John Hayes as a loser. Real- life

candidates Hayes and Taylor were amused by

the ad’s irony, but Hayes was disappointed

that Dole did the ad without considering its

connection to the 8th District.

While Gephardt visited in January and David

Bonior held a fund- raiser for T aylor in

October 1999, big- name Hayes supporters

dominated in 2000. In a rare campaign

appearance for a fellow Republican, Helms

appeared in Concord to rally support for

Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple

8th District: Incumbency Tu rn s

Tight Race Into Easy Wi n

ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 6 AND PUBLIC LIFE

County Taylor Schwartz Hayes Totals

Dem. Lib. Rep. # %

Cabarrus 31.7 1.2 67.1 49,847 24.5

Union 32.0 1.2 66.8 45,179 22.2

Cumberland 64.0 0.8 35.2 30,955 15.2

Stanly 36.2 0.9 63.0 22,453 11.0

Richmond 49.9 0.6 49.5 14,582 7.2

Scotland 62.0 0.5 37.5 9,131 4.5

Montgomery 47.6 0.7 51.7 8,985 4.4

Anson 62.0 0.5 37.5 7,975 3.9

Hoke 60.2 1.5 38.3 7,578 3.7

Robeson 53.7 0.8 45.5 6,779 3.3

Totals 44.0 1.0 55.0 203,464 100

SOURCE: State Board ofElections

8th District, by County

Year of

Seat Member, Party 1st Elec. Service

US Sen. Jesse Helms, R 1972 29th

6th CD Howard Coble, R 1984 17th

10th CD Cass Ballenger, R 1986 15th

4th CD David Price, D 1986 13th

11th CD Charles Taylor, R 1990 11th

1st CD Eva Clayton, D 1992 9th

12th CD Mel Watt, D 1992 9th

3rd CD Walter B. Jones Jr., R 1994 7th

5th CD Richard Burr, R 1994 7th

9th CD Sue Myrick, R 1994 7th

2nd CD Bob Etheridge, D 1996 5th

7th CD Mike McIntyre, D 1996 5th

US Sen. John Edwards, D 1998 3rd

8th CD Robin Hayes, R 1998 3rd

Total Years ofService 140

Total Republican Years ofService 96

Total Democratic Years ofService 44

Seniority in the N. C.

Congressional Delegation, 2001

S E E 8TH DI STRICT ON PAGE 15 ›

North Carolina’s 11th District was a hotly con-tested

race in 2000, as incumbent Rep re s e n t a-tive

Charles H. Taylor defeated Democrat Sam

Neill with 55 percent of the vote. The 11th

District, in the western part of the state,

includes Asheville and 15 mountain counties .

Neill challenged Taylor in what had been for

some time a “ safe” Republican district. But

because of his strong candidacy and allegat i o n s

surrounding Taylor’s financial dealings, Neill

was able to give Taylor serious contention.

The recent history of the 11th District is help -

ful in framing the e vents of the 2000 election.

Before the 1980s the district was, like most

Southern districts, safely Democratic. During

the Republicanization of the South in the

1980s, the district became a “ revolving door”

district, throwing out five of six incumbents in

elections held between 1980 and 1990. The

district became more of a Republican strong-hold

at the end of the decade, as voters sup-p

o rted Jim Gardner in the lieutenant gove rn o r ’ s

race in 1988 and Jesse Helms in the senatorial

campaign of 1990. Taylor, a businessman and

tree farmer from Brevard, came close to

unseating the incumbent in 1988 and suc -

ceeded in 1990.

During the 1990s, Taylor supported 98 perc e n t

of his party’s “ Contract with America” legisla -

tion and built an incredible reputation for

constituent service. Rather than leading on

the ideological front, Taylor represents local

interests effectively. He holds town meetings

at local courthouses and other locations,

where he gives residents a chance to tell him

about local issues. Taylor has a reputation as

a hard worker with a top- notch staf f and

maintains several regional offices throughout

his district. His most controversial stand is on

environmental protection, which he makes

very clear is not as important as preventing

job loss. This resonates well with the natives

in the 11th District. Party leaders value his

loyalty and have rewarded him with a seat on

the Appropriations Committee and the chair-manship

of the District of Columbia Finance

Committee. While Taylor lost some g round in

the elections between 1994 and 1998, he still

held the district safely.

The 11th District has a high percentage of

white voters, and these white voters go to the

polls. For instance, in 1994 more than

190,000 district residents cast votes

in the congressional election, while

in the active, highly populated 4th

District fewer than 155,000 votes

were cast. In 1998, African Americans

made up 4 percent of the district’s

registered voters. Without much

support from black voters, the

Democratic Party is challenged to

compete. The Republican Party

dominates despite the fact that in

1998 only 35 percent of the reg i s t e re d

voters in the district belonged to the

GOP, a holdover from the days of the

Democratic Solid South.

In the 2000 election Taylor found a

strong opponent in Sam Neill, a

Hendersonville attorney who ser ved

on the University of North Carolina

Board of Governors for 12 years.

Neill’s ability and financial backing

combined with the financial scandal

involving Taylor to produce a close

race.

In August, a federal grand jur y

requested information regarding

loans made by Blue Ridge Savings

Bank — owned by Taylor — to one

o f the congre s s m a n’s political backe rs,

Sylva businessman Charles Cagle. The

five loans, given between 1992 and

1995, amounting to more than $ 1 mil-l

i o n, were never repaid in full and

ended in lawsuits and foreclosures.

The Charlotte Observer reported that

one of the loans involved forged sig-natures.

The bank denied lending

the money to Cagl e, once the Ja cks o n

County GOP chairman and a Taylor

campaign contributor. Taylor

claimed to not remember the details

of the loans, and accused Neill of

planting the story. The Taylor cam-paign

responded with television ads

painting Neill as a liar with an ever-growing

“ Pinocchio” nose. Taylor also

faced media scrutiny over his busi-ness

dealings in Russia and his problems with

Jackson and Transylvania counties regarding

property taxes.

In the end, though, Taylor’s superior con-stituent

serving in a staunch Republican

district enabled him to win with 55 percent

of the vote. Only one of the 15 counties in

his district, Jackson, gave more votes to his

opponent. Taylor proved the power of incum-bency

and constituent service. n

11th District: Incumbency Ove rcomes Scandal

ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

County Neill Williams Taylor Totals

Dem. Lib. Rep. # %

Buncombe 46.8 3.3 49.9 85,634 32.1

Henderson 35.0 2.7 62.3 37,137 13.9

Haywood 46.3 2.9 50.8 22,947 8.6

Rutherford 41.0 2.6 56.3 21,311 8.0

Transylvania 39.4 4.0 56.7 14,169 5.3

McDowell 33.5 2.4 64.1 14,049 5.3

Macon 39.1 2.8 58.1 13,062 4.9

Jackson 49.8 2.8 47.4 12,231 4.6

Cherokee 33.9 1.1 65.0 9,047 3.4

Yancey 44.0 1.3 54.8 8,922 3.3

Polk 40.0 3.2 56.8 8,192 3.1

Madison 43.9 2.0 54.1 8,024 3.0

Swain 48.2 1.4 50.4 4,309 1.6

Clay 37.0 1.1 61.9 3,921 1.5

Graham 29.4 1.2 69.4 3,422 1.3

Totals 42.1 2.8 55.1 266,377 100

SOURCE: State Board ofElections

11th District, by County

11th District Polls, 2000

Taylor Dem.

Year % % Total Vote

1988 49.6 50.4 215,343

1990 51 49 201,309

1992 55 45 238,161

1994 60 40 192,688

1996 58 40 228,025

1998 57 42 199,423

2000 55 42 266,377

KEY: Dem. = Democratic candidate

Charles Taylor and the

11th District, 1988– 2000

Date Taylor Neill Pollster Sample

7/ 22– 24 59 31 Pub. Opin. Strategies- R 300 lvs

9/ 22– 24 44 36 Cooper & Secrest- D 503 rvs

11/ 7 55 42 Actual Vote

SOURCE: The Cook Political Repor t [ December 20, 2000]: 60.

11th District Polls, 2000

In 1991, the state leg i s l at u re re d rew the congre s-sional

district lines, giving African Americans a

majority in the 1st and 12th districts. As a re s u l t ,

Eva M. Clayton and Mel Watt in 1992 became

the first African Americans elected to Congress

in more than 90 years. Running in predomi-nantly

African- American districts, C l ayton and

Watt seemed to be products of biased district

lines and there fo re we re victorious by defa u l t .

T h ey easily won reelection in 1994 and 1996.

In 1996, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled a gainst

the 1991 redistricting plan — especially the

long and narrow 12th District. While the 1996

elections went forward under the older plan,

in 1997 the leg i s l at u re re d rew the district lines

to more equitably split the population within

the districts for the 1998 elections. In April

1998 the court threw out this plan, too, and

the legislature had to once a gain redraw the

district lines in May for the 1998 elections.

The new redistricting plan of May 1998

decreased Clayton and Watt’s base of support

and challenged their incumbency. However,

their quest to continue as r epresentatives was

not stifled when their districts were changed

and the people who were thought to be their

sole support reduced in numbers. The per-centage

of African Americans in the 1st D i s t r i c t

d e c reased from 57 percent to 50 perc e n t . The

12th District was affected even more as the

percentage of African Americans dwindled

from 57 percent to 36 percent.

These districts had been challenged because

they were designed to give African- Americans

a majority, and the lawsuits focused specifically

on the 12th District as a “ racial gerrymander.”

In the 1991 plan, the 12th District’s lines

stretched from west of Charlotte along

Interstate 85 all the way to Durham and

included parts of Greensboro and Winston-

Salem.

The 1997 plan eliminated many areas, and

the only parts left in District 12 ran from

Charlotte up I- 85 to Greensboro and Winston-

Salem. The 1998 plan dropped Greensboro

from the 12th District, and the lines ran from

Charlotte north to Winston- Salem.

In their first races for office in 1992, Clayton

and Watt fought strongly contested primaries

and won handily in the No vember general

election. While Watt was able to best three

o t h e rs for the Democratic nomination, Clay t o n

faced six other Democrats and had to win a

runoff primary just to get into the November

race. She defeated the then- Democrat Walter

B. Jones Jr. in the runoff. Jones, the son of a

long- time Democratic congressman, soon

changed parties and won the 1994 race for

the 3rd Congressional District as a Republican.

C l ayton and Wat t’s tenu re in office continu e d

e a s i ly through the 1994 and 1996 elections. In

both cases, they defe ated the same ch a l l e n ger in

these two elections. Clayton prevailed over ch a l-l

e n ger Ted Tyler 61 percent to 39 percent in 1994

and increased her winning margin over him in

1996 to 33 points. Watt defe ated Joe Martino in

1994 by 66 percent to 34 percent and dominat e d

M a rt i n o, 72 percent to 27 percent, in 1996.

With the new redistricting plan in 1998, Clay t o n

and Watt seemed vulnerable to defeat. Man y

s p e c u l ated that their terms would be ch a l l e n ge d

with a bitter, drawn- out race to the finish. The

speculators proved to be wrong, and Clayton

and Watt prevailed again in their respective

d i s t r i c t s. Clayton again easily defe ated her per-petual

contender Ty l e r, 62 percent to 37 perc e n t ,

while Watt defeated Scott Keadle, 56 percent

to 42 percent. Their margins of victory were

narrower, but they were still winners.

In 2000, Clayton defeated Duane E. Kratzer,

Jr.’ s challenge for the 1st District seat. Clayton

advocated education, vocational traini n g, ru r a l

health, minimum wage and economic develop-ment.

Kratzer’s platform included working for

tax reform, a strong military, preserving 2nd

Amendment rights, health care reform and

opposition to abortion. He chall e n ge d

C l ay t o n’s ability to make real diffe re n c e s in the

community.

Mel Watt successfu l ly defended his 12th District

seat against Chad Mitchell. Watt’s platform

i n cluded protecting Social Security and ensuring

health care for the elderly. Mitch e l l ’ s goals we re

similar to Watt’s, but he dif fered because he

1st and 12th Districts: African- American

Incumbents Surv ive Changing Districts

JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 8 AND PUBLIC LIFE

Dist. Representative Dem. % ofOverall Vote Black % Voting Age Pop.

’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 ’ 00 ’ 91 ’ 98 Change

Plan Plan

1st Eva Clayton 67 61 66 62 66 57 50 - 7

12th Mel Watt 72 66 72 56 65 57 36 - 21

1st & 12th Districts:

A Decade of African- American Incumbency

S E E AFRICAN AMERICANS ON PAGE 15 ›

During the past 40 years, North Carolina’s

congressional delegation has had to change

with the times. Although the majority of rep-resentatives

are still white men, minorities

and women are now a part of the electoral

politics of the state. There has also been con -

side r able growth in Republican strength in

N o rt h Carolina’s politics over this period.

Politics has long been considered an all- male

game in this state. However, two women, Eva

Clayton ( D- 1) and Sue Myrick ( R- 9), broke the

gender barrier in the 1992 and 1994 congres-sional

elections. Then in 1996, Elaine Mars h a l l

was elected secretary of state. In the 2000

elections, North Carolina reelected Clayton,

Myrick and Marshall as well as three other

women to statewide office — Lieutenant

Governor Beverly Perdue ( D), Commissioner of

Agriculture Meg Phipps ( D) and Commissioner

of Labor Cherie Berry ( R).

Even more astounding is that Clayton is also

one of North Carolina’s two African- American

representatives. Clayton and Mel Watt ( D- 12)

we re first elected in 1992 after the controve rs i a l

creation of two majority- black districts. They

were the first minorities to be elected to

Congress from North Carolina since Recon-struction.

Despite consistently changing dis -

trict lines that decreased the minority race

voting base in their districts, both Clayton and

Watts retained their seats. On the other hand,

North Carolina has a large number of Native

American and Latin American communities

across the state. However, African Americans

remain the only minority g roup represented

in Congress.

The Republican Party has also made g reat

strides in their fight for representation in

Congress. In 1960, there was only one

Republican congressman in the state ’ s delega-tion.

In the 1994 “ Republican Revolution”

election, Republicans became the majority in

the delegation by winning eight of the 12

s e ats ( 67 percent). Fo l l owing the 2000 election,

seven Republicans now make up 58 percent

of the state’s delegation.

As rep re s e n t ation becomes gre ater for fe m a l e s,

b l a cks and Rep u b l i c a n s, incumbents continu e

to hold on to their seats. During the past 40

years, incumbents have won the majority of

seats in each election. In fact, there were six

elections — 1964, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1988 and

2000 — in wh i ch all incumbents re t a i n e d their

s e at. Only in the 1972, 1984 and 1994 elections

did the number of winning newcomers nearly

match the number of winning incumbents.

During two of these elections in which new-comers

nearly equaled incumbent winners,

there was a direct correlation between the

increase of Republican gains and new repre-s

e n t at ive s. In 1984, five newc o m e rs comprised

45 percent of the delegation. This is the same

year that President Ronald Reagan soundly

defeated challenger Walter Mondale, Senator

Jesse Helms won reelection over Governor Jim

Hunt’s challenge, and Republicans made

coattail gains by winning fi ve of the 11 con-gressional

seats. Ten years later during the

“ Republican Revolution” of 1994, only seven

incumbents held onto their seats, and

Republican representation jumped from

four to eight.

More change is afoot in the state ’ s congres-sional

delegation. New district lines and, if

Utah’s challenge is unsuccessful, an entirely

new district. Based on the trends of the past

four decades we can be sure of one thing —

no longer can white Democratic males

dominate the elections. Instead, women,

Republicans and minorities now have a

significant chance of winning. n

C o n gressional Delegation Incre a s i n gly Dive rse

Women, Blacks, Re p u blicans Make Gains

JONAT H A N TR I BU LA, SE N I O R PU B L I C PO L I C Y ANA LYS I S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

1960 ’ 62 ’ 64 ’ 66 ’ 68 ’ 70 ’ 72 ’ 74 ’ 76 ’ 78 ’ 80 ’ 82 ’ 84 ’ 86 ’ 88 ’ 90 ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 2000 1960– 2000

BY PARTY:

#, Dem 11 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 6 8 8 7 8 4 6 5 5 162

%, Dem 92 82 82 73 73 73 82 82 82 82 64 82 55 73 73 64 67 33 50 42 42 69

#, Rep 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 8 6 7 7 75

%, Rep 8 18 18 27 27 27 18 18 18 18 36 18 45 27 27 36 33 67 50 58 58 31

BY GENDER:

#, Male 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 228

%, Male 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 83 83 83 83 96

#, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 9

%, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 17 4

BY RACE:

#, White 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 227

%, White 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 83 96

#, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10

%, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 4

BY TENURE:

#, New 3 1 0 3 3 0 5 0 2 0 2 3 5 3 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 42

%, New 25 9 0 27 27 0 45 0 18 0 18 27 45 27 0 9 17 42 25 8 0 18

#, Incumbent 9 10 11 8 8 11 6 11 9 11 9 8 6 8 11 0 10 7 9 11 12 185

%, Incumbent 75 91 100 73 73 100 55 100 82 100 82 73 55 73 100 91 83 58 75 92 100 82

Trends in Congressional Demographics: 1960– 2000

During the past four decades, the number of

major party voters in cong ressional elections

has increased greatly, as would be expected in

a rapidly growing state. In 2000, 2.708 million

votes we re cast for congressional candidates in

the general election compared to the 1.185 mil-lion

votes cast in those elections in 1960 — an

increase of 128 percent. i In fact, the growth in

numbers of voters outpaced the growth in

actual population. The 1960 census counted

4.556 million people in North Carolina, which

has grown to 8.049 million people in the 2000

census — an increase of 77 percent.

Population growth is only one factor in the

i n c reasing number of vo t e rs in North Caro l i n a .

Included in any list of factors has to be the

opening of the electoral system to those who

had been excluded in the past. The Civil

Rights revolution, with the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

opened the voting booth doors for blacks to

become part of the electorate. The Vietnam

War and the 26th Amendment to the U. S .

Constitution, ratified in 1971, opened the

doors to those between 18 and 21.

The increase in partisan competition o ver the

40- year period was also a very important

factor. In the first three elections of the 1960s

Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans

by a 3- to- 2 ratio. In the most recent four

elections this has switched to a 1.25- to- 1

Republican voting edge. Between 1960 and

2000, the number of D e m o c r atic congre s s i o n a l

votes increased by 64 percent, while the

number of Republican congressional votes

increased by 230 percent. This shift in voting

support translated from a 6- to- 1 Democratic

c o n gressional seat winning ratio in those thre e

early 1960 races to a 1.4- to- 1 Republican con-gressional

seat winning ratio in the four most

recent elections. The table “ Congressional

Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000” demonstrates

the consistent erosion of the Democratic

control over these elections.

This Republican voting growth had to over-come

a depression in GOP turnout following

the Watergate scandal, reflected in the results

of the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections. After

increasing their success ratio in the 1968 to

1972 elections to only a 1.8- to- 1 Democratic

advantage, Republicans saw those mid- 1970s

races elevate the Democratic success ratio to a

4.5- to- 1 high. Since the 1978 elections, the

Republican vote has been growing steadily.

T h e re are also some interesting pat t e rns hidd e n

in this 21 elections N. C. congressional voting

history. These patterns are tied to the differing

length of terms of elected officials. While two-year

term Congressional elections occur in

every even- numbered year [ 21 elections], the

four- year term presidential and gubernatorial

elections occur in every other e ven year [ 11

elections], and the six- year terms of the two

U. S. senators bring those statewide races into

these elections about two- thirds of the time

[ 14 elections].

Voter Tu rnout Grow i n g

Faster Than Po p u l at i o n

Re fo rm s, Pa rt i s a n s h i p, Big Races

Bring More People to Po l l s

TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L,

A N D JO H N BR A N C H, SE N I O R HI S TO RY MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POL ITIC S , MEDIA 1 0 AND PUBLIC LI FE

Votes ( thousands) % of Vote Seats Won Uncontested

Year Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep

1960 726 459 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0

1962 482 336 819 59 41 9 2 3 0

1964 788 511 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0

1966 484 432 916 53 47 8 3 2 0

1968 765 633 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1

1970 514 411 925 56 44 7 4 1 0

1972 735 610 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0

1974 638 348 986 65 35 9 2 3 0

1976 1,011 549 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0

1978 607 405 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1

1980 964 769 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0

1982 708 580 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0

1984 1,131 1,026 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0

1986 890 682 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0

1988 1,108 876 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0

1990 1,076 935 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0

1992 1,282 1,204 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0

1994 681 907 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1

1996 1,136 1,340 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0

1998 827 1,014 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2

2000 1,194 1,515 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2

KEY: Uncontested = number ofseats won in uncontested races

SOURCE: State Board ofElections

N. C. Congressional Voting Trends, 1960– 2000

›

There are four distinct patterns involved in

these elections: Pattern A is when there are

presidential, gubernatorial and U. S. senatorial

elections held at the same time as the con-gressional

elections. This has happened se ven

times since 1960. Pattern B, which has

happened three times, is when there ar e

presidential and gubernatorial elections being

held at the same time. P attern C, which has

happened seven times, is when there is just a

U. S. Senate race being held at the same time.

Pattern D, which has happened three times, is

when there are no major statewide elections

being held at the same time .

As can be seen in the table “ Patterns in N. C.

C o n gressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000,” the gre at e s t

turnout occurs when there are se veral impor-tant

statewide elections occurring at the same

time. Patterns C and D have had considerably

lower turnouts over the period. Voting in

elections when Jim Hunt was on the ballot

averaged 1.960 million voter s, while voting in

elections when Jesse Helms was on the ballot

averaged 1.800 million voters. ii The average

turnout during the past 40 years has been

1.585 million for all elections .

The 1994 Pattern D congressional elections, in

wh i ch the “ Republican Revolution” took place,

exemplified the impact of low turnout in a

volatile political atmosphere. The 1994 con-gressional

vote was the lowest since 1986 and

fell nearly 47 percent below the cong ressional

vote of 1992.

The upcoming 2002 congressional elections

will be a Pat t e rn C election. The only stat ew i d e

race will be for the U. S. Senate seat cur rently

held by Jesse Helms. With Helms retiring ,

there will be considerable statewide political

action, as an open seat race creates interest -

ing primaries in addition to a general election

with no incumbent run-ning.

There has not been

an open Senate seat race in

the state since 1974 when

Sam Ervin retired. The

upcoming race has already

attracted national media

interested in whether the

Democrats can keep their

tenuous hold on the U. S.

Senate, and the potential

for an ideological shift in

the Senate delegation.

This year’s redistricting

could also affect turnout in

2002. Will the new district

lines be “ incumbent friendly ”

and therefore not very con-troversial,

leading to some

rather uninteresting races?

Or will the new lines set up

some battle grounds that

may lead to some ver y

heated and controversial

races? And if North

Carolina fends off the

Utah challenge over which

state gains the additional

seat, will that 13th District

race between relative

newcomers to the congres-sional

scene attract or deter

voters from going to the

voting booth? n

i In the 2000 elections, there

were two seats not contested

by a Democratic candidate. If there had been

a Democratic candidate, the increase in the

number voting in the 2000 elections would

have been even greater vis- a- vis the 1960 vote ,

and the growth in the number of Democratic

votes would have also been g reater. n

ii Hunt ran for lieutenant governor in 1972,

governor in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996, and

for U. S. Senator in 1984. He won all but the

1984 race. Helms ran for a U. S. Senate seat in

1972, 1978, 1984, 1990 and 1996, and was

successful each time.

Party Voting Seats Uncon.

Votes Dem. Rep. D R D R

( thousands) % % # # # #

Pattern A: President, U. S. Senate, Governor Races [ 7]

1960 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0

1968 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1

1972a 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0

1980b 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0

1984a 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0

1992b 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0

1996a 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0

Avg. 1,826 54 46

% Change + 109 - 25 + 38

Pattern B: President and Governor Races [ 4]

1964 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0

1976b 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0

1988 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0

2000 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2

Avg. 1,888 57 44

% Change + 108 - 28 + 44

Pattern C: U. S. Senate Race [ 7]

1962 819 59 41 9 2 3 0

1966 916 53 47 8 3 2 0

1974 986 65 35 9 2 3 0

1978c 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1

1986 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0

1990c 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0

1998 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2

Avg. 1,308 56 44

% Change + 125 - 24 + 34

Pattern D: No Major Statewide Races [ 3]

1970 925 56 44 7 4 1 0

1982 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0

1994 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1

Avg. 1,267 51 49

% Change + 72 - 23 + 30

NOTES

Avg. – Average vote for that pattern ofraces over the period

% Change – percent change in totals from earliest to the most recent race in the pattern

Party Voting – % of2- party vote that was Democratic/ Republican

Seats – Number ofCongressional seats won by Democrats/ Republicans

Uncon. – Number ofuncontested races won by Democrats/ Republicans

a – Helms and Hunt in statewide races

b – Hunt in a statewide race

c – Helms in a statewide race

Pat t e rns in N. C. Congressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000

Decade Dem Rep Total D to R Ratio

1960– 68 43 12 55 3.6 to 1

1970– 78 41 14 55 2.9 to 1

1980– 88 38 17 55 2.2 to 1

1990– 98 30 29 59 1 to 1

2000 5 7 12 1 to 1.4

Total 157 79 236 2 to 1

Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000

An open seat Senate race

creates interesting

primaries, attracts national

media interested in

whether the Democrats

can keep their tenuous

hold on the U. S. Senate,

and holds the potential for

an ideological shift in the

state’s Senate delegation.

John McCain’s presidential campaign demon-strated

that being independent from your

political party could be the centerpiece of a

fairly successful national campaign. But in

c o n gressional districts dominated by one part y

or the other, independence can be seen as

disloyalty — and punished. In North Carolina,

most congressional delegates voted with their

party most of the time, but Republicans

showed more loyalty than Democrats during

the 1999– 2000 session.

The Congressional Quarterly rankings of the

state’s representatives reveal some surprises,

h oweve r. President Clinton did not re c e ive total

support from the North Carolina delegation,

even from his fellow Democrats. Mel Watt

( 12th) was Clinton’s strongest supporter from

the state. He voted with the president 82 per-cent

of the time. Bob Etheridge ( 2nd) vo t e d

with the president 65 percent of the time. Mike

McIntyre ( 7th) supported the president only 40

percent of the time.

The average presidential support rating of the

Democrats in the North Carolina dele gation

was nearly 70 percent, just

below the national

Democratic average of 73

percent. This differe n c e

highlights the fact that

S o u t h e rn Democrat s are

more conservative than

Democrats as a whole and

a re more like ly to oppose

the liberal plans of party

members.

None of the seven

Republicans the

state sent to Congress

broke ranks as often as

some Democrats did. The

highest support rating for

Clinton came from Sue

Myrick ( 9th) at 26 percent.

Two members tied for the

lowest, at 19 percent. The

gap between high and low

was much smaller than on

the Democratic side. O u t

o f eve ry five votes cast by

N. C. Rep u b l i c a n s, four

were in opposition to

Clinton.

N o rth Carolina Democrats we re also mu ch more

likely to go against their fellow Democrats in

Congress. McIntyre voted against the party 39

percent of the time. Etheridge, the next most

i n d ependent, bucked the party line 16 perc e n t

of the time. Both were reelected, despite what

some might consider damaging disloyalty to

the party. The average party opposition rating

for the North Carolina dele gation was nearly

16 percent, although McIntyre’s nu m b e rs skew

the average somewhat. Without McIntyre, the

North Carolina Democrats voted the party line

more than 90 percent of the time. Rega rd l e s s,

most of the Democratic delegat i o n supported

their party colleagues most of the time.

The Republicans delegates were much more

loyal to the GOP than their colleagues on the

other side of the aisle. Only one, Robin Hayes

( 8th), voted with the Democrats more than 8

percent of the time, and he buc ked the party

line only 11 percent of the time, voting with

the Republican party on nearly 9 of 10 votes.

On average, the GOP delegates from North

Carolina voted with the party more than 93

percent of the time, ignoring the party ’ s lead

on only 6.4 percent of the votes.

All but one of the members had voting partic-ipation

rates in the House of more than 90

percent, and all but two of the delegates had

participation rate scores between 96 and 99

percent. Charles Taylor ( 11th), required by a

very competitive reelection battle to spend

more time at home, had a voting rate of 91

percent — still good compared to Sue Myrick,

who voted only 86 percent of the time. Her

reelection campaign was by no means heated

— she won by more than 30 points and sits in

a safe Republican district. Most rep re s e n t at ive s

have made an effort to keep their voting rates

high ever since it became a campaign issue in

the mid- 1970s. Myrick’s low voting rate could

be somewhat of a liability in 2002.

These voting rates and analyses confirm again

that presidential support and party unity,

especially on the Democratic side, are not

important issues that representatives from

North Carolina consider in their votes. Nor, it

appears, are these two scores important to

the voters of North Carolina when choosing

their representatives. n

GOP Delegates More Loyal

To Pa rty Than Democrat s

EVA N SAU DA, SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 1 2 AND PUBLIC LIFE

Clinton Administration Party Majority Voting

Dist. Rep. ( Party) Sup. Opp. Sup. Opp. Partic.

1st Clayton ( D) 79 21 93 7 97

2nd Etheridge ( D) 65 35 84 16 99

3rd Jones ( R) 19 81 92 8 97

4th Price ( D) 80 20 90 10 97

5th Burr ( R) 22 78 92 8 96

6th Coble ( R) 21 79 96 4 96

7th McIntyre ( D) 40 60 61 39 96

8th Hayes ( R) 19 81 89 11 99

9th Myrick ( R) 26 74 96 4 86

10th Ballenger ( R) 23 77 96 4 96

11th Taylor ( R) 21 79 94 6 91

12th Watt ( D) 82 18 94 6 97

Clinton Administration Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 69 relevant House votes in which the

legislator was present and either supported or opposed the position ofthe Clinton

administration.

Party Majority Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 259 House votes in which the legislator was

present and supported or opposed a majority ofhis or her party.

Voting Partic.: Percent ofthe 600 House votes in which the legislator voted.

SOURCE: “ Vote Studies,” CQ Weekly ( January 6, 2001): 52 – 74.

Congressional Quarterly’s Voting Analysis of

NC’s 2000 Congressional Delegation

how many members of a minority they must

put in a district in order for them to have a

fair chance of electing the representative of

their choice.

The ( George H. W.) Bush and Clinton Justice

Departments told state legislatures that they

must consider race when drawing districts ,

but the U. S. Supreme Court also said they

can't consider race too much. During the last

decade, judges and statisticians have joined

legislators in the redistricting process so that

almost all of the national conversation about

the topic is focused on which mathematical

mode will make the best defense in court. A

leading vendor of redistricting software mar-kets

it as a " litigation support" tool that can

help lawmakers use census and other data to

prove that they weren't thinking about race

too little or too much.

Despite the legal wrangling of the last 10

years, North Carolina’s congressional districts

became predictable, reelecting in 2000 a

record number of incumbents. Politicians –

especially incumbents – like this certainty. In

the past, lawmakers could assuredly play b y

the first rule of redistricting – protect incum-bents.

However, legislators will bear little responsi-bility

for the electoral districts the state finally

ends up with. When they finish their impossi-ble

task, lawsuits will ensue.

With better data about “ communities of inter-est”

that aren’t based on race, legislators per -

haps could more confidently defend at least

one of their two competing goals. But e ven

with better information, few lawmakers have

professional backgrounds in the type of data

modeling needed to crunch the numbers. So

the process still ends up in the hands of com-puter

analysts whose names ne ver appear on

a ballot.

The political process is just the first round of

redistricting. Regardless of how many votes

have been taken or how many le gal decisions

have been handed down, North Carolinians

can be certain that more lawsuits lie ahead

— until the next round of political numbers

are handed down. n

› R E D I S T R I C T I N G F ROM PAGE 1

Dist# Incumbent 2000 Pop Ideal Pop Ideal +/- Ideal Ideal Pop Ideal +/-

13 Seats 13 Seats +/- % 12 Seats 12 Seats %

1st Clayton, D 587,830 619,178 - 31,348 - 5.1 670,776 - 51,598 - 7.7

2nd Etheridge, D 730,266 619,178 111,088 17.9 670,776 59,490 8.9

3rd Jones, R 615,614 619,178 - 3,564 - 0.6 670,776 - 55,162 - 8.2

4th Price, D 765,876 619,178 146,698 23.7 670,776 95,100 14.7

5th Burr, R 637,158 619,178 17,980 2.9 670,776 - 33,618 - 5.0

6th Coble, R 689,529 619,178 70,351 11.4 670,776 18,753 2.8

7th McIntyre, D 690,054 619,178 70,876 11.5 670,776 19,278 2.9

8th Hayes, R 661,112 619,178 41,934 6.8 670,776 - 9,664 - 1.4

9th Myrick, R 693,042 619,178 73,864 11.9 670,776 22,266 3.3

10th Ballenger, R 655,413 619,178 36,235 5.6 670,776 - 15,363 - 2.3

11th Taylor, R 656,619 619,178 37,441 6.1 670,776 - 14,157 - 2.1

12th Watt, D 666,800 619,178 47,622 7.7 670,776 - 3,976 - 0.6

13th ———— - 0- 619,178 - 619,178 —— ——— ——— ——

NOTES:

Ideal Pop — the total population ofthe state divided by 13 seats or 12 seats to get equal representation.

Ideal +/- — the dif ference between the ideal and actual population for the district

Ideal +/- % — the percent that the actual population deviates from the ideal population

SOURCE: www. ncleg/ redistricting/ 2000BaseMapRpt

N. C. Congressional Districts: Ideal vs. Actual Populations

13 District Scenario

Incumbent District +/-%

Price, D 4th + 23.7

Etheridge, D 2nd + 17.9

Myrick, R 9th + 11.9

McIntyre, D 7th + 11.5

Coble, R 6th + 11.4

Watt, D 12th + 7.7

Hayes, R 8th + 6.8

Taylor, R 11th + 6.1

Ballenger, R 10th + 5.9

Burr, R 5th + 2.9

Jones, R 3rd - 0.6

Clayton, D 1st - 5.1

12 District Scenario

Incumbent District +/-%

Price, D 4th + 14.7

Etheridge, D 2nd + 8.9

Myrick, R 9th + 3.3

McIntyre, D 7th + 2.9

Coble, R 6th + 2.8

Watt, D 12th - 0.6

Hayes, R 8th - 1.4

Taylor, R 11th - 2.1

Ballenger, R 10th - 2.3

Burr, R 5th - 5.0

Clayton, D 1st - 7.7

Jones, R 3rd - 8.2

The Impact of Two District Scenarios

N C

DATA N

E T

N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 4 A AND PUBL IC L IFE

ed the Bushes in 1992 and 2000, but backed

Bill Clinton in 1996.

Rep. Charles Taylor ( R- 11) has comfortably

retained his seat in each of the five elections

since he initially won the seat from incumbent

Democrat James Clarke in 1990. The district ’ s

voters decisively favored the Republican can-didate

for congress over the past decade but

did not decisively favor Republican candidates

for president until 2000, when George W. Bush

made off with 59 percent of the district’s vo t e s.

Voters slightly favored Clinton in 1992 before

slightly favoring Dole four years later.

Over the past 10 years North Carolina has

moved clearly in the direction of supporting

Republican candidates for president. In 2000,

George W. Bush took the state with 56 percent

o f the vote and won in nine of the 12 districts.

The only districts he failed to carry were the

1st and 12th – safe Democrat districts – and

the 4th, a district in which voters cast a bare

majority of their votes for Al Gore. The state’s

s u p p o rt for Republican presidential candidat e s

has been widely dispersed unlike its support fo r

D e m o c r at s, wh i ch is ge o gr ap h i c a l ly concentrat e d .

The Republicans hold the majority of the stat e’s

s e ats in Congre s s, but the five Democrats in the

delegation were all reelected by convincing

margins last year. Both parties have “ s a fe ”

s e ats that are almost guaranteed victories, but

the Republicans find safety in more districts

than do the Democrat s. The state has continu e d

to lean slightly towa rd Republicans in congre s-sional

races since the 1994 shift fro m support

of Democratic to GOP candidates. n

Avg Avg

Congressional Race Scores Score Incumbent, Party ( County) Presidential Race Scoresd Score

Dist # 92a 94a 96a 98b 00c 92– 00 92 96 00 92– 00

1st 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eva Clayton, D ( Warren) 1 1 1 1

2nd 2 4 2 2 2 2.4 Bob Etheridge, D ( Harnett) 4 2 4 3.3

3rd 2 4 5 5 5 4.2 Walter Jones, R ( Pitt) 4 4 5 4.3

4th 1 3R 2 2 1 1.5 David Price, D ( Orange) 2 3D 3D 2.7

5th 2 4 5 5 5u 4.2 Richard Burr, R ( Forsyth) 3R 4 5 4

6th 5 5u 5 5u 5u 5 Howard Coble, R ( Guilford) 5 5 5 5

7th 2 3D 3D 1u 1 2 Mike McIntyre, D ( Cumberland) 3D 4 4 3.7

8th 2 3D 2 3R 4 2.8 Robin Hayes, R ( Cabarrus) 3R 4 4 3.7

9th 5 5 5 5 5 5 Sue Myrick, R ( Mecklenburg) 5 5 5 5

10th 5 5 5 5u 5 5 Cass Ballenger, R ( Lenoir) 5 5 5 5

11th 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 Charles Taylor, R ( Buncombe) 3D 3R 5 3.7

12th 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 Mel Watt, D ( Mecklenburg) 1 1 2 1.3

Avgs 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.6

KEY

COMPETITIVENESS SCORES: 1 = Strong Dem. 58.6%+; 2 = Leaning Dem. 52.6%– 58.5%: 3 = Toss- up 47.5%– 52.5%; 4 = Leaning Rep. 52.6%– 58.5%;

5 = Strong Rep. 58.5+; u = unopposed. For districts with results within the toss- up range, the party ofthe winner is indicated ( D, R) for the con-gressional

races and by the winner in the presidential race in the district.

a Elections conducted under the 1991 Redistricting Plan; b Elections conducted under the 1998 Redistricting Plan; c Elections conducted under the

1997 Redistricting Plan; d Presidential- race scores calculated only from votes for the two major- party candidates.

Competitiveness in the N. C. Congressional Districts, 1992– 2000

District Candidate, Party # of Votes % of Point

Total Spread

5th * Richard Burr, R 172,489 93u + 86 R

Steven LeBoeuf, Lib 13,366 7

6th * Howard Coble, R 195,727 91u + 82 R

Jeffrey Bentley, Lib 18,726 9

9th * Sue Myrick, R 181,161 69 + 39 R

Ed McGuire, D 79,382 30

10th * T. Cass Ballenger, R 164,182 68 + 39 R

Delmas Parker, D 70,877 29

3rd * Walter B. Jones Jr., R 121,940 61 + 24 R

Leigh McNairy, D 74,058 37

11th * Charles H. Taylor, R 146,677 55 + 13 R

Sam Neill, D 112,234 42

8th * Robin Hayes, R 111,950 55 + 11 R

Mike Taylor, D 89,505 44

2nd * Bob Etheridge, D 146,733 58 + 17 D

Doug Haynes, R 103,011 41

4th * David Price, D 200,885 62 + 25 D

Jess Ward, R 119,412 37

12th * Mel Watt, D 135,570 65 + 32 D

Chad Mitchell, R 69,596 33

1st * Eva Clayton, D 124,171 66 + 33 D

Duane Kratzer Jr., R 62,198 33

7th * Mike McIntyre, D 160,185 70 + 41 D

James R. Adams, R 66,463 29

KEY: D - Democrat; Lib - Libertarian; R - Republican; u - unopposed by

a major- party challenger; * - incumbent.

2000 Election Results, from

Most Republican to Most Democratic

› I N C U M B E N T S F ROM PAGE 2

teristics.

The data that follow help sketch the electoral

landscape for the 2002 Democratic and

Republican primaries.

In modern North Carolina politics, primar y

turnout has plummeted to only a fraction of

general- election turnout. Many voters in

North Carolina – and elsewhere in the South

– stand aside during the primaries and wait

to vote in the general election.

In 1998, for example, there were both

Democratic and Republican Senate primaries,

combining to bring out 805,319 voter s. The

general election – Democrat John Edwards vs.

Republican Lauch Faircloth – attracted 1.97

million voters. The primary turnout amount-ed

to only 40 percent of the general- election

turnout.

Candidates in Democratic primaries must

chase more voters than Republican candi-dates.

Registered Democrats out- number reg-istered

Republicans, 2.55 million to 1.74 mil-lion.

In addition, more people turn out for

Democratic primaries than for Republican

primaries. Two years ago, the Democratic

gubernatorial primary attracted 553,794 vot -

ers, the Republican primary 312,529. ( The

2000 general election turnout totaled 2.9 mil-lion

North Carolina voters.)

Under state law, a candidate can win a

party’s nomination in the first primary with

40 percent of the vote. Assuming a turnout of

310,000 voters in a GOP primar y, a

Republican Senate candidate could win with

as few as 124,000 votes. Assuming a

Democratic turnout of 550,000, it would take

220,000 votes for victory. Clearly, primaries

put a premium on candidates’ tar geting of

activist and regular- voting partisans.

While Democrats still out- number

Republicans as primary voter s, GOP primary

turnout has risen over the past 30 years and

Democratic turnout has fallen dramatically.

Democratic primary turnout peaked at

955,799 in 1984, and then dropped to

540,031 in 1998. Meanwhile, GOP primar y

turnout rose from barely 100,000 in 1972 to

more than 312,000 in 2000.

Geographically, Republican primary voter s

are somewhat more concentrated than

Democratic voters. The top 14 counties in

GOP registration contain more than half of

potential GOP voters. It takes 16 counties to

reach 50 percent of the Democratic regis-tered

voters. ( See chart)

Under North Carolina election rules, the

Republican and Democratic parties may per -

mit unaffiliated voters to participate in their

primaries, as both parties did in 1998.

An unaffiliated voter can choose to cast a bal-lot

in one primar y, but not both.

Because 2002 is not a presidential election

year, it will almost certainly have a lower

voter turnout, in both primaries and the gen-eral

election, than 2000. So- called off- year

elections typically have lower turnouts than

presidential- election years. Also, if the Senate

primary in either party results in a runoff, the

turnout for the runoff will surely be lower

than in the first primar y. n

Editor’s Note: Owen Covington, a master’s stu-dent

in the UNC School of Journalism and

Mass Communication, contributed to this arti -

cle and to the accompanying chart.

Further examination of Helms’s career can be

found on our Web site at www. southnow. org.

Look for more analysis of southern Senate

races in the forthcoming issue of SouthNow..

› P R I M A R I E S F ROM PAGE 16

Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple

appearances, and NRA president and actor

Charlton Heston spoke at rallies in Concord

and Albemarle on Hayes’s behalf. The NRA

had contributed $ 7,450 to Hayes in 1998. The

day before the 2000 election, John McCain

stumped for Hayes in Richmond County.

In the end, Haye s ’ s incumbency pro b ab ly

m a d e the difference in 2000. Campaigning

on his re c o rd of l o o king out for the district,

H ayes also benefited from Taylor’s inability to

distinguish himself from his opponent. The

candidates had similar views on many issues,

such as Taylor’s opposition to abortion. Their

TV ads attacked each other’s stances on issues

like prescription drugs and taxes, but issues

were lost amid the spectacle of visits from

major political players. Helms, Hastert,

Heston and McCain overshadowed Gephardt

and Bonior.

Just as in 1998, Taylor won a majority of the

counties. However, Hayes made major gains

in most counties, picking up one more than

in 1998 and coming within a percentage

point of winning Richmond, which gave him

only 38.9 percent in 1998. In almost every

county, Hayes garnered more new voters

than Taylor. Once again, Hayes dominated the

t wo largest counties in the district, industrial-ized

Cabarrus and Union counties. The supe -

rior resources and incumbent status of Hayes

trumped the energized Democratic effort for

Taylor. n

› 8TH DI STRICT F ROM PAGE 6

wanted to empower Americans to help them-selves.

In the year 2000, Clayton and Watt once

again were victorious. Clayton won handily

over K r atzer by 33 points ( 66 percent to 33 per-c

e n t ) , while Watt easily defe ated Mitchell by 32

p o i n t s ( 65 percent to 33 percent).

Being the first North Carolina African- Americans

elected to Congress in this century, they had

a great deal of pressure to perform excellent-ly.

Despite the challenges by other candidates,

the constant law suits and court decisions

against the N. C. district plans, and the con-stantly

changing redistricting plans, Clayton

and Watt have proved to be worthy of their

positions. They won with the support of

white as well as African- American voter s,

especially in their last two races. They also

d e m o n s t r at e d how important incumbency is

to a candidate, thus proving that knowledge

and experience are important in getting re-elected.

The N. C General Assembly will use the data

from the 2000 census to reconfigure the lines

for the stat e’s congressional districts beg i n n i n g

in 2001.

This will be the fo u rth plan in 10 ye a rs, due to

the court challenges faced by the 12th

District. The new lines may provide more cl a r i-t

y as to who belongs in each district. While

this could affect who will hold wh i ch congre s-s

i o n a l seats, incumbents Clayton and Watt

may well be able to maintain their seats in

the 2002 elections under the new redistrict-ing

plan. n

› AFRICAN AMERICANS F ROM PAGE 8

With Sen. Jesse Helms having decided not to

seek re- election, North Carolina has in store

competitive contests for both the Democratic

and Republican nominations for the U. S.

Senate seat in 2002.

In the days of the one- party South, the winner

of the Democratic primary was practically

assured of victory in the general election.

Naturally, voters who wanted to make a dif-ference

turned out for the primary. But since

the rise of the two- party South, North Carolina

has increasingly come to have two different

kinds of elections, primary elections and gen -

eral elections with distinctly dif ferent charac-

Pa rties’ Paths to the Helms Seat

FE R R E L GU I L LO RY, DI R E C TO R

NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 6 A AND PUBL IC L IFE

Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life

School of Journalism and Mass Communications

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CB # 3365

University of North Carolina

Chapel Hill, NC 27559– 3365

Non- Profit Organization

U. S. Postage

P A I D

Permit No. 177

Chapel Hill, NC

Democrats, by County

County Registered Turnout1

Mecklenburg 200,210 29,096

Wake 177,211 37,973

Guilford 144,413 30,745

Forsyth 97,834 22,712

Durham 97,819 22,072

Cumberland 87,363 17,586

Buncombe 69,118 11,593

Robeson 58,989 18,377

Orange 51,733 12,445

Gaston 50,654 7,492

New Hanover 50, 101 8,615

Pitt 46,100 11,290

Alamance 39,672 7,075

Davidson 36,508 5,841

Cabarrus 35,147 7,510

Nash 35,142 6,680

Sixteen counties account for 1,278,014 or 50.0 per-cent

of registered Democrats.

Republicans, by County

County Registered Turnout2

Mecklenburg 168,625 26,299

Wake 141,291 25,021

Guilford 96,826 19,592

Forsyth 77,823 12,993

Buncombe 46,687 7,459

New Hanover 46,121 8,051

Gaston 45,733 6,908

Cumberland 45,180 6,056

Davidson 43,380 6,353

Catawba 42,982 7,446

Randolph 38,217 5,646

Cabarrus 36,835 4,883

Durham 35,714 6,265

Rowan 35,415 6,272

Fourteen counties account for 900,829 or 51.7 per-cent

of registered Republicans.

Where the Primary Voters Are

NOTES:

1Average Democratic primary turnout in the 1996 senate, 1998 senate, and 2000 secretary ofstate race.

2Average Republican primary turnout in the 1992 Senate and 2000 gubernatorial races.

Sources: State Board ofElections; N. C. Carolina Manual, various years.

S E E P R I M A R I E S ON PAGE 15 ›