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Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communication The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill O C T. 2001 • NUMBER 29 Thad Beyle Editor & Associate Director beyle@ email. unc. edu Ryan Thornburg Managing Editor & Assistant Director thornburg@ unc. edu Ferrel Guillory Director guillory@ unc. edu NC DataNet is a quarterly publica-tion of the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. To receive an electronic version of future issues, send your name and e- mail address to SouthNow@ unc. edu. To subscribe to a pritned version, call ( 919) 843– 8174 or e- mail SouthNow@ unc. edu. 2 Incumbent Wins Set Record 3 Without Serious Challengers, Incumbents Still Spend Big 4 A Decade of Spending in N. C. Congressional Races, 1992– 2000 5 2nd District: Etheridge Stabilizes Swing District 6 8th District: Incumbency Turns Tight Race Into Easy Win 7 11th District: Incumbency Overcomes Scandal 8 1st & 12th Districts: Incumbents Survive Changing Districts 9 Congressional Delegation Increasingly Diverse 10 Voter Turnout Growing Faster Than Population 12 GOP Delegates More Loyal To Party Than Democrats 16 Parties’ Paths to Helms Seat In This Issue L eg i s l at ive Votes Just the Start O f Long Redistricting Pro c e s s RYA N TH O R N BU RG, AS S I S TA N T DI R E C TO R Every 10 years, redrawing of the North Carolina congressional map changes the manner in whic h the state is represented in Washington. The highest turnover of the decade occurs in the election after the lines are redrawn. During the 1990s, redistrict-ing helped elect the centur y’s first black representa-tives from North Carolina and helped increase Republican rep-resentation on the state and fed - eral levels. The redistricting process of the last decade brought not just new representatives, but an entirely new way of drawing congres-sional districts. Legal wrangling replaced backroom deals as the primary tool used to draw North Carolina’s political boundaries. The minority- majority districts drawn up for the 1992 elections didn’t have their final court rul-ing until this year. Already, the state is in federal court fighting Utah for an additional congressional seat that would raise the state ’ s total to 13. This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting , registration and demographic trends that shaped the political personalities of North Carolina’s con-gressional districts during the last decade. It is this data that will form the starting point for discussions about next decade’s district lines. The sophistica - tion with which political data is collected and ana-lyzed – in addition to the le gal quarrels – is one of the primary reasons that judges and computers crowded in on the politics of the redistricting process. There is so much dispute o ver the meaning of the census numbers that federal judges will almost cer-tainly be the final arbiters of district lines. These court hearings will look very much like those dur-ing the 2000 presidential election, with mathemati-cal experts explaining theories and attorneys argu - ing about the correct legal appli-cation of those theories. The burdens placed on the poor souls who were forced to count chads on national television were nothing compared to those state lawmakers will face in their attempt to put voters into new districts. Just as Florida counties each used different standards to count votes, the federal govern-ment has handed down conflict-ing standards on how states must draw their districts without reducing the voting power of racial or political minorities. The math of the redistricting process seems simple - one person, one vote - but it's at the beginning of a long problem about how to distribute democracy fairly. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, which forced states, including North Carolina, that had suppressed African- American voter turnout to get approval for their congressional maps from the U. S. Justice Department. Because most Democrats and Republicans don't vote for each other and because many whites still don't vote for blacks, lawmakers struggle to divine S E E R E D I S T R I C T I N G ON PAGE 13 › This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting, regis-tration and demographic trends that shaped the political personalities of North Carolina’s congres-sional districts during the last decade. NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 2 A AND PUBL IC LI FE Incumbent candidates met with success in each of North Carolina’s 12 congressional districts in 2000. The state had not returned an entire dele gation to Capitol Hill since congressional veterans swept North Carolina’s 11 districts in the 1988 elections. Although neither 2000 nor 1988 saw a victorious challenger, the 2000 election season was less competitive than 1988. In 2000, each of the 12 successful candidates won at least 55 percent of his or her district ’ s vote. As the table on page 14 indicates, nine of the 12 districts saw “ strong” victories last year, meaning that the winning candidate gar-nered more than 58.6 percent of the vote. There were no “ close” races in which the win-ner took less than 55 percent of the vote. In 1988, the last year in which incumbents swept, three seats were won with less than 53 per-cent of the vote. In looking over the last decade, it is notable that the 1992 and 2000 elections shared a lack of close r a c e s. Howeve r, wh e re only half o f the districts we re won by strong victories in 1992, thre e - q u a rt e rs we re won by strong victories in 2000. The lack of competitiveness across the state is n o t without consequence. Several of the stat e’s districts have come to be considered “ safe” for either Democrats or Republicans. The 1st and 12th dis-tricts, created as minority- race districts following the 1990 census, are considered “ safe” by virtue of the strength with wh i ch they are held by Democrat s. In 2000, Eva Clayton carried the 1st District with 66 percent of the vote, and Mel Watt took the 12th District with 65 percent. Both Democratic cong res-sional and presidential candidates have uniformly posted convincing victories in both districts over the last decade. The 4th District, located in the Tr i a n gl e, also ge n e r a l-ly favors the Democrats in congressional elections. All the same, the Democrats’ “ safety” in the district was challenged in 1994 when incumbent Democrat David Price was unseated by Republican ch a l l e n ge r Fred Heineman. Despite significant Republican inroads, the 4th District is closest in fo l l owing the 1st and 12th districts in support for Democratic presidential candidates. But Gore and Clinton victo - ries in the district were quite narrow in the last two presidential elections. At both the congressional and presidential levels, the Republicans find more safety in the Old North State than do the Democrats. The 6th, 9th and 10th districts have all been Republican strong-holds over the last decade, as Republican candidates for both the presidency and Congress uniformly won at least 58.6 percent of the vote in each of the three dis-tricts. The 5th District has also emerged as a Republican bastion. Rep. R i ch a rd B u rr ’ s landslide victory over Demo c r atic ch a l l e n ger Mike Robinson in 1998 helped to discourage any opposition in 2000. The dis-trict has add i t i o n a l ly show n i n c reased support fo r Republican pre s i d e n t i a l candidates. Where the elder George Bush edged out Bill Clinton with 52.6 perc e n t o f the vote in 1992, Dole wo n by a comfortable mar-gin in 1996, and George W. Bush took the district from Al Gore by a 25- point margin in 2000. Republican Walter Jones Jr. has solidified his base of support in the 3rd District, winning with more than 60 percent of the vote in each of his three bids for reelection since taking the seat from Democrat Martin Lancaster in 1992. Jones’ contin-ued success over the last decade combined with strong showings by Bush, Dole and Bush has given the 3rd District a decidedly R epublican feel. Democrat Bob Etheridge has tightened his grip on his 2nd District seat, as has R epublican Robin Hayes on his 8th District seat. Etheridge has carried his district with an increasingly large percentage of the vote in each of his last three tries for office. Hayes, on the other hand, secured a full 55 percent of the vote in 2000 after winning with only 50.7 percent in 1998. In presidential races, the 2nd District suppor t- Incumbent Wins Set Re c o rd in 2000 Congressional Elections CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1st open * * * * 2nd * open LOST * * 3rd * LOST * * * 4th * LOST LOST * * 5th * open * * * 6th * * * * * 7th * * open * * 8th * * * open * 9th * open * * * 10th * * * * * 11th * * * * * 12th open * * * * LOST - incumbent lost 4 ( 7%) Open - no incumbent running 7 ( 12%) * - incumbent ran and won 49 ( 82%) Total races 60 Success of Incumbents, 1992– 2000 S E E I N C U M B E N T S ON PAGE 14 › Despite the lack of competitiveness in North Carolina’s 2000 congressional races, campaign spending was nearly 18 percent higher than in 1998, making it the most expensi ve set of c o n gressional elections of the past decade. The second most expensive congressional election year was in the “ Republican Revolution” of 1994, when two Democratic incumbents wer e unseated and three open seats filled. The table “ Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000” details the expenditures of the two major party candidates in each of the past five congressional campaigns, including primary and general elections. For purposes of comparison, all dollar amounts for these five sets of elections were converted to November 2000- dollar equivalents using the Consumer Price Index- Urban. i The 2000 numbers indicate that challenger s generally did not run big- ticket campaigns last year, as incumbent spending accounted for 73 percent of total expenditures during an election season when six of the incumbent winners actually spent less than they had in 1998. A clear exception to this was Democrat Leigh Harvey McNairy’s ch a l l e n ge of Rep u b l i c a n incumbent Walter Jones in the 3rd District. McNairy, who spent $ 1.176 million, matched Jo n e s ’ s spending ($ 1.267 million) almost dollar-for- dollar, forcing the incumbent to spend about double the amount he spent two year s b e fo re. Despite losing the race by 24 perc e n t age points, McNairy’s efforts did result in a 147 percent increase in the total cost of the race for the district ’ s seat from 1998 to 2000. The six representatives spending less on their campaigns in 2000 than in their previous suc-cessful bids for office were Eva Clayton ( D- 1), Bob Etheridge ( D- 2), David Price ( D- 4), Richard Burr ( R- 5), Howard Coble ( R- 6) and Mel Watt ( D- 12). Factoring out the unopposed victories of B u rr and Coble, the four Democratic incumbents ave r aged 27 percent margins of v i c t o ry, ranging from Etheridge’s win by 17 points to Clayton’s landslide 33 percent margin. Mike McIntyre ( D- 7) spent only 4 percent more in 2000 than in 1998. Cass Ballenger ( R- 10) increased spending in 2000 by about 25 percent more than his 1998 expenditure level – but he still won by 40 points in 2000 after being unopposed in 1998. O bv i o u s ly, continu e d big spending on the part o f an incumbent in the absence of a leg i t i m at e ch a l l e n ger still does its part to solidify a voter base and deter future challengers. Republican candidates outspent their Demo-c r atic rivals by a 1.3- to- 1 spending ratio in 2000. Republicans spent $ 7,573,174 to the Democrat s ’ $ 5,996,534. Pa rt of the reason Republicans spent so mu ch was that two Republican incumbents, Richard Burr in the 5th District and Howard Coble in the 6th District, had no Democratic o p p o n e n t s. If t h e re had been Democratic com-p e t i t i o n and money in these two races the m a rgin between the two parties spending leve l s would have narrowed considerab ly. For ex a m p l e, the 12 Republican candidates for the 12 seats spent an ave r age of $ 631,098 per seat while the 10 Democratic candidates for the 10 seats they contested average was $ 599,653. Without Serious Challenge rs, Incumbents Still Spend Big CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L Total # ofGeneral $ Spent District $ Spent Election Votes per Vote 8th 2,759,169 203,464 13.56 3rd 2,442,940 198,455 12.31 11th 2,910,673 266,377 10.93 2nd 1,248,193 251,838 4.96 Avg. 1,130,809 231,650 4.88 9th 1,096,896 264,220 4.15 1st 481,401 189,168 2.54 12th 481,401 209,144 2.30 5th 421,060 185,855 2.27 4th 727,485 325,870 2.23 7th 432,143 229,666 1.88 6th 301,790 215,085 1.40 10th 266,557 240,658 1.11 Total 13,569,708 2,779,800 SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina State Board ofElections Congressional Campaign Costs: 2000 Primary & General District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average 1st 691,264 509,709 368,281 713,415 481,401 552,814 Winner, % ii D 99% D 96% D 91% D 96% D 99% 96% 2nd 792,111 1,929,890 1,995,540 1,545,816 1,248,193 1,502,310 Winner, % D 72% R 44% D 41% D 76% D 73% 61% 3rd 973,718 1,665,920 712,244 987,408 2,442,940 1,356,446 Winner, % D 70% R 34% R 94% R 67% R 52% 63% 4th 566,413 1,103,931 2,425,272 1,785,821 727,485 1,321,784 Winner, % D 97% R 28% D 54% R 98% D 94% 74% 5th 875,588 1,762,592 996,688 621,050 421,060 935,396 Winner, % D 73% R 49% R 79% R 98% R 100% 80% 6th 574,337 411,949 599,383 426,331 301,790 462,758 Winner, % R 94% R 100% R 94% R 100% R 100% 98% 7th 337,411 1,073,132 928,679 416,471 432,143 637,567 Winner, % D 94% D 90% D 60% D 100% D 99% 89% 8th 872,145 1,162,139 797,624 1,688,926 2,759,169 1,456,001 Winner, % D 85% D 68% D 79% R 77% R 70% 76% 9th 331,549 878,947 689,382 796,717 1,096,896 758,698 Winner, % R 88% R 89% R 90% R 96% R 90% 91% 10th 374,770 260,019 296,207 213,895 266,557 282,290 Winner, % R 92% R 100% R 93% R 100% R 100% 97% 11th 2,040,307 1,885,675 596,549 1,242,399 2,910,673 1,735,121 Winner, % R 74% R 62% R 91% R 71% R 65% 73% 12th 624,658 315,041 174,834 1,085,947 481,401 536,376 Winner, % D 95% D 95% D 96% D 63% D 75% 85% TOTAL 9,054,271 12,958,945 10,580,681 11,524,195 13,569,708 11,537,561 Winner, % 86% 60% 69% 79% 73% 73% Avg. per seat 754,523 1,079,912 881,723 960,350 1,130,809 961,463 NOTES: i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each ofthe years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To convert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 ofthe 2000$; 1994$ = .852 ofthe 2000$; 1996$ = .886 ofthe 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of the 2000$. ii Winner, % = party ofthe winning candidate and the percentage ofthe district total spent by the winner. SOURCES: Almanac of American Politics; Federal Election Commission; the North Carolina Board ofElections Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000 i S E E S P E N D I N G ON PAGE 5 › NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 4 AND PUBLIC L IFE After the 2000 elections, we can now look at the decade of spending in congressional races following the 1990 U. S. census and the various redistricting plans used in the period. Using the same 2000- dollar equivalent data for those five s ep a r ate elections we find the fo l l owing pat t e rn s : • Between the 1992 and 2000 elections, the cost of these five sets of 12 elections incre a s e d by nearly 50 percent, from $ 9.054 million in 1992 to $ 13.570 million in 2000. The ave r age cost per seat moved from $ 755,000 in 1992 to $ 1.131 mil-lion in 2000, with an average cost per con-gressional seat of about $ 961,000 during the decade. • There are now five “ million- dollar” con-gressional seats in North Carolina – seats in which the average cost of elec-tions over the decade was more than a million dollars ( 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and 11th), and nearly a sixth ( 5th at $ 935,396). There is a “ three- quarter-million- dollar” seat ( 9th), three “ half-million- dollar” seats ( 1st, 7th, 12th), and nearly a fourth ( 6th at $ 462,758). The final 10th seat has been a “ quarter-million- dollar” seat with the incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R) winning each of the five races. • Money and winning go hand- in- hand in these races as the winners of the decade’s 60 races outspent their opponents by nearly a 3- to- 1 ratio. Incumbents espe-cially benefit from this as was clear ly seen in the 2000 elections when all races were won by incumbents, and they outspent their challengers by a 3- to- 1 ratio. And 13 of the 20 most expensive races over the decade were won by incumbents. • Wi n n e r ’ s spending has accounted for 73 per-c e n t of the total spending in these 60 races. The specific year range around that 73 per-cent figure is instructive. The high point was in 1992, when winners’ bank accounts overwhelmed their opponents by making 86 percent of the campaign expenditures. This was the year when e very candidate faced the first newly drawn districts since 1981. The low point of 60 percent was in 1994, when there were three open seats and two incumbents were defeated, so fi ve of the 12 winners were not incumbents . • T h e re has been a shift in the party spending tied to the increasing Republican strength in these races. In the 1992 elections, Democrat s outspent their Republican competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio, but in the 1994 elections the D e m o c r atic adv a n t age dropped to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio. Then in 1996, the Republicans gained the upper hand and outspent their Demo-cratic competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio. This Republican advantage dropped off to a 1.1- to- 1 ratio in 1998 and then increased slightly in 2000 to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio. • Twenty of the 60 races cost more than $ 1 mil-l i o n. They ranged from the $ 2.911 million high in the 2000 8th District race to the $ 1.073 million 1994 7th District race that was Charlie Ro s e’s last hurrah. Several tre n d s are visible. 1994 was a very expensive year as seven of the 20 most expensive races occurred then. The 1998 and 2000 elections each had five $ 1 million- plus contests. The 2nd and 11th districts each had four of their five contests in this high price level, while the 4th and 8th districts had three of their five there. The four races in which an incumbent was defeated and three of the six open seat races were also million-dollar- plus specials. As already noted, 13 of the 20 high- price races saw incumbents win, some quite easily. Only two of these races saw the winning margin in single digits. The bottom line is money and incumbents working together for the future. n A Decade of Spending in N. C. C o n gressional Ra c e s, 1992– 2000 TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R , UNC- CH A P E L HI L L Rank Dist. Year Amount Type Outcome Pts 1 11th 2000 $ 2.911 In. Taylor- R reelected 12 2 8th 2000 $ 2.759 In. Hayes- R reelected 11 3 3rd 2000 $ 2.443 In. Jones- R reelected 24 4 4th 1996 $ 2.425 In. Heineman- R defeated 10 5 11th 1992 $ 2.040 In. Taylor- R reelected 10 6 2nd 1996 $ 1.996 In. Funderburk- R defeated 7 7 2nd 1994 $ 1.930 Open seat R won 12 8 11th 1994 $ 1.886 In. Taylor- R reelected 20 9 4th 1998 $ 1.786 In. Price- D reelected 15 10 5th 1994 $ 1.763 Open seat R won 14 11 8th 1998 $ 1.689 Open seat R won 3 12 3rd 1994 $ 1.666 In. Lancaster- D defeated 6 13 2nd 1998 $ 1.546 In. Etheridge- D reelected 15 14 2nd 2000 $ 1.248 In. Etheridge- D reelected 17 15 11th 1998 $ 1.242 In. Taylor- R reelected 15 16 8th 1994 $ 1.162 In. Hefner- D reelected 4 17 4th 1994 $ 1.104 In. Price- D defeated 0.8 18 9th 2000 $ 1.090 In. Myrick- R reelected 39 19 12th 1998 $ 1.086 In. Watt- D reelected 14 20 7th 1994 $ 1.073 In. Rose- D reelected 4 KEY: Amount = cost ofcampaigns in 2000$ ( millions) Type = In. – incumbent; Open – no incumbent in race Pts. = point margin ofvictory or defeat Most Expensive Congressional Elections, 1992– 2000 Year Dems. Reps. % % 1992 60 40 1994 56 44 1996 40 60 1998 47 53 2000 44 56 K E Y: aThese perc e n t ages are of the two - p a rty spending in the races. Third- party and independents’ spending not included. Partisan Spending in 1992– 2000 Congressional Races a For the third time in a row, incumbent Bob Etheridge won the 2nd Congressional District in North Carolina. Although Etheridge is a s t rong candidat e, the 2nd District has been known to switch between Democrat and Republican in any given year. Nationwide, Democrats needed to win seven extra seats to regain power in the U. S. House of Representatives. Many closely watched the race between Bob Etheridge and Doug Haynes because any seat’s shift could a ffe c t the congressional balance of p owe r. Wi t h the state clearly favoring Bush, the Democrats needed another way to gain support. Bob Etheridge defeated Doug Haynes with 58 percent of the vote. Although new to the con-gressional race, Doug Haynes still garnered 41 percent of the vote, showing the volatility of the 2nd District voters. Haynes, a Republican from Rocky Mount, attempted to link himself to presidential candidate George W. Bush in a m ove to use Bush’s popularity in North Caro l i n a to gain support. He wanted to make funda-mental ch a n ges in areas such as tax policy and e d u c ation. He supported giving school districts the power to spend money as they see fit. Haynes told supporters that, in general, he supported Bush’s policies and would push for them in Congress; understanding the conserv-ativeness of the 2nd District. Haynes is a former John Locke Foundation re s e a rcher who is known for his strong opinions t h at he is not afraid to express. Soon after winning the primary, Haynes challenged Etheridge to a series of debates. He quickly wanted to gain the support of the undecided. He ch a l l e n ged Etheridge to speak on educat i o n , one of the main points of contention betwe e n the two candidates. In an early campaign ad, Haynes used Etheridge’s stance on education against him. Haynes is shown reading a quote from the News & Observer where Etheridge had pushed for Congress to assist in school renovation e ven when the local area has rejected the bond issue. Haynes stated that Etheridge belie ved the voters were dumb and challenged the voters to reject someone who did not believe in their ability to think for themselve s. Hay n e s’ top priorities included moving power away from Washington and into states, and creat-ing a fairer tax code . Bob Etheridge is a conserv at ive Democrat wh o uses his beliefs to his advanta ge. In the past three congressional elections, it has been dif - ficult for a Republican to defe at him since many o f his ideals are not too far from their own. The fo rmer N. C. Superintendent of Public Instru c t i o n strongly supports the reform of educa-tion. In one television ad, he shows what seems like a jail cell, but in reality it is a trailer t h at has been at t a ched to an ove r-c rowd e d s chool. He implores vo t e rs not to let ch i ld ren continue to learn in these con-d i t i o n s. Besides improving education, Etheridge said he looked to help North Carolina farmers, i m p rove safety and sup-p o rt tech n o l o g i c a l advances. With Gore’s popularity down in North Carolina, Etheridge looked to separate himself from the presidential candidate, as did many Democratic candidates. With Durham County removed from the 2nd District, many people felt a large base of Democratic supporters for Etheridge had been lost. Etheridge instead focused on the m a ny undecided vo t e rs living in the 2nd District who account for its voting unpre d i c t ab i l i t y. He maintained contact with the strong Democrat i c voters but pushed hard with mailings and phone calls to win the votes of those who were not sure. These independent voters were m a i n ly white and in the middle- income range. He looked to extend his presence in the com-munity by participating in walks around counties. Volunteers would hand out leaflets, and Etheridge would meet and g reet con-stituents. Etheridge’s top priorities include improving education and protecting the retirement security of the elderly. In the 2000 election, voters in Wake and Johnston Counties made up nearly 55 percent of the district’s electorate — and the voters there supported Etheridge. Wilson County, with only 5 percent of the district’s voters, was the strongest supporter for Haynes. With the exception of Wilson County, Etheridge was the victor in all other counties. The 2nd District has always gone through periods of change of political party leadership. In 1996, Etheridge b e at incumbent Republican Dav i d F u n d e r b u rk by less than 10,000 votes. His vic-tory in 1998 was by nearly 44,000 votes. In the 2000 election, perhaps the strangest part of the campaign was the difference in money. Etheridge raised approximately $ 1,030,216 to Haynes $ 237,248. With a just over a fifth of the incumbent’s budget, Haynes still manage d to gain a sizeable amount of the vote; falling s h o rt of E t h e r i d ge by 43,722 vo t e s. This should send red flags to the Democrats that the wave of support in the 2nd District may be coming to an end. But the shape of the current 2nd District is also coming to an end, which could revive competition. n 2nd District: Etheridge Stablizes Swing District JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L County Etheridge Jackson Haynes Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Wake 61.8 1.1 37.2 95,482 37.9 Johnston 52.7 0.7 46.6 41,920 16.6 Nash 55.5 0.5 44.0 31,003 12.3 Harnett 59.6 0.7 39.6 24,455 9.7 Lee 59.1 1.0 40.0 16,054 6.4 Franklin 59.9 0.7 39.4 16,038 6.4 Wilson 48.9 0.5 50.6 10,997 4.4 Sampson 61.2 0.5 38.4 9,196 3.7 Granville 56.6 0.8 42.6 6,693 2.7 Totals 58.3 40.9 0.8 251,838 100.0 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 2nd District, by County Total spending in the stat e’s three most ex p e n-s ive 2000 congressional races topped $ 2 million e a ch. The $ 2.911 million race in the 11th District between incumbent Charles Taylor ( R) and Sam Neill ( D) was the most expensive. Taylor outspent Neill by a 1.8- to- 1 ratio and re t a i n e d his seat with a 13- point margin. These two can-d i d at e s spent $ 10.93 per vote in the general election – yet that was less than the $ 13.56 spent per vote in the 8th District race and the $ 12.31 spent per vote in the 3rd District race. The 8th District race between Republican Ro b i n H ayes and Democrat Mike Taylor was the second most expensive race, costing $ 2,759,169 as H ayes tried to ach i eve his first reelection. Haye s outspent Taylor by nearly a 2.4- to- 1 ratio and retained his seat by a 11- point margin. But as just noted, the cost per vote in this race was the most of any of the 12 races. The 3rd District Jones- McNairy race also topped the $ 2 million mark at $ 2,442,940, as the candidates spent $ 12.31 per general election vote. Two other races topped $ 1 million in cost last year. In the 2nd District, incumbent Bob E t h e r i d ge ( D) outspent ch a l l e n ger Doug Hay n e s by a 3.2- to- 1 ratio while retaining his seat by a 17- point margin. In the 9th District, incum - bent Republican Sue Myrick outspent chal-lenger Edward McGuire by a 14- to- 1 ratio and won reelection by 39 points. The ye a r ’ s barga i n s e at belonged to incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R- 10), whose campaign spent only $ 266,557 to win a 39- point margin race. n i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of 1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each of the years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To con vert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 of the 2000$; 1994$ = .852 of the 2000$; 1996$ = .886 of the 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of the 2000$. › S P E N D I N G F ROM PAGE 3 The 2000 congressional election in District 8 provided another entertaining contest, as te x-tile heir Robin Hayes and attorney Mike Taylor went toe- to- toe for a rematch of their 1998 race. The district has a history of conservative voting and traditional politics. Democratic c o n gressman Bill Hefner held the seat betwe e n 1974 and 1996, winning consecutive — and sometimes close — elections. In 1998, most analysts thought Ha yes, the Republican nominee for gove rnor in 1996, wo u l d easily defeat relative newcomer Mike Taylor because of H aye s ’ s name recognition and mon-e t a ry strength as heir to the Cannon Textile Mills fortune. Many Democrats felt Taylor had no ch a n c e, and the party gave little personal or financial support to his campaign. Meanwhile, Hayes outspent Taylor 3- to- 1 and benefited from campaign visits from Newt Gingrich and Dan Quayle. However, Taylor stunned the experts by gaining 48 percent of the popular vote; Hayes won by a mere 3,378 votes. In 2000, both sides geared up for what was expected to be a hotly contested race. The two major factors that helped T aylor compete in 1998 were still relevant in 2000. First, the 1998 redistricting plan mandated by the U. S. Supreme Court increased overall Democratic registration in the district two points to 69 p e rcent, and it increased the number of A f r i c a n American vo t e rs from 21 percent to 25 perc e n t . Second, higher turnout among Democrat s, and particularly African Americans, was expected yet again in such a hard fought contest. The Democratic Party recognized that 2000 offered a prime opportunity to unseat Ha yes, and it poured monetary and personal re s o u rc e s into the district. Nationally known Democrats s u ch as House Minority Leader Rich a rd Gep h a rd t of Missouri and Minority Whip David Bonior of Michigan appeared on behalf of Taylor. The D e m o c r atic Congressional Campaign Committee in Washington contributed more than $ 600,000 for Taylor’s effort. Taylor spent more than $ 700,000 during his campaign. Republicans countered by sending Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, former presidential candidate John McCain, Sen. Jesse Helms and NRA presi-dent Charlton Heston to the district. Hayes spent more than $ 1.5 million in 2000. In 1998, the candidates spent a total of $ 1.5 million, but in 2000 they spent a combined $ 2.25 million. Somewhat surprisingly, the 2000 election was a bigger victory for Hayes, who won with 55 percent of the vote compared to his winning with just 50.7 percent of the vote in 1998. Voting turnout was considerably greater in the 2000 presidential year race [ 203,464 total vo t e s ] than it was in the 1998 U. S. Senate year race [ 133,124 total votes]. This was a 53 percent increase of more 70,000 votes. So running at the same time George W. Bush was winning the state seemed to help Hayes in his successful bid for reelection. The competitive nature of the 8th District race provided some interesting and occasionally amusing moments. When Gephardt spoke in Ja nu a ry to Cab a rrus County high school students on behalf of Taylor, Hayes showed up at what was supposed to be an all- Democratic event, causing a stir and no small amount of t e n s i o n . In Fe b ru a ry, a national TV ad from the American D a i ry Association praised “ the power of ch e e s e ” in an imagined campaign pitting fake presi-dential candidates John Hayes and Peter Taylor, as well as Bob Dole. The ad depicted cheese- lover Peter Taylor as a hero and cheese- hater John Hayes as a loser. Real- life candidates Hayes and Taylor were amused by the ad’s irony, but Hayes was disappointed that Dole did the ad without considering its connection to the 8th District. While Gephardt visited in January and David Bonior held a fund- raiser for T aylor in October 1999, big- name Hayes supporters dominated in 2000. In a rare campaign appearance for a fellow Republican, Helms appeared in Concord to rally support for Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple 8th District: Incumbency Tu rn s Tight Race Into Easy Wi n ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 6 AND PUBLIC LIFE County Taylor Schwartz Hayes Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Cabarrus 31.7 1.2 67.1 49,847 24.5 Union 32.0 1.2 66.8 45,179 22.2 Cumberland 64.0 0.8 35.2 30,955 15.2 Stanly 36.2 0.9 63.0 22,453 11.0 Richmond 49.9 0.6 49.5 14,582 7.2 Scotland 62.0 0.5 37.5 9,131 4.5 Montgomery 47.6 0.7 51.7 8,985 4.4 Anson 62.0 0.5 37.5 7,975 3.9 Hoke 60.2 1.5 38.3 7,578 3.7 Robeson 53.7 0.8 45.5 6,779 3.3 Totals 44.0 1.0 55.0 203,464 100 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 8th District, by County Year of Seat Member, Party 1st Elec. Service US Sen. Jesse Helms, R 1972 29th 6th CD Howard Coble, R 1984 17th 10th CD Cass Ballenger, R 1986 15th 4th CD David Price, D 1986 13th 11th CD Charles Taylor, R 1990 11th 1st CD Eva Clayton, D 1992 9th 12th CD Mel Watt, D 1992 9th 3rd CD Walter B. Jones Jr., R 1994 7th 5th CD Richard Burr, R 1994 7th 9th CD Sue Myrick, R 1994 7th 2nd CD Bob Etheridge, D 1996 5th 7th CD Mike McIntyre, D 1996 5th US Sen. John Edwards, D 1998 3rd 8th CD Robin Hayes, R 1998 3rd Total Years ofService 140 Total Republican Years ofService 96 Total Democratic Years ofService 44 Seniority in the N. C. Congressional Delegation, 2001 S E E 8TH DI STRICT ON PAGE 15 › North Carolina’s 11th District was a hotly con-tested race in 2000, as incumbent Rep re s e n t a-tive Charles H. Taylor defeated Democrat Sam Neill with 55 percent of the vote. The 11th District, in the western part of the state, includes Asheville and 15 mountain counties . Neill challenged Taylor in what had been for some time a “ safe” Republican district. But because of his strong candidacy and allegat i o n s surrounding Taylor’s financial dealings, Neill was able to give Taylor serious contention. The recent history of the 11th District is help - ful in framing the e vents of the 2000 election. Before the 1980s the district was, like most Southern districts, safely Democratic. During the Republicanization of the South in the 1980s, the district became a “ revolving door” district, throwing out five of six incumbents in elections held between 1980 and 1990. The district became more of a Republican strong-hold at the end of the decade, as voters sup-p o rted Jim Gardner in the lieutenant gove rn o r ’ s race in 1988 and Jesse Helms in the senatorial campaign of 1990. Taylor, a businessman and tree farmer from Brevard, came close to unseating the incumbent in 1988 and suc - ceeded in 1990. During the 1990s, Taylor supported 98 perc e n t of his party’s “ Contract with America” legisla - tion and built an incredible reputation for constituent service. Rather than leading on the ideological front, Taylor represents local interests effectively. He holds town meetings at local courthouses and other locations, where he gives residents a chance to tell him about local issues. Taylor has a reputation as a hard worker with a top- notch staf f and maintains several regional offices throughout his district. His most controversial stand is on environmental protection, which he makes very clear is not as important as preventing job loss. This resonates well with the natives in the 11th District. Party leaders value his loyalty and have rewarded him with a seat on the Appropriations Committee and the chair-manship of the District of Columbia Finance Committee. While Taylor lost some g round in the elections between 1994 and 1998, he still held the district safely. The 11th District has a high percentage of white voters, and these white voters go to the polls. For instance, in 1994 more than 190,000 district residents cast votes in the congressional election, while in the active, highly populated 4th District fewer than 155,000 votes were cast. In 1998, African Americans made up 4 percent of the district’s registered voters. Without much support from black voters, the Democratic Party is challenged to compete. The Republican Party dominates despite the fact that in 1998 only 35 percent of the reg i s t e re d voters in the district belonged to the GOP, a holdover from the days of the Democratic Solid South. In the 2000 election Taylor found a strong opponent in Sam Neill, a Hendersonville attorney who ser ved on the University of North Carolina Board of Governors for 12 years. Neill’s ability and financial backing combined with the financial scandal involving Taylor to produce a close race. In August, a federal grand jur y requested information regarding loans made by Blue Ridge Savings Bank — owned by Taylor — to one o f the congre s s m a n’s political backe rs, Sylva businessman Charles Cagle. The five loans, given between 1992 and 1995, amounting to more than $ 1 mil-l i o n, were never repaid in full and ended in lawsuits and foreclosures. The Charlotte Observer reported that one of the loans involved forged sig-natures. The bank denied lending the money to Cagl e, once the Ja cks o n County GOP chairman and a Taylor campaign contributor. Taylor claimed to not remember the details of the loans, and accused Neill of planting the story. The Taylor cam-paign responded with television ads painting Neill as a liar with an ever-growing “ Pinocchio” nose. Taylor also faced media scrutiny over his busi-ness dealings in Russia and his problems with Jackson and Transylvania counties regarding property taxes. In the end, though, Taylor’s superior con-stituent serving in a staunch Republican district enabled him to win with 55 percent of the vote. Only one of the 15 counties in his district, Jackson, gave more votes to his opponent. Taylor proved the power of incum-bency and constituent service. n 11th District: Incumbency Ove rcomes Scandal ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L County Neill Williams Taylor Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Buncombe 46.8 3.3 49.9 85,634 32.1 Henderson 35.0 2.7 62.3 37,137 13.9 Haywood 46.3 2.9 50.8 22,947 8.6 Rutherford 41.0 2.6 56.3 21,311 8.0 Transylvania 39.4 4.0 56.7 14,169 5.3 McDowell 33.5 2.4 64.1 14,049 5.3 Macon 39.1 2.8 58.1 13,062 4.9 Jackson 49.8 2.8 47.4 12,231 4.6 Cherokee 33.9 1.1 65.0 9,047 3.4 Yancey 44.0 1.3 54.8 8,922 3.3 Polk 40.0 3.2 56.8 8,192 3.1 Madison 43.9 2.0 54.1 8,024 3.0 Swain 48.2 1.4 50.4 4,309 1.6 Clay 37.0 1.1 61.9 3,921 1.5 Graham 29.4 1.2 69.4 3,422 1.3 Totals 42.1 2.8 55.1 266,377 100 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 11th District, by County 11th District Polls, 2000 Taylor Dem. Year % % Total Vote 1988 49.6 50.4 215,343 1990 51 49 201,309 1992 55 45 238,161 1994 60 40 192,688 1996 58 40 228,025 1998 57 42 199,423 2000 55 42 266,377 KEY: Dem. = Democratic candidate Charles Taylor and the 11th District, 1988– 2000 Date Taylor Neill Pollster Sample 7/ 22– 24 59 31 Pub. Opin. Strategies- R 300 lvs 9/ 22– 24 44 36 Cooper & Secrest- D 503 rvs 11/ 7 55 42 Actual Vote SOURCE: The Cook Political Repor t [ December 20, 2000]: 60. 11th District Polls, 2000 In 1991, the state leg i s l at u re re d rew the congre s-sional district lines, giving African Americans a majority in the 1st and 12th districts. As a re s u l t , Eva M. Clayton and Mel Watt in 1992 became the first African Americans elected to Congress in more than 90 years. Running in predomi-nantly African- American districts, C l ayton and Watt seemed to be products of biased district lines and there fo re we re victorious by defa u l t . T h ey easily won reelection in 1994 and 1996. In 1996, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled a gainst the 1991 redistricting plan — especially the long and narrow 12th District. While the 1996 elections went forward under the older plan, in 1997 the leg i s l at u re re d rew the district lines to more equitably split the population within the districts for the 1998 elections. In April 1998 the court threw out this plan, too, and the legislature had to once a gain redraw the district lines in May for the 1998 elections. The new redistricting plan of May 1998 decreased Clayton and Watt’s base of support and challenged their incumbency. However, their quest to continue as r epresentatives was not stifled when their districts were changed and the people who were thought to be their sole support reduced in numbers. The per-centage of African Americans in the 1st D i s t r i c t d e c reased from 57 percent to 50 perc e n t . The 12th District was affected even more as the percentage of African Americans dwindled from 57 percent to 36 percent. These districts had been challenged because they were designed to give African- Americans a majority, and the lawsuits focused specifically on the 12th District as a “ racial gerrymander.” In the 1991 plan, the 12th District’s lines stretched from west of Charlotte along Interstate 85 all the way to Durham and included parts of Greensboro and Winston- Salem. The 1997 plan eliminated many areas, and the only parts left in District 12 ran from Charlotte up I- 85 to Greensboro and Winston- Salem. The 1998 plan dropped Greensboro from the 12th District, and the lines ran from Charlotte north to Winston- Salem. In their first races for office in 1992, Clayton and Watt fought strongly contested primaries and won handily in the No vember general election. While Watt was able to best three o t h e rs for the Democratic nomination, Clay t o n faced six other Democrats and had to win a runoff primary just to get into the November race. She defeated the then- Democrat Walter B. Jones Jr. in the runoff. Jones, the son of a long- time Democratic congressman, soon changed parties and won the 1994 race for the 3rd Congressional District as a Republican. C l ayton and Wat t’s tenu re in office continu e d e a s i ly through the 1994 and 1996 elections. In both cases, they defe ated the same ch a l l e n ger in these two elections. Clayton prevailed over ch a l-l e n ger Ted Tyler 61 percent to 39 percent in 1994 and increased her winning margin over him in 1996 to 33 points. Watt defe ated Joe Martino in 1994 by 66 percent to 34 percent and dominat e d M a rt i n o, 72 percent to 27 percent, in 1996. With the new redistricting plan in 1998, Clay t o n and Watt seemed vulnerable to defeat. Man y s p e c u l ated that their terms would be ch a l l e n ge d with a bitter, drawn- out race to the finish. The speculators proved to be wrong, and Clayton and Watt prevailed again in their respective d i s t r i c t s. Clayton again easily defe ated her per-petual contender Ty l e r, 62 percent to 37 perc e n t , while Watt defeated Scott Keadle, 56 percent to 42 percent. Their margins of victory were narrower, but they were still winners. In 2000, Clayton defeated Duane E. Kratzer, Jr.’ s challenge for the 1st District seat. Clayton advocated education, vocational traini n g, ru r a l health, minimum wage and economic develop-ment. Kratzer’s platform included working for tax reform, a strong military, preserving 2nd Amendment rights, health care reform and opposition to abortion. He chall e n ge d C l ay t o n’s ability to make real diffe re n c e s in the community. Mel Watt successfu l ly defended his 12th District seat against Chad Mitchell. Watt’s platform i n cluded protecting Social Security and ensuring health care for the elderly. Mitch e l l ’ s goals we re similar to Watt’s, but he dif fered because he 1st and 12th Districts: African- American Incumbents Surv ive Changing Districts JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 8 AND PUBLIC LIFE Dist. Representative Dem. % ofOverall Vote Black % Voting Age Pop. ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 ’ 00 ’ 91 ’ 98 Change Plan Plan 1st Eva Clayton 67 61 66 62 66 57 50 - 7 12th Mel Watt 72 66 72 56 65 57 36 - 21 1st & 12th Districts: A Decade of African- American Incumbency S E E AFRICAN AMERICANS ON PAGE 15 › During the past 40 years, North Carolina’s congressional delegation has had to change with the times. Although the majority of rep-resentatives are still white men, minorities and women are now a part of the electoral politics of the state. There has also been con - side r able growth in Republican strength in N o rt h Carolina’s politics over this period. Politics has long been considered an all- male game in this state. However, two women, Eva Clayton ( D- 1) and Sue Myrick ( R- 9), broke the gender barrier in the 1992 and 1994 congres-sional elections. Then in 1996, Elaine Mars h a l l was elected secretary of state. In the 2000 elections, North Carolina reelected Clayton, Myrick and Marshall as well as three other women to statewide office — Lieutenant Governor Beverly Perdue ( D), Commissioner of Agriculture Meg Phipps ( D) and Commissioner of Labor Cherie Berry ( R). Even more astounding is that Clayton is also one of North Carolina’s two African- American representatives. Clayton and Mel Watt ( D- 12) we re first elected in 1992 after the controve rs i a l creation of two majority- black districts. They were the first minorities to be elected to Congress from North Carolina since Recon-struction. Despite consistently changing dis - trict lines that decreased the minority race voting base in their districts, both Clayton and Watts retained their seats. On the other hand, North Carolina has a large number of Native American and Latin American communities across the state. However, African Americans remain the only minority g roup represented in Congress. The Republican Party has also made g reat strides in their fight for representation in Congress. In 1960, there was only one Republican congressman in the state ’ s delega-tion. In the 1994 “ Republican Revolution” election, Republicans became the majority in the delegation by winning eight of the 12 s e ats ( 67 percent). Fo l l owing the 2000 election, seven Republicans now make up 58 percent of the state’s delegation. As rep re s e n t ation becomes gre ater for fe m a l e s, b l a cks and Rep u b l i c a n s, incumbents continu e to hold on to their seats. During the past 40 years, incumbents have won the majority of seats in each election. In fact, there were six elections — 1964, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1988 and 2000 — in wh i ch all incumbents re t a i n e d their s e at. Only in the 1972, 1984 and 1994 elections did the number of winning newcomers nearly match the number of winning incumbents. During two of these elections in which new-comers nearly equaled incumbent winners, there was a direct correlation between the increase of Republican gains and new repre-s e n t at ive s. In 1984, five newc o m e rs comprised 45 percent of the delegation. This is the same year that President Ronald Reagan soundly defeated challenger Walter Mondale, Senator Jesse Helms won reelection over Governor Jim Hunt’s challenge, and Republicans made coattail gains by winning fi ve of the 11 con-gressional seats. Ten years later during the “ Republican Revolution” of 1994, only seven incumbents held onto their seats, and Republican representation jumped from four to eight. More change is afoot in the state ’ s congres-sional delegation. New district lines and, if Utah’s challenge is unsuccessful, an entirely new district. Based on the trends of the past four decades we can be sure of one thing — no longer can white Democratic males dominate the elections. Instead, women, Republicans and minorities now have a significant chance of winning. n C o n gressional Delegation Incre a s i n gly Dive rse Women, Blacks, Re p u blicans Make Gains JONAT H A N TR I BU LA, SE N I O R PU B L I C PO L I C Y ANA LYS I S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L 1960 ’ 62 ’ 64 ’ 66 ’ 68 ’ 70 ’ 72 ’ 74 ’ 76 ’ 78 ’ 80 ’ 82 ’ 84 ’ 86 ’ 88 ’ 90 ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 2000 1960– 2000 BY PARTY: #, Dem 11 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 6 8 8 7 8 4 6 5 5 162 %, Dem 92 82 82 73 73 73 82 82 82 82 64 82 55 73 73 64 67 33 50 42 42 69 #, Rep 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 8 6 7 7 75 %, Rep 8 18 18 27 27 27 18 18 18 18 36 18 45 27 27 36 33 67 50 58 58 31 BY GENDER: #, Male 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 228 %, Male 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 83 83 83 83 96 #, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 9 %, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 17 4 BY RACE: #, White 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 227 %, White 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 83 96 #, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10 %, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 4 BY TENURE: #, New 3 1 0 3 3 0 5 0 2 0 2 3 5 3 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 42 %, New 25 9 0 27 27 0 45 0 18 0 18 27 45 27 0 9 17 42 25 8 0 18 #, Incumbent 9 10 11 8 8 11 6 11 9 11 9 8 6 8 11 0 10 7 9 11 12 185 %, Incumbent 75 91 100 73 73 100 55 100 82 100 82 73 55 73 100 91 83 58 75 92 100 82 Trends in Congressional Demographics: 1960– 2000 During the past four decades, the number of major party voters in cong ressional elections has increased greatly, as would be expected in a rapidly growing state. In 2000, 2.708 million votes we re cast for congressional candidates in the general election compared to the 1.185 mil-lion votes cast in those elections in 1960 — an increase of 128 percent. i In fact, the growth in numbers of voters outpaced the growth in actual population. The 1960 census counted 4.556 million people in North Carolina, which has grown to 8.049 million people in the 2000 census — an increase of 77 percent. Population growth is only one factor in the i n c reasing number of vo t e rs in North Caro l i n a . Included in any list of factors has to be the opening of the electoral system to those who had been excluded in the past. The Civil Rights revolution, with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, opened the voting booth doors for blacks to become part of the electorate. The Vietnam War and the 26th Amendment to the U. S . Constitution, ratified in 1971, opened the doors to those between 18 and 21. The increase in partisan competition o ver the 40- year period was also a very important factor. In the first three elections of the 1960s Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans by a 3- to- 2 ratio. In the most recent four elections this has switched to a 1.25- to- 1 Republican voting edge. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of D e m o c r atic congre s s i o n a l votes increased by 64 percent, while the number of Republican congressional votes increased by 230 percent. This shift in voting support translated from a 6- to- 1 Democratic c o n gressional seat winning ratio in those thre e early 1960 races to a 1.4- to- 1 Republican con-gressional seat winning ratio in the four most recent elections. The table “ Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000” demonstrates the consistent erosion of the Democratic control over these elections. This Republican voting growth had to over-come a depression in GOP turnout following the Watergate scandal, reflected in the results of the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections. After increasing their success ratio in the 1968 to 1972 elections to only a 1.8- to- 1 Democratic advantage, Republicans saw those mid- 1970s races elevate the Democratic success ratio to a 4.5- to- 1 high. Since the 1978 elections, the Republican vote has been growing steadily. T h e re are also some interesting pat t e rns hidd e n in this 21 elections N. C. congressional voting history. These patterns are tied to the differing length of terms of elected officials. While two-year term Congressional elections occur in every even- numbered year [ 21 elections], the four- year term presidential and gubernatorial elections occur in every other e ven year [ 11 elections], and the six- year terms of the two U. S. senators bring those statewide races into these elections about two- thirds of the time [ 14 elections]. Voter Tu rnout Grow i n g Faster Than Po p u l at i o n Re fo rm s, Pa rt i s a n s h i p, Big Races Bring More People to Po l l s TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D JO H N BR A N C H, SE N I O R HI S TO RY MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POL ITIC S , MEDIA 1 0 AND PUBLIC LI FE Votes ( thousands) % of Vote Seats Won Uncontested Year Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep 1960 726 459 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0 1962 482 336 819 59 41 9 2 3 0 1964 788 511 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0 1966 484 432 916 53 47 8 3 2 0 1968 765 633 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1 1970 514 411 925 56 44 7 4 1 0 1972 735 610 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0 1974 638 348 986 65 35 9 2 3 0 1976 1,011 549 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0 1978 607 405 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1 1980 964 769 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0 1982 708 580 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0 1984 1,131 1,026 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0 1986 890 682 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0 1988 1,108 876 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0 1990 1,076 935 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0 1992 1,282 1,204 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0 1994 681 907 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1 1996 1,136 1,340 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0 1998 827 1,014 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2 2000 1,194 1,515 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2 KEY: Uncontested = number ofseats won in uncontested races SOURCE: State Board ofElections N. C. Congressional Voting Trends, 1960– 2000 › There are four distinct patterns involved in these elections: Pattern A is when there are presidential, gubernatorial and U. S. senatorial elections held at the same time as the con-gressional elections. This has happened se ven times since 1960. Pattern B, which has happened three times, is when there ar e presidential and gubernatorial elections being held at the same time. P attern C, which has happened seven times, is when there is just a U. S. Senate race being held at the same time. Pattern D, which has happened three times, is when there are no major statewide elections being held at the same time . As can be seen in the table “ Patterns in N. C. C o n gressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000,” the gre at e s t turnout occurs when there are se veral impor-tant statewide elections occurring at the same time. Patterns C and D have had considerably lower turnouts over the period. Voting in elections when Jim Hunt was on the ballot averaged 1.960 million voter s, while voting in elections when Jesse Helms was on the ballot averaged 1.800 million voters. ii The average turnout during the past 40 years has been 1.585 million for all elections . The 1994 Pattern D congressional elections, in wh i ch the “ Republican Revolution” took place, exemplified the impact of low turnout in a volatile political atmosphere. The 1994 con-gressional vote was the lowest since 1986 and fell nearly 47 percent below the cong ressional vote of 1992. The upcoming 2002 congressional elections will be a Pat t e rn C election. The only stat ew i d e race will be for the U. S. Senate seat cur rently held by Jesse Helms. With Helms retiring , there will be considerable statewide political action, as an open seat race creates interest - ing primaries in addition to a general election with no incumbent run-ning. There has not been an open Senate seat race in the state since 1974 when Sam Ervin retired. The upcoming race has already attracted national media interested in whether the Democrats can keep their tenuous hold on the U. S. Senate, and the potential for an ideological shift in the Senate delegation. This year’s redistricting could also affect turnout in 2002. Will the new district lines be “ incumbent friendly ” and therefore not very con-troversial, leading to some rather uninteresting races? Or will the new lines set up some battle grounds that may lead to some ver y heated and controversial races? And if North Carolina fends off the Utah challenge over which state gains the additional seat, will that 13th District race between relative newcomers to the congres-sional scene attract or deter voters from going to the voting booth? n i In the 2000 elections, there were two seats not contested by a Democratic candidate. If there had been a Democratic candidate, the increase in the number voting in the 2000 elections would have been even greater vis- a- vis the 1960 vote , and the growth in the number of Democratic votes would have also been g reater. n ii Hunt ran for lieutenant governor in 1972, governor in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996, and for U. S. Senator in 1984. He won all but the 1984 race. Helms ran for a U. S. Senate seat in 1972, 1978, 1984, 1990 and 1996, and was successful each time. Party Voting Seats Uncon. Votes Dem. Rep. D R D R ( thousands) % % # # # # Pattern A: President, U. S. Senate, Governor Races [ 7] 1960 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0 1968 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1 1972a 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0 1980b 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0 1984a 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0 1992b 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0 1996a 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0 Avg. 1,826 54 46 % Change + 109 - 25 + 38 Pattern B: President and Governor Races [ 4] 1964 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0 1976b 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0 1988 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0 2000 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2 Avg. 1,888 57 44 % Change + 108 - 28 + 44 Pattern C: U. S. Senate Race [ 7] 1962 819 59 41 9 2 3 0 1966 916 53 47 8 3 2 0 1974 986 65 35 9 2 3 0 1978c 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1 1986 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0 1990c 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0 1998 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2 Avg. 1,308 56 44 % Change + 125 - 24 + 34 Pattern D: No Major Statewide Races [ 3] 1970 925 56 44 7 4 1 0 1982 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0 1994 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1 Avg. 1,267 51 49 % Change + 72 - 23 + 30 NOTES Avg. – Average vote for that pattern ofraces over the period % Change – percent change in totals from earliest to the most recent race in the pattern Party Voting – % of2- party vote that was Democratic/ Republican Seats – Number ofCongressional seats won by Democrats/ Republicans Uncon. – Number ofuncontested races won by Democrats/ Republicans a – Helms and Hunt in statewide races b – Hunt in a statewide race c – Helms in a statewide race Pat t e rns in N. C. Congressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000 Decade Dem Rep Total D to R Ratio 1960– 68 43 12 55 3.6 to 1 1970– 78 41 14 55 2.9 to 1 1980– 88 38 17 55 2.2 to 1 1990– 98 30 29 59 1 to 1 2000 5 7 12 1 to 1.4 Total 157 79 236 2 to 1 Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000 An open seat Senate race creates interesting primaries, attracts national media interested in whether the Democrats can keep their tenuous hold on the U. S. Senate, and holds the potential for an ideological shift in the state’s Senate delegation. John McCain’s presidential campaign demon-strated that being independent from your political party could be the centerpiece of a fairly successful national campaign. But in c o n gressional districts dominated by one part y or the other, independence can be seen as disloyalty — and punished. In North Carolina, most congressional delegates voted with their party most of the time, but Republicans showed more loyalty than Democrats during the 1999– 2000 session. The Congressional Quarterly rankings of the state’s representatives reveal some surprises, h oweve r. President Clinton did not re c e ive total support from the North Carolina delegation, even from his fellow Democrats. Mel Watt ( 12th) was Clinton’s strongest supporter from the state. He voted with the president 82 per-cent of the time. Bob Etheridge ( 2nd) vo t e d with the president 65 percent of the time. Mike McIntyre ( 7th) supported the president only 40 percent of the time. The average presidential support rating of the Democrats in the North Carolina dele gation was nearly 70 percent, just below the national Democratic average of 73 percent. This differe n c e highlights the fact that S o u t h e rn Democrat s are more conservative than Democrats as a whole and a re more like ly to oppose the liberal plans of party members. None of the seven Republicans the state sent to Congress broke ranks as often as some Democrats did. The highest support rating for Clinton came from Sue Myrick ( 9th) at 26 percent. Two members tied for the lowest, at 19 percent. The gap between high and low was much smaller than on the Democratic side. O u t o f eve ry five votes cast by N. C. Rep u b l i c a n s, four were in opposition to Clinton. N o rth Carolina Democrats we re also mu ch more likely to go against their fellow Democrats in Congress. McIntyre voted against the party 39 percent of the time. Etheridge, the next most i n d ependent, bucked the party line 16 perc e n t of the time. Both were reelected, despite what some might consider damaging disloyalty to the party. The average party opposition rating for the North Carolina dele gation was nearly 16 percent, although McIntyre’s nu m b e rs skew the average somewhat. Without McIntyre, the North Carolina Democrats voted the party line more than 90 percent of the time. Rega rd l e s s, most of the Democratic delegat i o n supported their party colleagues most of the time. The Republicans delegates were much more loyal to the GOP than their colleagues on the other side of the aisle. Only one, Robin Hayes ( 8th), voted with the Democrats more than 8 percent of the time, and he buc ked the party line only 11 percent of the time, voting with the Republican party on nearly 9 of 10 votes. On average, the GOP delegates from North Carolina voted with the party more than 93 percent of the time, ignoring the party ’ s lead on only 6.4 percent of the votes. All but one of the members had voting partic-ipation rates in the House of more than 90 percent, and all but two of the delegates had participation rate scores between 96 and 99 percent. Charles Taylor ( 11th), required by a very competitive reelection battle to spend more time at home, had a voting rate of 91 percent — still good compared to Sue Myrick, who voted only 86 percent of the time. Her reelection campaign was by no means heated — she won by more than 30 points and sits in a safe Republican district. Most rep re s e n t at ive s have made an effort to keep their voting rates high ever since it became a campaign issue in the mid- 1970s. Myrick’s low voting rate could be somewhat of a liability in 2002. These voting rates and analyses confirm again that presidential support and party unity, especially on the Democratic side, are not important issues that representatives from North Carolina consider in their votes. Nor, it appears, are these two scores important to the voters of North Carolina when choosing their representatives. n GOP Delegates More Loyal To Pa rty Than Democrat s EVA N SAU DA, SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 1 2 AND PUBLIC LIFE Clinton Administration Party Majority Voting Dist. Rep. ( Party) Sup. Opp. Sup. Opp. Partic. 1st Clayton ( D) 79 21 93 7 97 2nd Etheridge ( D) 65 35 84 16 99 3rd Jones ( R) 19 81 92 8 97 4th Price ( D) 80 20 90 10 97 5th Burr ( R) 22 78 92 8 96 6th Coble ( R) 21 79 96 4 96 7th McIntyre ( D) 40 60 61 39 96 8th Hayes ( R) 19 81 89 11 99 9th Myrick ( R) 26 74 96 4 86 10th Ballenger ( R) 23 77 96 4 96 11th Taylor ( R) 21 79 94 6 91 12th Watt ( D) 82 18 94 6 97 Clinton Administration Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 69 relevant House votes in which the legislator was present and either supported or opposed the position ofthe Clinton administration. Party Majority Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 259 House votes in which the legislator was present and supported or opposed a majority ofhis or her party. Voting Partic.: Percent ofthe 600 House votes in which the legislator voted. SOURCE: “ Vote Studies,” CQ Weekly ( January 6, 2001): 52 – 74. Congressional Quarterly’s Voting Analysis of NC’s 2000 Congressional Delegation how many members of a minority they must put in a district in order for them to have a fair chance of electing the representative of their choice. The ( George H. W.) Bush and Clinton Justice Departments told state legislatures that they must consider race when drawing districts , but the U. S. Supreme Court also said they can't consider race too much. During the last decade, judges and statisticians have joined legislators in the redistricting process so that almost all of the national conversation about the topic is focused on which mathematical mode will make the best defense in court. A leading vendor of redistricting software mar-kets it as a " litigation support" tool that can help lawmakers use census and other data to prove that they weren't thinking about race too little or too much. Despite the legal wrangling of the last 10 years, North Carolina’s congressional districts became predictable, reelecting in 2000 a record number of incumbents. Politicians – especially incumbents – like this certainty. In the past, lawmakers could assuredly play b y the first rule of redistricting – protect incum-bents. However, legislators will bear little responsi-bility for the electoral districts the state finally ends up with. When they finish their impossi-ble task, lawsuits will ensue. With better data about “ communities of inter-est” that aren’t based on race, legislators per - haps could more confidently defend at least one of their two competing goals. But e ven with better information, few lawmakers have professional backgrounds in the type of data modeling needed to crunch the numbers. So the process still ends up in the hands of com-puter analysts whose names ne ver appear on a ballot. The political process is just the first round of redistricting. Regardless of how many votes have been taken or how many le gal decisions have been handed down, North Carolinians can be certain that more lawsuits lie ahead — until the next round of political numbers are handed down. n › R E D I S T R I C T I N G F ROM PAGE 1 Dist# Incumbent 2000 Pop Ideal Pop Ideal +/- Ideal Ideal Pop Ideal +/- 13 Seats 13 Seats +/- % 12 Seats 12 Seats % 1st Clayton, D 587,830 619,178 - 31,348 - 5.1 670,776 - 51,598 - 7.7 2nd Etheridge, D 730,266 619,178 111,088 17.9 670,776 59,490 8.9 3rd Jones, R 615,614 619,178 - 3,564 - 0.6 670,776 - 55,162 - 8.2 4th Price, D 765,876 619,178 146,698 23.7 670,776 95,100 14.7 5th Burr, R 637,158 619,178 17,980 2.9 670,776 - 33,618 - 5.0 6th Coble, R 689,529 619,178 70,351 11.4 670,776 18,753 2.8 7th McIntyre, D 690,054 619,178 70,876 11.5 670,776 19,278 2.9 8th Hayes, R 661,112 619,178 41,934 6.8 670,776 - 9,664 - 1.4 9th Myrick, R 693,042 619,178 73,864 11.9 670,776 22,266 3.3 10th Ballenger, R 655,413 619,178 36,235 5.6 670,776 - 15,363 - 2.3 11th Taylor, R 656,619 619,178 37,441 6.1 670,776 - 14,157 - 2.1 12th Watt, D 666,800 619,178 47,622 7.7 670,776 - 3,976 - 0.6 13th ———— - 0- 619,178 - 619,178 —— ——— ——— —— NOTES: Ideal Pop — the total population ofthe state divided by 13 seats or 12 seats to get equal representation. Ideal +/- — the dif ference between the ideal and actual population for the district Ideal +/- % — the percent that the actual population deviates from the ideal population SOURCE: www. ncleg/ redistricting/ 2000BaseMapRpt N. C. Congressional Districts: Ideal vs. Actual Populations 13 District Scenario Incumbent District +/-% Price, D 4th + 23.7 Etheridge, D 2nd + 17.9 Myrick, R 9th + 11.9 McIntyre, D 7th + 11.5 Coble, R 6th + 11.4 Watt, D 12th + 7.7 Hayes, R 8th + 6.8 Taylor, R 11th + 6.1 Ballenger, R 10th + 5.9 Burr, R 5th + 2.9 Jones, R 3rd - 0.6 Clayton, D 1st - 5.1 12 District Scenario Incumbent District +/-% Price, D 4th + 14.7 Etheridge, D 2nd + 8.9 Myrick, R 9th + 3.3 McIntyre, D 7th + 2.9 Coble, R 6th + 2.8 Watt, D 12th - 0.6 Hayes, R 8th - 1.4 Taylor, R 11th - 2.1 Ballenger, R 10th - 2.3 Burr, R 5th - 5.0 Clayton, D 1st - 7.7 Jones, R 3rd - 8.2 The Impact of Two District Scenarios N C DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 4 A AND PUBL IC L IFE ed the Bushes in 1992 and 2000, but backed Bill Clinton in 1996. Rep. Charles Taylor ( R- 11) has comfortably retained his seat in each of the five elections since he initially won the seat from incumbent Democrat James Clarke in 1990. The district ’ s voters decisively favored the Republican can-didate for congress over the past decade but did not decisively favor Republican candidates for president until 2000, when George W. Bush made off with 59 percent of the district’s vo t e s. Voters slightly favored Clinton in 1992 before slightly favoring Dole four years later. Over the past 10 years North Carolina has moved clearly in the direction of supporting Republican candidates for president. In 2000, George W. Bush took the state with 56 percent o f the vote and won in nine of the 12 districts. The only districts he failed to carry were the 1st and 12th – safe Democrat districts – and the 4th, a district in which voters cast a bare majority of their votes for Al Gore. The state’s s u p p o rt for Republican presidential candidat e s has been widely dispersed unlike its support fo r D e m o c r at s, wh i ch is ge o gr ap h i c a l ly concentrat e d . The Republicans hold the majority of the stat e’s s e ats in Congre s s, but the five Democrats in the delegation were all reelected by convincing margins last year. Both parties have “ s a fe ” s e ats that are almost guaranteed victories, but the Republicans find safety in more districts than do the Democrat s. The state has continu e d to lean slightly towa rd Republicans in congre s-sional races since the 1994 shift fro m support of Democratic to GOP candidates. n Avg Avg Congressional Race Scores Score Incumbent, Party ( County) Presidential Race Scoresd Score Dist # 92a 94a 96a 98b 00c 92– 00 92 96 00 92– 00 1st 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eva Clayton, D ( Warren) 1 1 1 1 2nd 2 4 2 2 2 2.4 Bob Etheridge, D ( Harnett) 4 2 4 3.3 3rd 2 4 5 5 5 4.2 Walter Jones, R ( Pitt) 4 4 5 4.3 4th 1 3R 2 2 1 1.5 David Price, D ( Orange) 2 3D 3D 2.7 5th 2 4 5 5 5u 4.2 Richard Burr, R ( Forsyth) 3R 4 5 4 6th 5 5u 5 5u 5u 5 Howard Coble, R ( Guilford) 5 5 5 5 7th 2 3D 3D 1u 1 2 Mike McIntyre, D ( Cumberland) 3D 4 4 3.7 8th 2 3D 2 3R 4 2.8 Robin Hayes, R ( Cabarrus) 3R 4 4 3.7 9th 5 5 5 5 5 5 Sue Myrick, R ( Mecklenburg) 5 5 5 5 10th 5 5 5 5u 5 5 Cass Ballenger, R ( Lenoir) 5 5 5 5 11th 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 Charles Taylor, R ( Buncombe) 3D 3R 5 3.7 12th 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 Mel Watt, D ( Mecklenburg) 1 1 2 1.3 Avgs 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.6 KEY COMPETITIVENESS SCORES: 1 = Strong Dem. 58.6%+; 2 = Leaning Dem. 52.6%– 58.5%: 3 = Toss- up 47.5%– 52.5%; 4 = Leaning Rep. 52.6%– 58.5%; 5 = Strong Rep. 58.5+; u = unopposed. For districts with results within the toss- up range, the party ofthe winner is indicated ( D, R) for the con-gressional races and by the winner in the presidential race in the district. a Elections conducted under the 1991 Redistricting Plan; b Elections conducted under the 1998 Redistricting Plan; c Elections conducted under the 1997 Redistricting Plan; d Presidential- race scores calculated only from votes for the two major- party candidates. Competitiveness in the N. C. Congressional Districts, 1992– 2000 District Candidate, Party # of Votes % of Point Total Spread 5th * Richard Burr, R 172,489 93u + 86 R Steven LeBoeuf, Lib 13,366 7 6th * Howard Coble, R 195,727 91u + 82 R Jeffrey Bentley, Lib 18,726 9 9th * Sue Myrick, R 181,161 69 + 39 R Ed McGuire, D 79,382 30 10th * T. Cass Ballenger, R 164,182 68 + 39 R Delmas Parker, D 70,877 29 3rd * Walter B. Jones Jr., R 121,940 61 + 24 R Leigh McNairy, D 74,058 37 11th * Charles H. Taylor, R 146,677 55 + 13 R Sam Neill, D 112,234 42 8th * Robin Hayes, R 111,950 55 + 11 R Mike Taylor, D 89,505 44 2nd * Bob Etheridge, D 146,733 58 + 17 D Doug Haynes, R 103,011 41 4th * David Price, D 200,885 62 + 25 D Jess Ward, R 119,412 37 12th * Mel Watt, D 135,570 65 + 32 D Chad Mitchell, R 69,596 33 1st * Eva Clayton, D 124,171 66 + 33 D Duane Kratzer Jr., R 62,198 33 7th * Mike McIntyre, D 160,185 70 + 41 D James R. Adams, R 66,463 29 KEY: D - Democrat; Lib - Libertarian; R - Republican; u - unopposed by a major- party challenger; * - incumbent. 2000 Election Results, from Most Republican to Most Democratic › I N C U M B E N T S F ROM PAGE 2 teristics. The data that follow help sketch the electoral landscape for the 2002 Democratic and Republican primaries. In modern North Carolina politics, primar y turnout has plummeted to only a fraction of general- election turnout. Many voters in North Carolina – and elsewhere in the South – stand aside during the primaries and wait to vote in the general election. In 1998, for example, there were both Democratic and Republican Senate primaries, combining to bring out 805,319 voter s. The general election – Democrat John Edwards vs. Republican Lauch Faircloth – attracted 1.97 million voters. The primary turnout amount-ed to only 40 percent of the general- election turnout. Candidates in Democratic primaries must chase more voters than Republican candi-dates. Registered Democrats out- number reg-istered Republicans, 2.55 million to 1.74 mil-lion. In addition, more people turn out for Democratic primaries than for Republican primaries. Two years ago, the Democratic gubernatorial primary attracted 553,794 vot - ers, the Republican primary 312,529. ( The 2000 general election turnout totaled 2.9 mil-lion North Carolina voters.) Under state law, a candidate can win a party’s nomination in the first primary with 40 percent of the vote. Assuming a turnout of 310,000 voters in a GOP primar y, a Republican Senate candidate could win with as few as 124,000 votes. Assuming a Democratic turnout of 550,000, it would take 220,000 votes for victory. Clearly, primaries put a premium on candidates’ tar geting of activist and regular- voting partisans. While Democrats still out- number Republicans as primary voter s, GOP primary turnout has risen over the past 30 years and Democratic turnout has fallen dramatically. Democratic primary turnout peaked at 955,799 in 1984, and then dropped to 540,031 in 1998. Meanwhile, GOP primar y turnout rose from barely 100,000 in 1972 to more than 312,000 in 2000. Geographically, Republican primary voter s are somewhat more concentrated than Democratic voters. The top 14 counties in GOP registration contain more than half of potential GOP voters. It takes 16 counties to reach 50 percent of the Democratic regis-tered voters. ( See chart) Under North Carolina election rules, the Republican and Democratic parties may per - mit unaffiliated voters to participate in their primaries, as both parties did in 1998. An unaffiliated voter can choose to cast a bal-lot in one primar y, but not both. Because 2002 is not a presidential election year, it will almost certainly have a lower voter turnout, in both primaries and the gen-eral election, than 2000. So- called off- year elections typically have lower turnouts than presidential- election years. Also, if the Senate primary in either party results in a runoff, the turnout for the runoff will surely be lower than in the first primar y. n Editor’s Note: Owen Covington, a master’s stu-dent in the UNC School of Journalism and Mass Communication, contributed to this arti - cle and to the accompanying chart. Further examination of Helms’s career can be found on our Web site at www. southnow. org. Look for more analysis of southern Senate races in the forthcoming issue of SouthNow.. › P R I M A R I E S F ROM PAGE 16 Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple appearances, and NRA president and actor Charlton Heston spoke at rallies in Concord and Albemarle on Hayes’s behalf. The NRA had contributed $ 7,450 to Hayes in 1998. The day before the 2000 election, John McCain stumped for Hayes in Richmond County. In the end, Haye s ’ s incumbency pro b ab ly m a d e the difference in 2000. Campaigning on his re c o rd of l o o king out for the district, H ayes also benefited from Taylor’s inability to distinguish himself from his opponent. The candidates had similar views on many issues, such as Taylor’s opposition to abortion. Their TV ads attacked each other’s stances on issues like prescription drugs and taxes, but issues were lost amid the spectacle of visits from major political players. Helms, Hastert, Heston and McCain overshadowed Gephardt and Bonior. Just as in 1998, Taylor won a majority of the counties. However, Hayes made major gains in most counties, picking up one more than in 1998 and coming within a percentage point of winning Richmond, which gave him only 38.9 percent in 1998. In almost every county, Hayes garnered more new voters than Taylor. Once again, Hayes dominated the t wo largest counties in the district, industrial-ized Cabarrus and Union counties. The supe - rior resources and incumbent status of Hayes trumped the energized Democratic effort for Taylor. n › 8TH DI STRICT F ROM PAGE 6 wanted to empower Americans to help them-selves. In the year 2000, Clayton and Watt once again were victorious. Clayton won handily over K r atzer by 33 points ( 66 percent to 33 per-c e n t ) , while Watt easily defe ated Mitchell by 32 p o i n t s ( 65 percent to 33 percent). Being the first North Carolina African- Americans elected to Congress in this century, they had a great deal of pressure to perform excellent-ly. Despite the challenges by other candidates, the constant law suits and court decisions against the N. C. district plans, and the con-stantly changing redistricting plans, Clayton and Watt have proved to be worthy of their positions. They won with the support of white as well as African- American voter s, especially in their last two races. They also d e m o n s t r at e d how important incumbency is to a candidate, thus proving that knowledge and experience are important in getting re-elected. The N. C General Assembly will use the data from the 2000 census to reconfigure the lines for the stat e’s congressional districts beg i n n i n g in 2001. This will be the fo u rth plan in 10 ye a rs, due to the court challenges faced by the 12th District. The new lines may provide more cl a r i-t y as to who belongs in each district. While this could affect who will hold wh i ch congre s-s i o n a l seats, incumbents Clayton and Watt may well be able to maintain their seats in the 2002 elections under the new redistrict-ing plan. n › AFRICAN AMERICANS F ROM PAGE 8 With Sen. Jesse Helms having decided not to seek re- election, North Carolina has in store competitive contests for both the Democratic and Republican nominations for the U. S. Senate seat in 2002. In the days of the one- party South, the winner of the Democratic primary was practically assured of victory in the general election. Naturally, voters who wanted to make a dif-ference turned out for the primary. But since the rise of the two- party South, North Carolina has increasingly come to have two different kinds of elections, primary elections and gen - eral elections with distinctly dif ferent charac- Pa rties’ Paths to the Helms Seat FE R R E L GU I L LO RY, DI R E C TO R NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 6 A AND PUBL IC L IFE Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communications University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill CB # 3365 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27559– 3365 Non- Profit Organization U. S. Postage P A I D Permit No. 177 Chapel Hill, NC Democrats, by County County Registered Turnout1 Mecklenburg 200,210 29,096 Wake 177,211 37,973 Guilford 144,413 30,745 Forsyth 97,834 22,712 Durham 97,819 22,072 Cumberland 87,363 17,586 Buncombe 69,118 11,593 Robeson 58,989 18,377 Orange 51,733 12,445 Gaston 50,654 7,492 New Hanover 50, 101 8,615 Pitt 46,100 11,290 Alamance 39,672 7,075 Davidson 36,508 5,841 Cabarrus 35,147 7,510 Nash 35,142 6,680 Sixteen counties account for 1,278,014 or 50.0 per-cent of registered Democrats. Republicans, by County County Registered Turnout2 Mecklenburg 168,625 26,299 Wake 141,291 25,021 Guilford 96,826 19,592 Forsyth 77,823 12,993 Buncombe 46,687 7,459 New Hanover 46,121 8,051 Gaston 45,733 6,908 Cumberland 45,180 6,056 Davidson 43,380 6,353 Catawba 42,982 7,446 Randolph 38,217 5,646 Cabarrus 36,835 4,883 Durham 35,714 6,265 Rowan 35,415 6,272 Fourteen counties account for 900,829 or 51.7 per-cent of registered Republicans. Where the Primary Voters Are NOTES: 1Average Democratic primary turnout in the 1996 senate, 1998 senate, and 2000 secretary ofstate race. 2Average Republican primary turnout in the 1992 Senate and 2000 gubernatorial races. Sources: State Board ofElections; N. C. Carolina Manual, various years. S E E P R I M A R I E S ON PAGE 15 ›
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Full Text | Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communication The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill O C T. 2001 • NUMBER 29 Thad Beyle Editor & Associate Director beyle@ email. unc. edu Ryan Thornburg Managing Editor & Assistant Director thornburg@ unc. edu Ferrel Guillory Director guillory@ unc. edu NC DataNet is a quarterly publica-tion of the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. To receive an electronic version of future issues, send your name and e- mail address to SouthNow@ unc. edu. To subscribe to a pritned version, call ( 919) 843– 8174 or e- mail SouthNow@ unc. edu. 2 Incumbent Wins Set Record 3 Without Serious Challengers, Incumbents Still Spend Big 4 A Decade of Spending in N. C. Congressional Races, 1992– 2000 5 2nd District: Etheridge Stabilizes Swing District 6 8th District: Incumbency Turns Tight Race Into Easy Win 7 11th District: Incumbency Overcomes Scandal 8 1st & 12th Districts: Incumbents Survive Changing Districts 9 Congressional Delegation Increasingly Diverse 10 Voter Turnout Growing Faster Than Population 12 GOP Delegates More Loyal To Party Than Democrats 16 Parties’ Paths to Helms Seat In This Issue L eg i s l at ive Votes Just the Start O f Long Redistricting Pro c e s s RYA N TH O R N BU RG, AS S I S TA N T DI R E C TO R Every 10 years, redrawing of the North Carolina congressional map changes the manner in whic h the state is represented in Washington. The highest turnover of the decade occurs in the election after the lines are redrawn. During the 1990s, redistrict-ing helped elect the centur y’s first black representa-tives from North Carolina and helped increase Republican rep-resentation on the state and fed - eral levels. The redistricting process of the last decade brought not just new representatives, but an entirely new way of drawing congres-sional districts. Legal wrangling replaced backroom deals as the primary tool used to draw North Carolina’s political boundaries. The minority- majority districts drawn up for the 1992 elections didn’t have their final court rul-ing until this year. Already, the state is in federal court fighting Utah for an additional congressional seat that would raise the state ’ s total to 13. This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting , registration and demographic trends that shaped the political personalities of North Carolina’s con-gressional districts during the last decade. It is this data that will form the starting point for discussions about next decade’s district lines. The sophistica - tion with which political data is collected and ana-lyzed – in addition to the le gal quarrels – is one of the primary reasons that judges and computers crowded in on the politics of the redistricting process. There is so much dispute o ver the meaning of the census numbers that federal judges will almost cer-tainly be the final arbiters of district lines. These court hearings will look very much like those dur-ing the 2000 presidential election, with mathemati-cal experts explaining theories and attorneys argu - ing about the correct legal appli-cation of those theories. The burdens placed on the poor souls who were forced to count chads on national television were nothing compared to those state lawmakers will face in their attempt to put voters into new districts. Just as Florida counties each used different standards to count votes, the federal govern-ment has handed down conflict-ing standards on how states must draw their districts without reducing the voting power of racial or political minorities. The math of the redistricting process seems simple - one person, one vote - but it's at the beginning of a long problem about how to distribute democracy fairly. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, which forced states, including North Carolina, that had suppressed African- American voter turnout to get approval for their congressional maps from the U. S. Justice Department. Because most Democrats and Republicans don't vote for each other and because many whites still don't vote for blacks, lawmakers struggle to divine S E E R E D I S T R I C T I N G ON PAGE 13 › This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting, regis-tration and demographic trends that shaped the political personalities of North Carolina’s congres-sional districts during the last decade. NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 2 A AND PUBL IC LI FE Incumbent candidates met with success in each of North Carolina’s 12 congressional districts in 2000. The state had not returned an entire dele gation to Capitol Hill since congressional veterans swept North Carolina’s 11 districts in the 1988 elections. Although neither 2000 nor 1988 saw a victorious challenger, the 2000 election season was less competitive than 1988. In 2000, each of the 12 successful candidates won at least 55 percent of his or her district ’ s vote. As the table on page 14 indicates, nine of the 12 districts saw “ strong” victories last year, meaning that the winning candidate gar-nered more than 58.6 percent of the vote. There were no “ close” races in which the win-ner took less than 55 percent of the vote. In 1988, the last year in which incumbents swept, three seats were won with less than 53 per-cent of the vote. In looking over the last decade, it is notable that the 1992 and 2000 elections shared a lack of close r a c e s. Howeve r, wh e re only half o f the districts we re won by strong victories in 1992, thre e - q u a rt e rs we re won by strong victories in 2000. The lack of competitiveness across the state is n o t without consequence. Several of the stat e’s districts have come to be considered “ safe” for either Democrats or Republicans. The 1st and 12th dis-tricts, created as minority- race districts following the 1990 census, are considered “ safe” by virtue of the strength with wh i ch they are held by Democrat s. In 2000, Eva Clayton carried the 1st District with 66 percent of the vote, and Mel Watt took the 12th District with 65 percent. Both Democratic cong res-sional and presidential candidates have uniformly posted convincing victories in both districts over the last decade. The 4th District, located in the Tr i a n gl e, also ge n e r a l-ly favors the Democrats in congressional elections. All the same, the Democrats’ “ safety” in the district was challenged in 1994 when incumbent Democrat David Price was unseated by Republican ch a l l e n ge r Fred Heineman. Despite significant Republican inroads, the 4th District is closest in fo l l owing the 1st and 12th districts in support for Democratic presidential candidates. But Gore and Clinton victo - ries in the district were quite narrow in the last two presidential elections. At both the congressional and presidential levels, the Republicans find more safety in the Old North State than do the Democrats. The 6th, 9th and 10th districts have all been Republican strong-holds over the last decade, as Republican candidates for both the presidency and Congress uniformly won at least 58.6 percent of the vote in each of the three dis-tricts. The 5th District has also emerged as a Republican bastion. Rep. R i ch a rd B u rr ’ s landslide victory over Demo c r atic ch a l l e n ger Mike Robinson in 1998 helped to discourage any opposition in 2000. The dis-trict has add i t i o n a l ly show n i n c reased support fo r Republican pre s i d e n t i a l candidates. Where the elder George Bush edged out Bill Clinton with 52.6 perc e n t o f the vote in 1992, Dole wo n by a comfortable mar-gin in 1996, and George W. Bush took the district from Al Gore by a 25- point margin in 2000. Republican Walter Jones Jr. has solidified his base of support in the 3rd District, winning with more than 60 percent of the vote in each of his three bids for reelection since taking the seat from Democrat Martin Lancaster in 1992. Jones’ contin-ued success over the last decade combined with strong showings by Bush, Dole and Bush has given the 3rd District a decidedly R epublican feel. Democrat Bob Etheridge has tightened his grip on his 2nd District seat, as has R epublican Robin Hayes on his 8th District seat. Etheridge has carried his district with an increasingly large percentage of the vote in each of his last three tries for office. Hayes, on the other hand, secured a full 55 percent of the vote in 2000 after winning with only 50.7 percent in 1998. In presidential races, the 2nd District suppor t- Incumbent Wins Set Re c o rd in 2000 Congressional Elections CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1st open * * * * 2nd * open LOST * * 3rd * LOST * * * 4th * LOST LOST * * 5th * open * * * 6th * * * * * 7th * * open * * 8th * * * open * 9th * open * * * 10th * * * * * 11th * * * * * 12th open * * * * LOST - incumbent lost 4 ( 7%) Open - no incumbent running 7 ( 12%) * - incumbent ran and won 49 ( 82%) Total races 60 Success of Incumbents, 1992– 2000 S E E I N C U M B E N T S ON PAGE 14 › Despite the lack of competitiveness in North Carolina’s 2000 congressional races, campaign spending was nearly 18 percent higher than in 1998, making it the most expensi ve set of c o n gressional elections of the past decade. The second most expensive congressional election year was in the “ Republican Revolution” of 1994, when two Democratic incumbents wer e unseated and three open seats filled. The table “ Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000” details the expenditures of the two major party candidates in each of the past five congressional campaigns, including primary and general elections. For purposes of comparison, all dollar amounts for these five sets of elections were converted to November 2000- dollar equivalents using the Consumer Price Index- Urban. i The 2000 numbers indicate that challenger s generally did not run big- ticket campaigns last year, as incumbent spending accounted for 73 percent of total expenditures during an election season when six of the incumbent winners actually spent less than they had in 1998. A clear exception to this was Democrat Leigh Harvey McNairy’s ch a l l e n ge of Rep u b l i c a n incumbent Walter Jones in the 3rd District. McNairy, who spent $ 1.176 million, matched Jo n e s ’ s spending ($ 1.267 million) almost dollar-for- dollar, forcing the incumbent to spend about double the amount he spent two year s b e fo re. Despite losing the race by 24 perc e n t age points, McNairy’s efforts did result in a 147 percent increase in the total cost of the race for the district ’ s seat from 1998 to 2000. The six representatives spending less on their campaigns in 2000 than in their previous suc-cessful bids for office were Eva Clayton ( D- 1), Bob Etheridge ( D- 2), David Price ( D- 4), Richard Burr ( R- 5), Howard Coble ( R- 6) and Mel Watt ( D- 12). Factoring out the unopposed victories of B u rr and Coble, the four Democratic incumbents ave r aged 27 percent margins of v i c t o ry, ranging from Etheridge’s win by 17 points to Clayton’s landslide 33 percent margin. Mike McIntyre ( D- 7) spent only 4 percent more in 2000 than in 1998. Cass Ballenger ( R- 10) increased spending in 2000 by about 25 percent more than his 1998 expenditure level – but he still won by 40 points in 2000 after being unopposed in 1998. O bv i o u s ly, continu e d big spending on the part o f an incumbent in the absence of a leg i t i m at e ch a l l e n ger still does its part to solidify a voter base and deter future challengers. Republican candidates outspent their Demo-c r atic rivals by a 1.3- to- 1 spending ratio in 2000. Republicans spent $ 7,573,174 to the Democrat s ’ $ 5,996,534. Pa rt of the reason Republicans spent so mu ch was that two Republican incumbents, Richard Burr in the 5th District and Howard Coble in the 6th District, had no Democratic o p p o n e n t s. If t h e re had been Democratic com-p e t i t i o n and money in these two races the m a rgin between the two parties spending leve l s would have narrowed considerab ly. For ex a m p l e, the 12 Republican candidates for the 12 seats spent an ave r age of $ 631,098 per seat while the 10 Democratic candidates for the 10 seats they contested average was $ 599,653. Without Serious Challenge rs, Incumbents Still Spend Big CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L Total # ofGeneral $ Spent District $ Spent Election Votes per Vote 8th 2,759,169 203,464 13.56 3rd 2,442,940 198,455 12.31 11th 2,910,673 266,377 10.93 2nd 1,248,193 251,838 4.96 Avg. 1,130,809 231,650 4.88 9th 1,096,896 264,220 4.15 1st 481,401 189,168 2.54 12th 481,401 209,144 2.30 5th 421,060 185,855 2.27 4th 727,485 325,870 2.23 7th 432,143 229,666 1.88 6th 301,790 215,085 1.40 10th 266,557 240,658 1.11 Total 13,569,708 2,779,800 SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina State Board ofElections Congressional Campaign Costs: 2000 Primary & General District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average 1st 691,264 509,709 368,281 713,415 481,401 552,814 Winner, % ii D 99% D 96% D 91% D 96% D 99% 96% 2nd 792,111 1,929,890 1,995,540 1,545,816 1,248,193 1,502,310 Winner, % D 72% R 44% D 41% D 76% D 73% 61% 3rd 973,718 1,665,920 712,244 987,408 2,442,940 1,356,446 Winner, % D 70% R 34% R 94% R 67% R 52% 63% 4th 566,413 1,103,931 2,425,272 1,785,821 727,485 1,321,784 Winner, % D 97% R 28% D 54% R 98% D 94% 74% 5th 875,588 1,762,592 996,688 621,050 421,060 935,396 Winner, % D 73% R 49% R 79% R 98% R 100% 80% 6th 574,337 411,949 599,383 426,331 301,790 462,758 Winner, % R 94% R 100% R 94% R 100% R 100% 98% 7th 337,411 1,073,132 928,679 416,471 432,143 637,567 Winner, % D 94% D 90% D 60% D 100% D 99% 89% 8th 872,145 1,162,139 797,624 1,688,926 2,759,169 1,456,001 Winner, % D 85% D 68% D 79% R 77% R 70% 76% 9th 331,549 878,947 689,382 796,717 1,096,896 758,698 Winner, % R 88% R 89% R 90% R 96% R 90% 91% 10th 374,770 260,019 296,207 213,895 266,557 282,290 Winner, % R 92% R 100% R 93% R 100% R 100% 97% 11th 2,040,307 1,885,675 596,549 1,242,399 2,910,673 1,735,121 Winner, % R 74% R 62% R 91% R 71% R 65% 73% 12th 624,658 315,041 174,834 1,085,947 481,401 536,376 Winner, % D 95% D 95% D 96% D 63% D 75% 85% TOTAL 9,054,271 12,958,945 10,580,681 11,524,195 13,569,708 11,537,561 Winner, % 86% 60% 69% 79% 73% 73% Avg. per seat 754,523 1,079,912 881,723 960,350 1,130,809 961,463 NOTES: i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each ofthe years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To convert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 ofthe 2000$; 1994$ = .852 ofthe 2000$; 1996$ = .886 ofthe 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of the 2000$. ii Winner, % = party ofthe winning candidate and the percentage ofthe district total spent by the winner. SOURCES: Almanac of American Politics; Federal Election Commission; the North Carolina Board ofElections Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000 i S E E S P E N D I N G ON PAGE 5 › NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 4 AND PUBLIC L IFE After the 2000 elections, we can now look at the decade of spending in congressional races following the 1990 U. S. census and the various redistricting plans used in the period. Using the same 2000- dollar equivalent data for those five s ep a r ate elections we find the fo l l owing pat t e rn s : • Between the 1992 and 2000 elections, the cost of these five sets of 12 elections incre a s e d by nearly 50 percent, from $ 9.054 million in 1992 to $ 13.570 million in 2000. The ave r age cost per seat moved from $ 755,000 in 1992 to $ 1.131 mil-lion in 2000, with an average cost per con-gressional seat of about $ 961,000 during the decade. • There are now five “ million- dollar” con-gressional seats in North Carolina – seats in which the average cost of elec-tions over the decade was more than a million dollars ( 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and 11th), and nearly a sixth ( 5th at $ 935,396). There is a “ three- quarter-million- dollar” seat ( 9th), three “ half-million- dollar” seats ( 1st, 7th, 12th), and nearly a fourth ( 6th at $ 462,758). The final 10th seat has been a “ quarter-million- dollar” seat with the incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R) winning each of the five races. • Money and winning go hand- in- hand in these races as the winners of the decade’s 60 races outspent their opponents by nearly a 3- to- 1 ratio. Incumbents espe-cially benefit from this as was clear ly seen in the 2000 elections when all races were won by incumbents, and they outspent their challengers by a 3- to- 1 ratio. And 13 of the 20 most expensive races over the decade were won by incumbents. • Wi n n e r ’ s spending has accounted for 73 per-c e n t of the total spending in these 60 races. The specific year range around that 73 per-cent figure is instructive. The high point was in 1992, when winners’ bank accounts overwhelmed their opponents by making 86 percent of the campaign expenditures. This was the year when e very candidate faced the first newly drawn districts since 1981. The low point of 60 percent was in 1994, when there were three open seats and two incumbents were defeated, so fi ve of the 12 winners were not incumbents . • T h e re has been a shift in the party spending tied to the increasing Republican strength in these races. In the 1992 elections, Democrat s outspent their Republican competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio, but in the 1994 elections the D e m o c r atic adv a n t age dropped to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio. Then in 1996, the Republicans gained the upper hand and outspent their Demo-cratic competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio. This Republican advantage dropped off to a 1.1- to- 1 ratio in 1998 and then increased slightly in 2000 to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio. • Twenty of the 60 races cost more than $ 1 mil-l i o n. They ranged from the $ 2.911 million high in the 2000 8th District race to the $ 1.073 million 1994 7th District race that was Charlie Ro s e’s last hurrah. Several tre n d s are visible. 1994 was a very expensive year as seven of the 20 most expensive races occurred then. The 1998 and 2000 elections each had five $ 1 million- plus contests. The 2nd and 11th districts each had four of their five contests in this high price level, while the 4th and 8th districts had three of their five there. The four races in which an incumbent was defeated and three of the six open seat races were also million-dollar- plus specials. As already noted, 13 of the 20 high- price races saw incumbents win, some quite easily. Only two of these races saw the winning margin in single digits. The bottom line is money and incumbents working together for the future. n A Decade of Spending in N. C. C o n gressional Ra c e s, 1992– 2000 TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R , UNC- CH A P E L HI L L Rank Dist. Year Amount Type Outcome Pts 1 11th 2000 $ 2.911 In. Taylor- R reelected 12 2 8th 2000 $ 2.759 In. Hayes- R reelected 11 3 3rd 2000 $ 2.443 In. Jones- R reelected 24 4 4th 1996 $ 2.425 In. Heineman- R defeated 10 5 11th 1992 $ 2.040 In. Taylor- R reelected 10 6 2nd 1996 $ 1.996 In. Funderburk- R defeated 7 7 2nd 1994 $ 1.930 Open seat R won 12 8 11th 1994 $ 1.886 In. Taylor- R reelected 20 9 4th 1998 $ 1.786 In. Price- D reelected 15 10 5th 1994 $ 1.763 Open seat R won 14 11 8th 1998 $ 1.689 Open seat R won 3 12 3rd 1994 $ 1.666 In. Lancaster- D defeated 6 13 2nd 1998 $ 1.546 In. Etheridge- D reelected 15 14 2nd 2000 $ 1.248 In. Etheridge- D reelected 17 15 11th 1998 $ 1.242 In. Taylor- R reelected 15 16 8th 1994 $ 1.162 In. Hefner- D reelected 4 17 4th 1994 $ 1.104 In. Price- D defeated 0.8 18 9th 2000 $ 1.090 In. Myrick- R reelected 39 19 12th 1998 $ 1.086 In. Watt- D reelected 14 20 7th 1994 $ 1.073 In. Rose- D reelected 4 KEY: Amount = cost ofcampaigns in 2000$ ( millions) Type = In. – incumbent; Open – no incumbent in race Pts. = point margin ofvictory or defeat Most Expensive Congressional Elections, 1992– 2000 Year Dems. Reps. % % 1992 60 40 1994 56 44 1996 40 60 1998 47 53 2000 44 56 K E Y: aThese perc e n t ages are of the two - p a rty spending in the races. Third- party and independents’ spending not included. Partisan Spending in 1992– 2000 Congressional Races a For the third time in a row, incumbent Bob Etheridge won the 2nd Congressional District in North Carolina. Although Etheridge is a s t rong candidat e, the 2nd District has been known to switch between Democrat and Republican in any given year. Nationwide, Democrats needed to win seven extra seats to regain power in the U. S. House of Representatives. Many closely watched the race between Bob Etheridge and Doug Haynes because any seat’s shift could a ffe c t the congressional balance of p owe r. Wi t h the state clearly favoring Bush, the Democrats needed another way to gain support. Bob Etheridge defeated Doug Haynes with 58 percent of the vote. Although new to the con-gressional race, Doug Haynes still garnered 41 percent of the vote, showing the volatility of the 2nd District voters. Haynes, a Republican from Rocky Mount, attempted to link himself to presidential candidate George W. Bush in a m ove to use Bush’s popularity in North Caro l i n a to gain support. He wanted to make funda-mental ch a n ges in areas such as tax policy and e d u c ation. He supported giving school districts the power to spend money as they see fit. Haynes told supporters that, in general, he supported Bush’s policies and would push for them in Congress; understanding the conserv-ativeness of the 2nd District. Haynes is a former John Locke Foundation re s e a rcher who is known for his strong opinions t h at he is not afraid to express. Soon after winning the primary, Haynes challenged Etheridge to a series of debates. He quickly wanted to gain the support of the undecided. He ch a l l e n ged Etheridge to speak on educat i o n , one of the main points of contention betwe e n the two candidates. In an early campaign ad, Haynes used Etheridge’s stance on education against him. Haynes is shown reading a quote from the News & Observer where Etheridge had pushed for Congress to assist in school renovation e ven when the local area has rejected the bond issue. Haynes stated that Etheridge belie ved the voters were dumb and challenged the voters to reject someone who did not believe in their ability to think for themselve s. Hay n e s’ top priorities included moving power away from Washington and into states, and creat-ing a fairer tax code . Bob Etheridge is a conserv at ive Democrat wh o uses his beliefs to his advanta ge. In the past three congressional elections, it has been dif - ficult for a Republican to defe at him since many o f his ideals are not too far from their own. The fo rmer N. C. Superintendent of Public Instru c t i o n strongly supports the reform of educa-tion. In one television ad, he shows what seems like a jail cell, but in reality it is a trailer t h at has been at t a ched to an ove r-c rowd e d s chool. He implores vo t e rs not to let ch i ld ren continue to learn in these con-d i t i o n s. Besides improving education, Etheridge said he looked to help North Carolina farmers, i m p rove safety and sup-p o rt tech n o l o g i c a l advances. With Gore’s popularity down in North Carolina, Etheridge looked to separate himself from the presidential candidate, as did many Democratic candidates. With Durham County removed from the 2nd District, many people felt a large base of Democratic supporters for Etheridge had been lost. Etheridge instead focused on the m a ny undecided vo t e rs living in the 2nd District who account for its voting unpre d i c t ab i l i t y. He maintained contact with the strong Democrat i c voters but pushed hard with mailings and phone calls to win the votes of those who were not sure. These independent voters were m a i n ly white and in the middle- income range. He looked to extend his presence in the com-munity by participating in walks around counties. Volunteers would hand out leaflets, and Etheridge would meet and g reet con-stituents. Etheridge’s top priorities include improving education and protecting the retirement security of the elderly. In the 2000 election, voters in Wake and Johnston Counties made up nearly 55 percent of the district’s electorate — and the voters there supported Etheridge. Wilson County, with only 5 percent of the district’s voters, was the strongest supporter for Haynes. With the exception of Wilson County, Etheridge was the victor in all other counties. The 2nd District has always gone through periods of change of political party leadership. In 1996, Etheridge b e at incumbent Republican Dav i d F u n d e r b u rk by less than 10,000 votes. His vic-tory in 1998 was by nearly 44,000 votes. In the 2000 election, perhaps the strangest part of the campaign was the difference in money. Etheridge raised approximately $ 1,030,216 to Haynes $ 237,248. With a just over a fifth of the incumbent’s budget, Haynes still manage d to gain a sizeable amount of the vote; falling s h o rt of E t h e r i d ge by 43,722 vo t e s. This should send red flags to the Democrats that the wave of support in the 2nd District may be coming to an end. But the shape of the current 2nd District is also coming to an end, which could revive competition. n 2nd District: Etheridge Stablizes Swing District JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L County Etheridge Jackson Haynes Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Wake 61.8 1.1 37.2 95,482 37.9 Johnston 52.7 0.7 46.6 41,920 16.6 Nash 55.5 0.5 44.0 31,003 12.3 Harnett 59.6 0.7 39.6 24,455 9.7 Lee 59.1 1.0 40.0 16,054 6.4 Franklin 59.9 0.7 39.4 16,038 6.4 Wilson 48.9 0.5 50.6 10,997 4.4 Sampson 61.2 0.5 38.4 9,196 3.7 Granville 56.6 0.8 42.6 6,693 2.7 Totals 58.3 40.9 0.8 251,838 100.0 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 2nd District, by County Total spending in the stat e’s three most ex p e n-s ive 2000 congressional races topped $ 2 million e a ch. The $ 2.911 million race in the 11th District between incumbent Charles Taylor ( R) and Sam Neill ( D) was the most expensive. Taylor outspent Neill by a 1.8- to- 1 ratio and re t a i n e d his seat with a 13- point margin. These two can-d i d at e s spent $ 10.93 per vote in the general election – yet that was less than the $ 13.56 spent per vote in the 8th District race and the $ 12.31 spent per vote in the 3rd District race. The 8th District race between Republican Ro b i n H ayes and Democrat Mike Taylor was the second most expensive race, costing $ 2,759,169 as H ayes tried to ach i eve his first reelection. Haye s outspent Taylor by nearly a 2.4- to- 1 ratio and retained his seat by a 11- point margin. But as just noted, the cost per vote in this race was the most of any of the 12 races. The 3rd District Jones- McNairy race also topped the $ 2 million mark at $ 2,442,940, as the candidates spent $ 12.31 per general election vote. Two other races topped $ 1 million in cost last year. In the 2nd District, incumbent Bob E t h e r i d ge ( D) outspent ch a l l e n ger Doug Hay n e s by a 3.2- to- 1 ratio while retaining his seat by a 17- point margin. In the 9th District, incum - bent Republican Sue Myrick outspent chal-lenger Edward McGuire by a 14- to- 1 ratio and won reelection by 39 points. The ye a r ’ s barga i n s e at belonged to incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R- 10), whose campaign spent only $ 266,557 to win a 39- point margin race. n i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of 1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each of the years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To con vert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 of the 2000$; 1994$ = .852 of the 2000$; 1996$ = .886 of the 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of the 2000$. › S P E N D I N G F ROM PAGE 3 The 2000 congressional election in District 8 provided another entertaining contest, as te x-tile heir Robin Hayes and attorney Mike Taylor went toe- to- toe for a rematch of their 1998 race. The district has a history of conservative voting and traditional politics. Democratic c o n gressman Bill Hefner held the seat betwe e n 1974 and 1996, winning consecutive — and sometimes close — elections. In 1998, most analysts thought Ha yes, the Republican nominee for gove rnor in 1996, wo u l d easily defeat relative newcomer Mike Taylor because of H aye s ’ s name recognition and mon-e t a ry strength as heir to the Cannon Textile Mills fortune. Many Democrats felt Taylor had no ch a n c e, and the party gave little personal or financial support to his campaign. Meanwhile, Hayes outspent Taylor 3- to- 1 and benefited from campaign visits from Newt Gingrich and Dan Quayle. However, Taylor stunned the experts by gaining 48 percent of the popular vote; Hayes won by a mere 3,378 votes. In 2000, both sides geared up for what was expected to be a hotly contested race. The two major factors that helped T aylor compete in 1998 were still relevant in 2000. First, the 1998 redistricting plan mandated by the U. S. Supreme Court increased overall Democratic registration in the district two points to 69 p e rcent, and it increased the number of A f r i c a n American vo t e rs from 21 percent to 25 perc e n t . Second, higher turnout among Democrat s, and particularly African Americans, was expected yet again in such a hard fought contest. The Democratic Party recognized that 2000 offered a prime opportunity to unseat Ha yes, and it poured monetary and personal re s o u rc e s into the district. Nationally known Democrats s u ch as House Minority Leader Rich a rd Gep h a rd t of Missouri and Minority Whip David Bonior of Michigan appeared on behalf of Taylor. The D e m o c r atic Congressional Campaign Committee in Washington contributed more than $ 600,000 for Taylor’s effort. Taylor spent more than $ 700,000 during his campaign. Republicans countered by sending Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, former presidential candidate John McCain, Sen. Jesse Helms and NRA presi-dent Charlton Heston to the district. Hayes spent more than $ 1.5 million in 2000. In 1998, the candidates spent a total of $ 1.5 million, but in 2000 they spent a combined $ 2.25 million. Somewhat surprisingly, the 2000 election was a bigger victory for Hayes, who won with 55 percent of the vote compared to his winning with just 50.7 percent of the vote in 1998. Voting turnout was considerably greater in the 2000 presidential year race [ 203,464 total vo t e s ] than it was in the 1998 U. S. Senate year race [ 133,124 total votes]. This was a 53 percent increase of more 70,000 votes. So running at the same time George W. Bush was winning the state seemed to help Hayes in his successful bid for reelection. The competitive nature of the 8th District race provided some interesting and occasionally amusing moments. When Gephardt spoke in Ja nu a ry to Cab a rrus County high school students on behalf of Taylor, Hayes showed up at what was supposed to be an all- Democratic event, causing a stir and no small amount of t e n s i o n . In Fe b ru a ry, a national TV ad from the American D a i ry Association praised “ the power of ch e e s e ” in an imagined campaign pitting fake presi-dential candidates John Hayes and Peter Taylor, as well as Bob Dole. The ad depicted cheese- lover Peter Taylor as a hero and cheese- hater John Hayes as a loser. Real- life candidates Hayes and Taylor were amused by the ad’s irony, but Hayes was disappointed that Dole did the ad without considering its connection to the 8th District. While Gephardt visited in January and David Bonior held a fund- raiser for T aylor in October 1999, big- name Hayes supporters dominated in 2000. In a rare campaign appearance for a fellow Republican, Helms appeared in Concord to rally support for Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple 8th District: Incumbency Tu rn s Tight Race Into Easy Wi n ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 6 AND PUBLIC LIFE County Taylor Schwartz Hayes Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Cabarrus 31.7 1.2 67.1 49,847 24.5 Union 32.0 1.2 66.8 45,179 22.2 Cumberland 64.0 0.8 35.2 30,955 15.2 Stanly 36.2 0.9 63.0 22,453 11.0 Richmond 49.9 0.6 49.5 14,582 7.2 Scotland 62.0 0.5 37.5 9,131 4.5 Montgomery 47.6 0.7 51.7 8,985 4.4 Anson 62.0 0.5 37.5 7,975 3.9 Hoke 60.2 1.5 38.3 7,578 3.7 Robeson 53.7 0.8 45.5 6,779 3.3 Totals 44.0 1.0 55.0 203,464 100 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 8th District, by County Year of Seat Member, Party 1st Elec. Service US Sen. Jesse Helms, R 1972 29th 6th CD Howard Coble, R 1984 17th 10th CD Cass Ballenger, R 1986 15th 4th CD David Price, D 1986 13th 11th CD Charles Taylor, R 1990 11th 1st CD Eva Clayton, D 1992 9th 12th CD Mel Watt, D 1992 9th 3rd CD Walter B. Jones Jr., R 1994 7th 5th CD Richard Burr, R 1994 7th 9th CD Sue Myrick, R 1994 7th 2nd CD Bob Etheridge, D 1996 5th 7th CD Mike McIntyre, D 1996 5th US Sen. John Edwards, D 1998 3rd 8th CD Robin Hayes, R 1998 3rd Total Years ofService 140 Total Republican Years ofService 96 Total Democratic Years ofService 44 Seniority in the N. C. Congressional Delegation, 2001 S E E 8TH DI STRICT ON PAGE 15 › North Carolina’s 11th District was a hotly con-tested race in 2000, as incumbent Rep re s e n t a-tive Charles H. Taylor defeated Democrat Sam Neill with 55 percent of the vote. The 11th District, in the western part of the state, includes Asheville and 15 mountain counties . Neill challenged Taylor in what had been for some time a “ safe” Republican district. But because of his strong candidacy and allegat i o n s surrounding Taylor’s financial dealings, Neill was able to give Taylor serious contention. The recent history of the 11th District is help - ful in framing the e vents of the 2000 election. Before the 1980s the district was, like most Southern districts, safely Democratic. During the Republicanization of the South in the 1980s, the district became a “ revolving door” district, throwing out five of six incumbents in elections held between 1980 and 1990. The district became more of a Republican strong-hold at the end of the decade, as voters sup-p o rted Jim Gardner in the lieutenant gove rn o r ’ s race in 1988 and Jesse Helms in the senatorial campaign of 1990. Taylor, a businessman and tree farmer from Brevard, came close to unseating the incumbent in 1988 and suc - ceeded in 1990. During the 1990s, Taylor supported 98 perc e n t of his party’s “ Contract with America” legisla - tion and built an incredible reputation for constituent service. Rather than leading on the ideological front, Taylor represents local interests effectively. He holds town meetings at local courthouses and other locations, where he gives residents a chance to tell him about local issues. Taylor has a reputation as a hard worker with a top- notch staf f and maintains several regional offices throughout his district. His most controversial stand is on environmental protection, which he makes very clear is not as important as preventing job loss. This resonates well with the natives in the 11th District. Party leaders value his loyalty and have rewarded him with a seat on the Appropriations Committee and the chair-manship of the District of Columbia Finance Committee. While Taylor lost some g round in the elections between 1994 and 1998, he still held the district safely. The 11th District has a high percentage of white voters, and these white voters go to the polls. For instance, in 1994 more than 190,000 district residents cast votes in the congressional election, while in the active, highly populated 4th District fewer than 155,000 votes were cast. In 1998, African Americans made up 4 percent of the district’s registered voters. Without much support from black voters, the Democratic Party is challenged to compete. The Republican Party dominates despite the fact that in 1998 only 35 percent of the reg i s t e re d voters in the district belonged to the GOP, a holdover from the days of the Democratic Solid South. In the 2000 election Taylor found a strong opponent in Sam Neill, a Hendersonville attorney who ser ved on the University of North Carolina Board of Governors for 12 years. Neill’s ability and financial backing combined with the financial scandal involving Taylor to produce a close race. In August, a federal grand jur y requested information regarding loans made by Blue Ridge Savings Bank — owned by Taylor — to one o f the congre s s m a n’s political backe rs, Sylva businessman Charles Cagle. The five loans, given between 1992 and 1995, amounting to more than $ 1 mil-l i o n, were never repaid in full and ended in lawsuits and foreclosures. The Charlotte Observer reported that one of the loans involved forged sig-natures. The bank denied lending the money to Cagl e, once the Ja cks o n County GOP chairman and a Taylor campaign contributor. Taylor claimed to not remember the details of the loans, and accused Neill of planting the story. The Taylor cam-paign responded with television ads painting Neill as a liar with an ever-growing “ Pinocchio” nose. Taylor also faced media scrutiny over his busi-ness dealings in Russia and his problems with Jackson and Transylvania counties regarding property taxes. In the end, though, Taylor’s superior con-stituent serving in a staunch Republican district enabled him to win with 55 percent of the vote. Only one of the 15 counties in his district, Jackson, gave more votes to his opponent. Taylor proved the power of incum-bency and constituent service. n 11th District: Incumbency Ove rcomes Scandal ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L County Neill Williams Taylor Totals Dem. Lib. Rep. # % Buncombe 46.8 3.3 49.9 85,634 32.1 Henderson 35.0 2.7 62.3 37,137 13.9 Haywood 46.3 2.9 50.8 22,947 8.6 Rutherford 41.0 2.6 56.3 21,311 8.0 Transylvania 39.4 4.0 56.7 14,169 5.3 McDowell 33.5 2.4 64.1 14,049 5.3 Macon 39.1 2.8 58.1 13,062 4.9 Jackson 49.8 2.8 47.4 12,231 4.6 Cherokee 33.9 1.1 65.0 9,047 3.4 Yancey 44.0 1.3 54.8 8,922 3.3 Polk 40.0 3.2 56.8 8,192 3.1 Madison 43.9 2.0 54.1 8,024 3.0 Swain 48.2 1.4 50.4 4,309 1.6 Clay 37.0 1.1 61.9 3,921 1.5 Graham 29.4 1.2 69.4 3,422 1.3 Totals 42.1 2.8 55.1 266,377 100 SOURCE: State Board ofElections 11th District, by County 11th District Polls, 2000 Taylor Dem. Year % % Total Vote 1988 49.6 50.4 215,343 1990 51 49 201,309 1992 55 45 238,161 1994 60 40 192,688 1996 58 40 228,025 1998 57 42 199,423 2000 55 42 266,377 KEY: Dem. = Democratic candidate Charles Taylor and the 11th District, 1988– 2000 Date Taylor Neill Pollster Sample 7/ 22– 24 59 31 Pub. Opin. Strategies- R 300 lvs 9/ 22– 24 44 36 Cooper & Secrest- D 503 rvs 11/ 7 55 42 Actual Vote SOURCE: The Cook Political Repor t [ December 20, 2000]: 60. 11th District Polls, 2000 In 1991, the state leg i s l at u re re d rew the congre s-sional district lines, giving African Americans a majority in the 1st and 12th districts. As a re s u l t , Eva M. Clayton and Mel Watt in 1992 became the first African Americans elected to Congress in more than 90 years. Running in predomi-nantly African- American districts, C l ayton and Watt seemed to be products of biased district lines and there fo re we re victorious by defa u l t . T h ey easily won reelection in 1994 and 1996. In 1996, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled a gainst the 1991 redistricting plan — especially the long and narrow 12th District. While the 1996 elections went forward under the older plan, in 1997 the leg i s l at u re re d rew the district lines to more equitably split the population within the districts for the 1998 elections. In April 1998 the court threw out this plan, too, and the legislature had to once a gain redraw the district lines in May for the 1998 elections. The new redistricting plan of May 1998 decreased Clayton and Watt’s base of support and challenged their incumbency. However, their quest to continue as r epresentatives was not stifled when their districts were changed and the people who were thought to be their sole support reduced in numbers. The per-centage of African Americans in the 1st D i s t r i c t d e c reased from 57 percent to 50 perc e n t . The 12th District was affected even more as the percentage of African Americans dwindled from 57 percent to 36 percent. These districts had been challenged because they were designed to give African- Americans a majority, and the lawsuits focused specifically on the 12th District as a “ racial gerrymander.” In the 1991 plan, the 12th District’s lines stretched from west of Charlotte along Interstate 85 all the way to Durham and included parts of Greensboro and Winston- Salem. The 1997 plan eliminated many areas, and the only parts left in District 12 ran from Charlotte up I- 85 to Greensboro and Winston- Salem. The 1998 plan dropped Greensboro from the 12th District, and the lines ran from Charlotte north to Winston- Salem. In their first races for office in 1992, Clayton and Watt fought strongly contested primaries and won handily in the No vember general election. While Watt was able to best three o t h e rs for the Democratic nomination, Clay t o n faced six other Democrats and had to win a runoff primary just to get into the November race. She defeated the then- Democrat Walter B. Jones Jr. in the runoff. Jones, the son of a long- time Democratic congressman, soon changed parties and won the 1994 race for the 3rd Congressional District as a Republican. C l ayton and Wat t’s tenu re in office continu e d e a s i ly through the 1994 and 1996 elections. In both cases, they defe ated the same ch a l l e n ger in these two elections. Clayton prevailed over ch a l-l e n ger Ted Tyler 61 percent to 39 percent in 1994 and increased her winning margin over him in 1996 to 33 points. Watt defe ated Joe Martino in 1994 by 66 percent to 34 percent and dominat e d M a rt i n o, 72 percent to 27 percent, in 1996. With the new redistricting plan in 1998, Clay t o n and Watt seemed vulnerable to defeat. Man y s p e c u l ated that their terms would be ch a l l e n ge d with a bitter, drawn- out race to the finish. The speculators proved to be wrong, and Clayton and Watt prevailed again in their respective d i s t r i c t s. Clayton again easily defe ated her per-petual contender Ty l e r, 62 percent to 37 perc e n t , while Watt defeated Scott Keadle, 56 percent to 42 percent. Their margins of victory were narrower, but they were still winners. In 2000, Clayton defeated Duane E. Kratzer, Jr.’ s challenge for the 1st District seat. Clayton advocated education, vocational traini n g, ru r a l health, minimum wage and economic develop-ment. Kratzer’s platform included working for tax reform, a strong military, preserving 2nd Amendment rights, health care reform and opposition to abortion. He chall e n ge d C l ay t o n’s ability to make real diffe re n c e s in the community. Mel Watt successfu l ly defended his 12th District seat against Chad Mitchell. Watt’s platform i n cluded protecting Social Security and ensuring health care for the elderly. Mitch e l l ’ s goals we re similar to Watt’s, but he dif fered because he 1st and 12th Districts: African- American Incumbents Surv ive Changing Districts JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 8 AND PUBLIC LIFE Dist. Representative Dem. % ofOverall Vote Black % Voting Age Pop. ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 ’ 00 ’ 91 ’ 98 Change Plan Plan 1st Eva Clayton 67 61 66 62 66 57 50 - 7 12th Mel Watt 72 66 72 56 65 57 36 - 21 1st & 12th Districts: A Decade of African- American Incumbency S E E AFRICAN AMERICANS ON PAGE 15 › During the past 40 years, North Carolina’s congressional delegation has had to change with the times. Although the majority of rep-resentatives are still white men, minorities and women are now a part of the electoral politics of the state. There has also been con - side r able growth in Republican strength in N o rt h Carolina’s politics over this period. Politics has long been considered an all- male game in this state. However, two women, Eva Clayton ( D- 1) and Sue Myrick ( R- 9), broke the gender barrier in the 1992 and 1994 congres-sional elections. Then in 1996, Elaine Mars h a l l was elected secretary of state. In the 2000 elections, North Carolina reelected Clayton, Myrick and Marshall as well as three other women to statewide office — Lieutenant Governor Beverly Perdue ( D), Commissioner of Agriculture Meg Phipps ( D) and Commissioner of Labor Cherie Berry ( R). Even more astounding is that Clayton is also one of North Carolina’s two African- American representatives. Clayton and Mel Watt ( D- 12) we re first elected in 1992 after the controve rs i a l creation of two majority- black districts. They were the first minorities to be elected to Congress from North Carolina since Recon-struction. Despite consistently changing dis - trict lines that decreased the minority race voting base in their districts, both Clayton and Watts retained their seats. On the other hand, North Carolina has a large number of Native American and Latin American communities across the state. However, African Americans remain the only minority g roup represented in Congress. The Republican Party has also made g reat strides in their fight for representation in Congress. In 1960, there was only one Republican congressman in the state ’ s delega-tion. In the 1994 “ Republican Revolution” election, Republicans became the majority in the delegation by winning eight of the 12 s e ats ( 67 percent). Fo l l owing the 2000 election, seven Republicans now make up 58 percent of the state’s delegation. As rep re s e n t ation becomes gre ater for fe m a l e s, b l a cks and Rep u b l i c a n s, incumbents continu e to hold on to their seats. During the past 40 years, incumbents have won the majority of seats in each election. In fact, there were six elections — 1964, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1988 and 2000 — in wh i ch all incumbents re t a i n e d their s e at. Only in the 1972, 1984 and 1994 elections did the number of winning newcomers nearly match the number of winning incumbents. During two of these elections in which new-comers nearly equaled incumbent winners, there was a direct correlation between the increase of Republican gains and new repre-s e n t at ive s. In 1984, five newc o m e rs comprised 45 percent of the delegation. This is the same year that President Ronald Reagan soundly defeated challenger Walter Mondale, Senator Jesse Helms won reelection over Governor Jim Hunt’s challenge, and Republicans made coattail gains by winning fi ve of the 11 con-gressional seats. Ten years later during the “ Republican Revolution” of 1994, only seven incumbents held onto their seats, and Republican representation jumped from four to eight. More change is afoot in the state ’ s congres-sional delegation. New district lines and, if Utah’s challenge is unsuccessful, an entirely new district. Based on the trends of the past four decades we can be sure of one thing — no longer can white Democratic males dominate the elections. Instead, women, Republicans and minorities now have a significant chance of winning. n C o n gressional Delegation Incre a s i n gly Dive rse Women, Blacks, Re p u blicans Make Gains JONAT H A N TR I BU LA, SE N I O R PU B L I C PO L I C Y ANA LYS I S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L 1960 ’ 62 ’ 64 ’ 66 ’ 68 ’ 70 ’ 72 ’ 74 ’ 76 ’ 78 ’ 80 ’ 82 ’ 84 ’ 86 ’ 88 ’ 90 ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 2000 1960– 2000 BY PARTY: #, Dem 11 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 6 8 8 7 8 4 6 5 5 162 %, Dem 92 82 82 73 73 73 82 82 82 82 64 82 55 73 73 64 67 33 50 42 42 69 #, Rep 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 8 6 7 7 75 %, Rep 8 18 18 27 27 27 18 18 18 18 36 18 45 27 27 36 33 67 50 58 58 31 BY GENDER: #, Male 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 228 %, Male 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 83 83 83 83 96 #, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 9 %, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 17 4 BY RACE: #, White 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 227 %, White 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 83 96 #, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10 %, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 4 BY TENURE: #, New 3 1 0 3 3 0 5 0 2 0 2 3 5 3 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 42 %, New 25 9 0 27 27 0 45 0 18 0 18 27 45 27 0 9 17 42 25 8 0 18 #, Incumbent 9 10 11 8 8 11 6 11 9 11 9 8 6 8 11 0 10 7 9 11 12 185 %, Incumbent 75 91 100 73 73 100 55 100 82 100 82 73 55 73 100 91 83 58 75 92 100 82 Trends in Congressional Demographics: 1960– 2000 During the past four decades, the number of major party voters in cong ressional elections has increased greatly, as would be expected in a rapidly growing state. In 2000, 2.708 million votes we re cast for congressional candidates in the general election compared to the 1.185 mil-lion votes cast in those elections in 1960 — an increase of 128 percent. i In fact, the growth in numbers of voters outpaced the growth in actual population. The 1960 census counted 4.556 million people in North Carolina, which has grown to 8.049 million people in the 2000 census — an increase of 77 percent. Population growth is only one factor in the i n c reasing number of vo t e rs in North Caro l i n a . Included in any list of factors has to be the opening of the electoral system to those who had been excluded in the past. The Civil Rights revolution, with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, opened the voting booth doors for blacks to become part of the electorate. The Vietnam War and the 26th Amendment to the U. S . Constitution, ratified in 1971, opened the doors to those between 18 and 21. The increase in partisan competition o ver the 40- year period was also a very important factor. In the first three elections of the 1960s Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans by a 3- to- 2 ratio. In the most recent four elections this has switched to a 1.25- to- 1 Republican voting edge. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of D e m o c r atic congre s s i o n a l votes increased by 64 percent, while the number of Republican congressional votes increased by 230 percent. This shift in voting support translated from a 6- to- 1 Democratic c o n gressional seat winning ratio in those thre e early 1960 races to a 1.4- to- 1 Republican con-gressional seat winning ratio in the four most recent elections. The table “ Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000” demonstrates the consistent erosion of the Democratic control over these elections. This Republican voting growth had to over-come a depression in GOP turnout following the Watergate scandal, reflected in the results of the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections. After increasing their success ratio in the 1968 to 1972 elections to only a 1.8- to- 1 Democratic advantage, Republicans saw those mid- 1970s races elevate the Democratic success ratio to a 4.5- to- 1 high. Since the 1978 elections, the Republican vote has been growing steadily. T h e re are also some interesting pat t e rns hidd e n in this 21 elections N. C. congressional voting history. These patterns are tied to the differing length of terms of elected officials. While two-year term Congressional elections occur in every even- numbered year [ 21 elections], the four- year term presidential and gubernatorial elections occur in every other e ven year [ 11 elections], and the six- year terms of the two U. S. senators bring those statewide races into these elections about two- thirds of the time [ 14 elections]. Voter Tu rnout Grow i n g Faster Than Po p u l at i o n Re fo rm s, Pa rt i s a n s h i p, Big Races Bring More People to Po l l s TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D JO H N BR A N C H, SE N I O R HI S TO RY MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POL ITIC S , MEDIA 1 0 AND PUBLIC LI FE Votes ( thousands) % of Vote Seats Won Uncontested Year Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep 1960 726 459 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0 1962 482 336 819 59 41 9 2 3 0 1964 788 511 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0 1966 484 432 916 53 47 8 3 2 0 1968 765 633 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1 1970 514 411 925 56 44 7 4 1 0 1972 735 610 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0 1974 638 348 986 65 35 9 2 3 0 1976 1,011 549 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0 1978 607 405 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1 1980 964 769 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0 1982 708 580 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0 1984 1,131 1,026 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0 1986 890 682 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0 1988 1,108 876 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0 1990 1,076 935 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0 1992 1,282 1,204 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0 1994 681 907 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1 1996 1,136 1,340 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0 1998 827 1,014 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2 2000 1,194 1,515 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2 KEY: Uncontested = number ofseats won in uncontested races SOURCE: State Board ofElections N. C. Congressional Voting Trends, 1960– 2000 › There are four distinct patterns involved in these elections: Pattern A is when there are presidential, gubernatorial and U. S. senatorial elections held at the same time as the con-gressional elections. This has happened se ven times since 1960. Pattern B, which has happened three times, is when there ar e presidential and gubernatorial elections being held at the same time. P attern C, which has happened seven times, is when there is just a U. S. Senate race being held at the same time. Pattern D, which has happened three times, is when there are no major statewide elections being held at the same time . As can be seen in the table “ Patterns in N. C. C o n gressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000,” the gre at e s t turnout occurs when there are se veral impor-tant statewide elections occurring at the same time. Patterns C and D have had considerably lower turnouts over the period. Voting in elections when Jim Hunt was on the ballot averaged 1.960 million voter s, while voting in elections when Jesse Helms was on the ballot averaged 1.800 million voters. ii The average turnout during the past 40 years has been 1.585 million for all elections . The 1994 Pattern D congressional elections, in wh i ch the “ Republican Revolution” took place, exemplified the impact of low turnout in a volatile political atmosphere. The 1994 con-gressional vote was the lowest since 1986 and fell nearly 47 percent below the cong ressional vote of 1992. The upcoming 2002 congressional elections will be a Pat t e rn C election. The only stat ew i d e race will be for the U. S. Senate seat cur rently held by Jesse Helms. With Helms retiring , there will be considerable statewide political action, as an open seat race creates interest - ing primaries in addition to a general election with no incumbent run-ning. There has not been an open Senate seat race in the state since 1974 when Sam Ervin retired. The upcoming race has already attracted national media interested in whether the Democrats can keep their tenuous hold on the U. S. Senate, and the potential for an ideological shift in the Senate delegation. This year’s redistricting could also affect turnout in 2002. Will the new district lines be “ incumbent friendly ” and therefore not very con-troversial, leading to some rather uninteresting races? Or will the new lines set up some battle grounds that may lead to some ver y heated and controversial races? And if North Carolina fends off the Utah challenge over which state gains the additional seat, will that 13th District race between relative newcomers to the congres-sional scene attract or deter voters from going to the voting booth? n i In the 2000 elections, there were two seats not contested by a Democratic candidate. If there had been a Democratic candidate, the increase in the number voting in the 2000 elections would have been even greater vis- a- vis the 1960 vote , and the growth in the number of Democratic votes would have also been g reater. n ii Hunt ran for lieutenant governor in 1972, governor in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996, and for U. S. Senator in 1984. He won all but the 1984 race. Helms ran for a U. S. Senate seat in 1972, 1978, 1984, 1990 and 1996, and was successful each time. Party Voting Seats Uncon. Votes Dem. Rep. D R D R ( thousands) % % # # # # Pattern A: President, U. S. Senate, Governor Races [ 7] 1960 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0 1968 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1 1972a 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0 1980b 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0 1984a 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0 1992b 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0 1996a 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0 Avg. 1,826 54 46 % Change + 109 - 25 + 38 Pattern B: President and Governor Races [ 4] 1964 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0 1976b 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0 1988 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0 2000 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2 Avg. 1,888 57 44 % Change + 108 - 28 + 44 Pattern C: U. S. Senate Race [ 7] 1962 819 59 41 9 2 3 0 1966 916 53 47 8 3 2 0 1974 986 65 35 9 2 3 0 1978c 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1 1986 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0 1990c 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0 1998 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2 Avg. 1,308 56 44 % Change + 125 - 24 + 34 Pattern D: No Major Statewide Races [ 3] 1970 925 56 44 7 4 1 0 1982 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0 1994 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1 Avg. 1,267 51 49 % Change + 72 - 23 + 30 NOTES Avg. – Average vote for that pattern ofraces over the period % Change – percent change in totals from earliest to the most recent race in the pattern Party Voting – % of2- party vote that was Democratic/ Republican Seats – Number ofCongressional seats won by Democrats/ Republicans Uncon. – Number ofuncontested races won by Democrats/ Republicans a – Helms and Hunt in statewide races b – Hunt in a statewide race c – Helms in a statewide race Pat t e rns in N. C. Congressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000 Decade Dem Rep Total D to R Ratio 1960– 68 43 12 55 3.6 to 1 1970– 78 41 14 55 2.9 to 1 1980– 88 38 17 55 2.2 to 1 1990– 98 30 29 59 1 to 1 2000 5 7 12 1 to 1.4 Total 157 79 236 2 to 1 Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000 An open seat Senate race creates interesting primaries, attracts national media interested in whether the Democrats can keep their tenuous hold on the U. S. Senate, and holds the potential for an ideological shift in the state’s Senate delegation. John McCain’s presidential campaign demon-strated that being independent from your political party could be the centerpiece of a fairly successful national campaign. But in c o n gressional districts dominated by one part y or the other, independence can be seen as disloyalty — and punished. In North Carolina, most congressional delegates voted with their party most of the time, but Republicans showed more loyalty than Democrats during the 1999– 2000 session. The Congressional Quarterly rankings of the state’s representatives reveal some surprises, h oweve r. President Clinton did not re c e ive total support from the North Carolina delegation, even from his fellow Democrats. Mel Watt ( 12th) was Clinton’s strongest supporter from the state. He voted with the president 82 per-cent of the time. Bob Etheridge ( 2nd) vo t e d with the president 65 percent of the time. Mike McIntyre ( 7th) supported the president only 40 percent of the time. The average presidential support rating of the Democrats in the North Carolina dele gation was nearly 70 percent, just below the national Democratic average of 73 percent. This differe n c e highlights the fact that S o u t h e rn Democrat s are more conservative than Democrats as a whole and a re more like ly to oppose the liberal plans of party members. None of the seven Republicans the state sent to Congress broke ranks as often as some Democrats did. The highest support rating for Clinton came from Sue Myrick ( 9th) at 26 percent. Two members tied for the lowest, at 19 percent. The gap between high and low was much smaller than on the Democratic side. O u t o f eve ry five votes cast by N. C. Rep u b l i c a n s, four were in opposition to Clinton. N o rth Carolina Democrats we re also mu ch more likely to go against their fellow Democrats in Congress. McIntyre voted against the party 39 percent of the time. Etheridge, the next most i n d ependent, bucked the party line 16 perc e n t of the time. Both were reelected, despite what some might consider damaging disloyalty to the party. The average party opposition rating for the North Carolina dele gation was nearly 16 percent, although McIntyre’s nu m b e rs skew the average somewhat. Without McIntyre, the North Carolina Democrats voted the party line more than 90 percent of the time. Rega rd l e s s, most of the Democratic delegat i o n supported their party colleagues most of the time. The Republicans delegates were much more loyal to the GOP than their colleagues on the other side of the aisle. Only one, Robin Hayes ( 8th), voted with the Democrats more than 8 percent of the time, and he buc ked the party line only 11 percent of the time, voting with the Republican party on nearly 9 of 10 votes. On average, the GOP delegates from North Carolina voted with the party more than 93 percent of the time, ignoring the party ’ s lead on only 6.4 percent of the votes. All but one of the members had voting partic-ipation rates in the House of more than 90 percent, and all but two of the delegates had participation rate scores between 96 and 99 percent. Charles Taylor ( 11th), required by a very competitive reelection battle to spend more time at home, had a voting rate of 91 percent — still good compared to Sue Myrick, who voted only 86 percent of the time. Her reelection campaign was by no means heated — she won by more than 30 points and sits in a safe Republican district. Most rep re s e n t at ive s have made an effort to keep their voting rates high ever since it became a campaign issue in the mid- 1970s. Myrick’s low voting rate could be somewhat of a liability in 2002. These voting rates and analyses confirm again that presidential support and party unity, especially on the Democratic side, are not important issues that representatives from North Carolina consider in their votes. Nor, it appears, are these two scores important to the voters of North Carolina when choosing their representatives. n GOP Delegates More Loyal To Pa rty Than Democrat s EVA N SAU DA, SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 1 2 AND PUBLIC LIFE Clinton Administration Party Majority Voting Dist. Rep. ( Party) Sup. Opp. Sup. Opp. Partic. 1st Clayton ( D) 79 21 93 7 97 2nd Etheridge ( D) 65 35 84 16 99 3rd Jones ( R) 19 81 92 8 97 4th Price ( D) 80 20 90 10 97 5th Burr ( R) 22 78 92 8 96 6th Coble ( R) 21 79 96 4 96 7th McIntyre ( D) 40 60 61 39 96 8th Hayes ( R) 19 81 89 11 99 9th Myrick ( R) 26 74 96 4 86 10th Ballenger ( R) 23 77 96 4 96 11th Taylor ( R) 21 79 94 6 91 12th Watt ( D) 82 18 94 6 97 Clinton Administration Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 69 relevant House votes in which the legislator was present and either supported or opposed the position ofthe Clinton administration. Party Majority Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 259 House votes in which the legislator was present and supported or opposed a majority ofhis or her party. Voting Partic.: Percent ofthe 600 House votes in which the legislator voted. SOURCE: “ Vote Studies,” CQ Weekly ( January 6, 2001): 52 – 74. Congressional Quarterly’s Voting Analysis of NC’s 2000 Congressional Delegation how many members of a minority they must put in a district in order for them to have a fair chance of electing the representative of their choice. The ( George H. W.) Bush and Clinton Justice Departments told state legislatures that they must consider race when drawing districts , but the U. S. Supreme Court also said they can't consider race too much. During the last decade, judges and statisticians have joined legislators in the redistricting process so that almost all of the national conversation about the topic is focused on which mathematical mode will make the best defense in court. A leading vendor of redistricting software mar-kets it as a " litigation support" tool that can help lawmakers use census and other data to prove that they weren't thinking about race too little or too much. Despite the legal wrangling of the last 10 years, North Carolina’s congressional districts became predictable, reelecting in 2000 a record number of incumbents. Politicians – especially incumbents – like this certainty. In the past, lawmakers could assuredly play b y the first rule of redistricting – protect incum-bents. However, legislators will bear little responsi-bility for the electoral districts the state finally ends up with. When they finish their impossi-ble task, lawsuits will ensue. With better data about “ communities of inter-est” that aren’t based on race, legislators per - haps could more confidently defend at least one of their two competing goals. But e ven with better information, few lawmakers have professional backgrounds in the type of data modeling needed to crunch the numbers. So the process still ends up in the hands of com-puter analysts whose names ne ver appear on a ballot. The political process is just the first round of redistricting. Regardless of how many votes have been taken or how many le gal decisions have been handed down, North Carolinians can be certain that more lawsuits lie ahead — until the next round of political numbers are handed down. n › R E D I S T R I C T I N G F ROM PAGE 1 Dist# Incumbent 2000 Pop Ideal Pop Ideal +/- Ideal Ideal Pop Ideal +/- 13 Seats 13 Seats +/- % 12 Seats 12 Seats % 1st Clayton, D 587,830 619,178 - 31,348 - 5.1 670,776 - 51,598 - 7.7 2nd Etheridge, D 730,266 619,178 111,088 17.9 670,776 59,490 8.9 3rd Jones, R 615,614 619,178 - 3,564 - 0.6 670,776 - 55,162 - 8.2 4th Price, D 765,876 619,178 146,698 23.7 670,776 95,100 14.7 5th Burr, R 637,158 619,178 17,980 2.9 670,776 - 33,618 - 5.0 6th Coble, R 689,529 619,178 70,351 11.4 670,776 18,753 2.8 7th McIntyre, D 690,054 619,178 70,876 11.5 670,776 19,278 2.9 8th Hayes, R 661,112 619,178 41,934 6.8 670,776 - 9,664 - 1.4 9th Myrick, R 693,042 619,178 73,864 11.9 670,776 22,266 3.3 10th Ballenger, R 655,413 619,178 36,235 5.6 670,776 - 15,363 - 2.3 11th Taylor, R 656,619 619,178 37,441 6.1 670,776 - 14,157 - 2.1 12th Watt, D 666,800 619,178 47,622 7.7 670,776 - 3,976 - 0.6 13th ———— - 0- 619,178 - 619,178 —— ——— ——— —— NOTES: Ideal Pop — the total population ofthe state divided by 13 seats or 12 seats to get equal representation. Ideal +/- — the dif ference between the ideal and actual population for the district Ideal +/- % — the percent that the actual population deviates from the ideal population SOURCE: www. ncleg/ redistricting/ 2000BaseMapRpt N. C. Congressional Districts: Ideal vs. Actual Populations 13 District Scenario Incumbent District +/-% Price, D 4th + 23.7 Etheridge, D 2nd + 17.9 Myrick, R 9th + 11.9 McIntyre, D 7th + 11.5 Coble, R 6th + 11.4 Watt, D 12th + 7.7 Hayes, R 8th + 6.8 Taylor, R 11th + 6.1 Ballenger, R 10th + 5.9 Burr, R 5th + 2.9 Jones, R 3rd - 0.6 Clayton, D 1st - 5.1 12 District Scenario Incumbent District +/-% Price, D 4th + 14.7 Etheridge, D 2nd + 8.9 Myrick, R 9th + 3.3 McIntyre, D 7th + 2.9 Coble, R 6th + 2.8 Watt, D 12th - 0.6 Hayes, R 8th - 1.4 Taylor, R 11th - 2.1 Ballenger, R 10th - 2.3 Burr, R 5th - 5.0 Clayton, D 1st - 7.7 Jones, R 3rd - 8.2 The Impact of Two District Scenarios N C DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 4 A AND PUBL IC L IFE ed the Bushes in 1992 and 2000, but backed Bill Clinton in 1996. Rep. Charles Taylor ( R- 11) has comfortably retained his seat in each of the five elections since he initially won the seat from incumbent Democrat James Clarke in 1990. The district ’ s voters decisively favored the Republican can-didate for congress over the past decade but did not decisively favor Republican candidates for president until 2000, when George W. Bush made off with 59 percent of the district’s vo t e s. Voters slightly favored Clinton in 1992 before slightly favoring Dole four years later. Over the past 10 years North Carolina has moved clearly in the direction of supporting Republican candidates for president. In 2000, George W. Bush took the state with 56 percent o f the vote and won in nine of the 12 districts. The only districts he failed to carry were the 1st and 12th – safe Democrat districts – and the 4th, a district in which voters cast a bare majority of their votes for Al Gore. The state’s s u p p o rt for Republican presidential candidat e s has been widely dispersed unlike its support fo r D e m o c r at s, wh i ch is ge o gr ap h i c a l ly concentrat e d . The Republicans hold the majority of the stat e’s s e ats in Congre s s, but the five Democrats in the delegation were all reelected by convincing margins last year. Both parties have “ s a fe ” s e ats that are almost guaranteed victories, but the Republicans find safety in more districts than do the Democrat s. The state has continu e d to lean slightly towa rd Republicans in congre s-sional races since the 1994 shift fro m support of Democratic to GOP candidates. n Avg Avg Congressional Race Scores Score Incumbent, Party ( County) Presidential Race Scoresd Score Dist # 92a 94a 96a 98b 00c 92– 00 92 96 00 92– 00 1st 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eva Clayton, D ( Warren) 1 1 1 1 2nd 2 4 2 2 2 2.4 Bob Etheridge, D ( Harnett) 4 2 4 3.3 3rd 2 4 5 5 5 4.2 Walter Jones, R ( Pitt) 4 4 5 4.3 4th 1 3R 2 2 1 1.5 David Price, D ( Orange) 2 3D 3D 2.7 5th 2 4 5 5 5u 4.2 Richard Burr, R ( Forsyth) 3R 4 5 4 6th 5 5u 5 5u 5u 5 Howard Coble, R ( Guilford) 5 5 5 5 7th 2 3D 3D 1u 1 2 Mike McIntyre, D ( Cumberland) 3D 4 4 3.7 8th 2 3D 2 3R 4 2.8 Robin Hayes, R ( Cabarrus) 3R 4 4 3.7 9th 5 5 5 5 5 5 Sue Myrick, R ( Mecklenburg) 5 5 5 5 10th 5 5 5 5u 5 5 Cass Ballenger, R ( Lenoir) 5 5 5 5 11th 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 Charles Taylor, R ( Buncombe) 3D 3R 5 3.7 12th 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 Mel Watt, D ( Mecklenburg) 1 1 2 1.3 Avgs 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.6 KEY COMPETITIVENESS SCORES: 1 = Strong Dem. 58.6%+; 2 = Leaning Dem. 52.6%– 58.5%: 3 = Toss- up 47.5%– 52.5%; 4 = Leaning Rep. 52.6%– 58.5%; 5 = Strong Rep. 58.5+; u = unopposed. For districts with results within the toss- up range, the party ofthe winner is indicated ( D, R) for the con-gressional races and by the winner in the presidential race in the district. a Elections conducted under the 1991 Redistricting Plan; b Elections conducted under the 1998 Redistricting Plan; c Elections conducted under the 1997 Redistricting Plan; d Presidential- race scores calculated only from votes for the two major- party candidates. Competitiveness in the N. C. Congressional Districts, 1992– 2000 District Candidate, Party # of Votes % of Point Total Spread 5th * Richard Burr, R 172,489 93u + 86 R Steven LeBoeuf, Lib 13,366 7 6th * Howard Coble, R 195,727 91u + 82 R Jeffrey Bentley, Lib 18,726 9 9th * Sue Myrick, R 181,161 69 + 39 R Ed McGuire, D 79,382 30 10th * T. Cass Ballenger, R 164,182 68 + 39 R Delmas Parker, D 70,877 29 3rd * Walter B. Jones Jr., R 121,940 61 + 24 R Leigh McNairy, D 74,058 37 11th * Charles H. Taylor, R 146,677 55 + 13 R Sam Neill, D 112,234 42 8th * Robin Hayes, R 111,950 55 + 11 R Mike Taylor, D 89,505 44 2nd * Bob Etheridge, D 146,733 58 + 17 D Doug Haynes, R 103,011 41 4th * David Price, D 200,885 62 + 25 D Jess Ward, R 119,412 37 12th * Mel Watt, D 135,570 65 + 32 D Chad Mitchell, R 69,596 33 1st * Eva Clayton, D 124,171 66 + 33 D Duane Kratzer Jr., R 62,198 33 7th * Mike McIntyre, D 160,185 70 + 41 D James R. Adams, R 66,463 29 KEY: D - Democrat; Lib - Libertarian; R - Republican; u - unopposed by a major- party challenger; * - incumbent. 2000 Election Results, from Most Republican to Most Democratic › I N C U M B E N T S F ROM PAGE 2 teristics. The data that follow help sketch the electoral landscape for the 2002 Democratic and Republican primaries. In modern North Carolina politics, primar y turnout has plummeted to only a fraction of general- election turnout. Many voters in North Carolina – and elsewhere in the South – stand aside during the primaries and wait to vote in the general election. In 1998, for example, there were both Democratic and Republican Senate primaries, combining to bring out 805,319 voter s. The general election – Democrat John Edwards vs. Republican Lauch Faircloth – attracted 1.97 million voters. The primary turnout amount-ed to only 40 percent of the general- election turnout. Candidates in Democratic primaries must chase more voters than Republican candi-dates. Registered Democrats out- number reg-istered Republicans, 2.55 million to 1.74 mil-lion. In addition, more people turn out for Democratic primaries than for Republican primaries. Two years ago, the Democratic gubernatorial primary attracted 553,794 vot - ers, the Republican primary 312,529. ( The 2000 general election turnout totaled 2.9 mil-lion North Carolina voters.) Under state law, a candidate can win a party’s nomination in the first primary with 40 percent of the vote. Assuming a turnout of 310,000 voters in a GOP primar y, a Republican Senate candidate could win with as few as 124,000 votes. Assuming a Democratic turnout of 550,000, it would take 220,000 votes for victory. Clearly, primaries put a premium on candidates’ tar geting of activist and regular- voting partisans. While Democrats still out- number Republicans as primary voter s, GOP primary turnout has risen over the past 30 years and Democratic turnout has fallen dramatically. Democratic primary turnout peaked at 955,799 in 1984, and then dropped to 540,031 in 1998. Meanwhile, GOP primar y turnout rose from barely 100,000 in 1972 to more than 312,000 in 2000. Geographically, Republican primary voter s are somewhat more concentrated than Democratic voters. The top 14 counties in GOP registration contain more than half of potential GOP voters. It takes 16 counties to reach 50 percent of the Democratic regis-tered voters. ( See chart) Under North Carolina election rules, the Republican and Democratic parties may per - mit unaffiliated voters to participate in their primaries, as both parties did in 1998. An unaffiliated voter can choose to cast a bal-lot in one primar y, but not both. Because 2002 is not a presidential election year, it will almost certainly have a lower voter turnout, in both primaries and the gen-eral election, than 2000. So- called off- year elections typically have lower turnouts than presidential- election years. Also, if the Senate primary in either party results in a runoff, the turnout for the runoff will surely be lower than in the first primar y. n Editor’s Note: Owen Covington, a master’s stu-dent in the UNC School of Journalism and Mass Communication, contributed to this arti - cle and to the accompanying chart. Further examination of Helms’s career can be found on our Web site at www. southnow. org. Look for more analysis of southern Senate races in the forthcoming issue of SouthNow.. › P R I M A R I E S F ROM PAGE 16 Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple appearances, and NRA president and actor Charlton Heston spoke at rallies in Concord and Albemarle on Hayes’s behalf. The NRA had contributed $ 7,450 to Hayes in 1998. The day before the 2000 election, John McCain stumped for Hayes in Richmond County. In the end, Haye s ’ s incumbency pro b ab ly m a d e the difference in 2000. Campaigning on his re c o rd of l o o king out for the district, H ayes also benefited from Taylor’s inability to distinguish himself from his opponent. The candidates had similar views on many issues, such as Taylor’s opposition to abortion. Their TV ads attacked each other’s stances on issues like prescription drugs and taxes, but issues were lost amid the spectacle of visits from major political players. Helms, Hastert, Heston and McCain overshadowed Gephardt and Bonior. Just as in 1998, Taylor won a majority of the counties. However, Hayes made major gains in most counties, picking up one more than in 1998 and coming within a percentage point of winning Richmond, which gave him only 38.9 percent in 1998. In almost every county, Hayes garnered more new voters than Taylor. Once again, Hayes dominated the t wo largest counties in the district, industrial-ized Cabarrus and Union counties. The supe - rior resources and incumbent status of Hayes trumped the energized Democratic effort for Taylor. n › 8TH DI STRICT F ROM PAGE 6 wanted to empower Americans to help them-selves. In the year 2000, Clayton and Watt once again were victorious. Clayton won handily over K r atzer by 33 points ( 66 percent to 33 per-c e n t ) , while Watt easily defe ated Mitchell by 32 p o i n t s ( 65 percent to 33 percent). Being the first North Carolina African- Americans elected to Congress in this century, they had a great deal of pressure to perform excellent-ly. Despite the challenges by other candidates, the constant law suits and court decisions against the N. C. district plans, and the con-stantly changing redistricting plans, Clayton and Watt have proved to be worthy of their positions. They won with the support of white as well as African- American voter s, especially in their last two races. They also d e m o n s t r at e d how important incumbency is to a candidate, thus proving that knowledge and experience are important in getting re-elected. The N. C General Assembly will use the data from the 2000 census to reconfigure the lines for the stat e’s congressional districts beg i n n i n g in 2001. This will be the fo u rth plan in 10 ye a rs, due to the court challenges faced by the 12th District. The new lines may provide more cl a r i-t y as to who belongs in each district. While this could affect who will hold wh i ch congre s-s i o n a l seats, incumbents Clayton and Watt may well be able to maintain their seats in the 2002 elections under the new redistrict-ing plan. n › AFRICAN AMERICANS F ROM PAGE 8 With Sen. Jesse Helms having decided not to seek re- election, North Carolina has in store competitive contests for both the Democratic and Republican nominations for the U. S. Senate seat in 2002. In the days of the one- party South, the winner of the Democratic primary was practically assured of victory in the general election. Naturally, voters who wanted to make a dif-ference turned out for the primary. But since the rise of the two- party South, North Carolina has increasingly come to have two different kinds of elections, primary elections and gen - eral elections with distinctly dif ferent charac- Pa rties’ Paths to the Helms Seat FE R R E L GU I L LO RY, DI R E C TO R NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 6 A AND PUBL IC L IFE Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communications University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill CB # 3365 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27559– 3365 Non- Profit Organization U. S. Postage P A I D Permit No. 177 Chapel Hill, NC Democrats, by County County Registered Turnout1 Mecklenburg 200,210 29,096 Wake 177,211 37,973 Guilford 144,413 30,745 Forsyth 97,834 22,712 Durham 97,819 22,072 Cumberland 87,363 17,586 Buncombe 69,118 11,593 Robeson 58,989 18,377 Orange 51,733 12,445 Gaston 50,654 7,492 New Hanover 50, 101 8,615 Pitt 46,100 11,290 Alamance 39,672 7,075 Davidson 36,508 5,841 Cabarrus 35,147 7,510 Nash 35,142 6,680 Sixteen counties account for 1,278,014 or 50.0 per-cent of registered Democrats. Republicans, by County County Registered Turnout2 Mecklenburg 168,625 26,299 Wake 141,291 25,021 Guilford 96,826 19,592 Forsyth 77,823 12,993 Buncombe 46,687 7,459 New Hanover 46,121 8,051 Gaston 45,733 6,908 Cumberland 45,180 6,056 Davidson 43,380 6,353 Catawba 42,982 7,446 Randolph 38,217 5,646 Cabarrus 36,835 4,883 Durham 35,714 6,265 Rowan 35,415 6,272 Fourteen counties account for 900,829 or 51.7 per-cent of registered Republicans. Where the Primary Voters Are NOTES: 1Average Democratic primary turnout in the 1996 senate, 1998 senate, and 2000 secretary ofstate race. 2Average Republican primary turnout in the 1992 Senate and 2000 gubernatorial races. Sources: State Board ofElections; N. C. Carolina Manual, various years. S E E P R I M A R I E S ON PAGE 15 › |
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