Recruitment and selection law for local government employers - Page 384 |
Previous | 384 of 464 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
368 | Appendix 2
found that the plan was one of unlimited duration, in that it was to be resurrected from time to time whenever the board perceived a need for it.20
Other Title VII challenges to affirmative action have focused on whether there was a racial imbalance in the workforce,21 whether a plan that reset its goals every year trammeled the rights of white applicants,22 the lack of a formal set of goals that would mark the end of the plan,23 whether there was a manifest imbalance in compensation between male and female employees,24 and whether remedial pay increases were more than remedial.25
There have been no recent challenges to any North Carolina public employer affirmative action plans most likely because, to the author’s knowledge, no formal plans exist.
App. 2.2.2 Title VII and Affirmative Action: A Summary
Both public and private employer affirmative action plans are subject to challenge under Title VII. The rules that can be derived from the Supreme Court’s cases in this area may be summarized as follows: 1. To be lawful under Title VII, plans with race or gender preference must be designed to correct manifest imbalances reflecting underrepresentation of minority groups in traditionally segregated job categories.
20. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564.
21. See, e.g., Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 695–96 (8th Cir. 2009) (question of material fact as to whether the workforce was racially imbalanced).
22. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 262 F. App’x 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirmative action plan satisfied all of the Weber and Johnson criteria).
23. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191 (1986) (informal affirmative action plan adopted to avoid loss of funding for all-white and all-male city police department did not satisfy Weber and Johnson criteria).
24. See, e.g., Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (question of material fact as to whether there was manifest imbalance between male and female faculty salaries at time of adoption of affirmative action plan); Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
25. See, e.g., Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 520–21 (9th Cir. 2002) (faculty pay adjustments did not trammel the rights of male professors, but whether the pay increases were more than remedial was a disputed issue of material fact).
Object Description
Description
| Title | Recruitment and selection law for local government employers - Page 384 |
| Full Text | 368 | Appendix 2 found that the plan was one of unlimited duration, in that it was to be resurrected from time to time whenever the board perceived a need for it.20 Other Title VII challenges to affirmative action have focused on whether there was a racial imbalance in the workforce,21 whether a plan that reset its goals every year trammeled the rights of white applicants,22 the lack of a formal set of goals that would mark the end of the plan,23 whether there was a manifest imbalance in compensation between male and female employees,24 and whether remedial pay increases were more than remedial.25 There have been no recent challenges to any North Carolina public employer affirmative action plans most likely because, to the author’s knowledge, no formal plans exist. App. 2.2.2 Title VII and Affirmative Action: A Summary Both public and private employer affirmative action plans are subject to challenge under Title VII. The rules that can be derived from the Supreme Court’s cases in this area may be summarized as follows: 1. To be lawful under Title VII, plans with race or gender preference must be designed to correct manifest imbalances reflecting underrepresentation of minority groups in traditionally segregated job categories. 20. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564. 21. See, e.g., Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 695–96 (8th Cir. 2009) (question of material fact as to whether the workforce was racially imbalanced). 22. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 262 F. App’x 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirmative action plan satisfied all of the Weber and Johnson criteria). 23. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 797 F.2d 191 (1986) (informal affirmative action plan adopted to avoid loss of funding for all-white and all-male city police department did not satisfy Weber and Johnson criteria). 24. See, e.g., Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (question of material fact as to whether there was manifest imbalance between male and female faculty salaries at time of adoption of affirmative action plan); Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 1996) (same). 25. See, e.g., Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 520–21 (9th Cir. 2002) (faculty pay adjustments did not trammel the rights of male professors, but whether the pay increases were more than remedial was a disputed issue of material fact). |
