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63 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS [I7
State v. McEachin
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Rules concerning the use and exclusion of hearsay evidence
and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment are gen-erally
designed to protect similar values. However, that is not
to say that the confrontation clause is nothing more or less than
a codification of the rules of hearsay. There may be a violation
of the confrontation values even though the statements in issue
were admitted under a hearsay exception, just as there may
not be a violation of confrontation values in another case just
because evidence has been admitted in violation of the hearsay
evidence rules. Duttom v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 27 L.Ed. 2d 213,
91 S.Ct. 210 (1970).
However, since the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused
to confront the witness against him is a fundamentd right made
obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (l965),
there is some point at which the admission of hearsay evidence
is a denial of that constitutional right.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476,
88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), there was a joint trial of two defendants
in Federd District Court. During the course of the trial a postal
insyector telstified as to the extrajudicial confession of one of
the defendants; that defendant did not testify. The court in-structed
the jury that the confession testimony could not be
used against both defendants, but only against the defendant
whom it was alleged had made the statement. Both were con-victed,
and the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The confession added substantial weight to the government's
case in a form not subject to crolss-examination, thereby violat-ing
the other defendant's Sixth Amendment right of cross-ex-amination.
This encroachment on Bruton's constitutional right
could not be avoided by a jury instruction to disregard the con-fession
as to him.
L L L . . . The naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practic-ing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. . . . 1 9 )
66 6 . . . The government should not have the windfall
of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a de-fendant
which, as a matter of law, they should not consider
Object Description
| Title | North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports [v.017, Fall Session Session 1972 - Spring Session 1973] |
| Creator | North Carolina. Court of Appeals. |
| Date | 1973 |
| Subjects | Law reports, digests, etc.--North Carolina; Court records--North Carolina |
| Place | North Carolina, United States |
| Description | Volume 17, Fall Session Session 1972 - Spring Session 1973. Cited as 17 N.C.App. The North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports are the official report of opinions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Includes cases and other information about the courts of North Carolina. |
| Publisher | Court of Appeals of North Carolina |
| Agency-Current | North Carolina Court of Appeals, Judicial Department |
| Rights | State Document see http://digital.ncdcr.gov/u?/p249901coll22,63754 |
| Collection | North Carolina State Documents Collection. State Library of North Carolina |
| Type | Text |
| Language | English |
| Format | Reports; Legal documents |
| Digital Characteristics-A | 36.1 MB; 820 p. |
| Serial Title | North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports |
| Digital Collection | North Carolina Digital State Documents Collection |
| Digital Format | application/pdf |
| Pres File Name-M | pubs_serial_courtofappealsreports_vol_017.pdf |
| Pres Local File Path-M | \Preservation_content\StatePubs\pubs_law\images_master\ |
| OCLC Number-Original | 1681248 |
Description
| Title | Page 660 |
| Full Text | 63 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS [I7 State v. McEachin CAMPBELL, Judge. Rules concerning the use and exclusion of hearsay evidence and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment are gen-erally designed to protect similar values. However, that is not to say that the confrontation clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay. There may be a violation of the confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under a hearsay exception, just as there may not be a violation of confrontation values in another case just because evidence has been admitted in violation of the hearsay evidence rules. Duttom v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 27 L.Ed. 2d 213, 91 S.Ct. 210 (1970). However, since the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witness against him is a fundamentd right made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (l965), there is some point at which the admission of hearsay evidence is a denial of that constitutional right. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), there was a joint trial of two defendants in Federd District Court. During the course of the trial a postal insyector telstified as to the extrajudicial confession of one of the defendants; that defendant did not testify. The court in-structed the jury that the confession testimony could not be used against both defendants, but only against the defendant whom it was alleged had made the statement. Both were con-victed, and the United States Supreme Court reversed. The confession added substantial weight to the government's case in a form not subject to crolss-examination, thereby violat-ing the other defendant's Sixth Amendment right of cross-ex-amination. This encroachment on Bruton's constitutional right could not be avoided by a jury instruction to disregard the con-fession as to him. L L L . . . The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practic-ing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. . . . 1 9 ) 66 6 . . . The government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a de-fendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider |
