il«iw^lba a ** c "^^ 5__i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m published weekly by philo ii'iiite.'x salisbury js c i i ksjuy february 28 1826 vol \ j ...... no 299 the terms of the western carolinian are s ; nerartnum-or gs 50 (/* paid t athtanee no paper discon.i rd except a the option of tin editor until all arrearages are paid advertisements will he inserted al fifty cents per sqiinre fertile first insertion und tivcnly-hve cent for each subsequent one all letters addrc-'-d tothe editor must be foal-paid r thev will not be attend ti to first btated the slate legislatures now possess the right io say whether electors shall be chosen by districts or by a general ticket ; and some of them without establishing a clear right ex ercise the privilege of choosing the electors themselves by the proposed amendment it is admitted as objec ted that these several powers will be taken from the legislature and that a uniform mode of voting by districts will be substituted which tbey cannot change but so far from admitting that the sovereignty of the state loses any thing by this operation the direct reverse is maintained ; the servants only being the losers while the real sovereigns gain for it is not to be questioned hut that the district system gives the fairest play to every inter and the fullest effect to every vote nor can it be denied that it conforms to the intention of the present consti tution which in giving an indepen dent vote to every elector instead of a consolidated vote to tbe college of electors governed by a majority man ifestly intended that each mass of citi zens entitled to choose one elector should have the right of disposing of one vote according to their own sense of their own interest it is a fact of historical notoriety that the general ticket plan of election has been adopt ed in some states for the avowed pur pose of cotntroling this intention of the constitution ; and for the purpose of subjecting the wenker sections of the state to the policy of the stronger ; thus g vinjf on a smaller scale and in reference to counties and state divi sions an example of that tendency of lhe strong to oppress the weak which is one of the main objections lo the consolidation of these confederated states lhc unity by giving the same vote if they nre not it is held to lie a viola tion of the rights of so many districts as would have voted differently to im press their votes inti the service of the dominant party in the general as sembly of the stare in the geaeral ticket mode of election the vote of thc slate is directed by the majority of the state legislature ; the majority itself influenced by some leading mem bers and the tickets thus arranged is often made to triumph over the whole state by the mere effect of dis cipline anu in open violation of the will of thc irtnal sovereigns the fair majority ofthe qualified voters it is capable of d'monstration thai the gen eral ticket election especially over a large surfact is often no election at all by the people a small and or ganized body supply the plac of num bers by unity 01 design and energy ot action vant of concer in the bodv of the people will rcni'rr supe rior numbers of 10 avail division will destroy their strength hi scatter ing their votts ; and anticipation uf defeat will ensure it by preventing numbers from going to the polls 3 the ual branch of ihe objection is in the supposed tendency to conso lidation which is seen by some in the abolition of electors ami tie substitu tion of the direct vote of the people this is completely and fullv answered in a foregoing part of this ll-port ; to which it may be added that when an alyzed it turns uut to lie n thing more nor less than an old objection in a new form to the district sytem itself i'or ih 1 purposes of consolidation it is perfectly iinn iterial whether the people vote by districts h their own persons or through the agency of electors and if this syst-m is estab lished it is unknown to ne commit tee for what object the institution of electors can be supposed to be want ing finally there is a point of view from which to look at the several branches of all these objections which exhibit them in the light of anomalous if not very equivocal pretensions 10 the character of state rights it is this : that they present as contending par ties not the federal government on one side and thc people of a stale on the other but the legislature of a state against the people of the smite state : the servants against their masters ; the leading men against the mass the few complaining that they will lose the pri vilege of controling and directing the votes of the many ! the committee have leased their plan of amendment upon the proposi tion that the plan of the constitution had failed in the election of president and vice president of the united states the points f failure were indicated in its two leading features — the institution of electors and the ultimate election by states in thc house of representatives that the i firm branch of this proposition has been fully demonstrated and the in r substitute proposed which tbe case li mits of is respectfully submitted to the decisiou of the senate the es tablishment ofthe second branch anil 1 committee believe ihat this failure has been complete and lhat tbe principles which should govern the election of a chief magistrate in a free country require that the choice ol president of these united slates should no lon ger lie permitted to devolve upon the house of representatives these principles have been stated and en forced in the course of this report riny spring from tlie dangers to which such dec ions are liable these il angers ure — 1 of corruption nmong the voters !!. of violence in the heart of the elections -*!. of coalitions to elect or defeat a particular candidate opposed to these dangers nre ccr lain rules of action ripened into ax ioms to the test of nhich even , lec tion of a fust officer of a republic should be brought these axioms tion before that body in any contin gency whatsoever it 1 obvious from the whole theory and spirit of the constitution that tin i'i -'• ! mt was intended to be chos n by electors fresh from the people mid lhat il was never contempl leij ihnt the eleelion should devolvepn t li - eofrepre sentatives except in an extraordinary and rare contingency llu from an extension in territory which could not have been foreseen and an increase in wealth nnd population beyond nil cx pectation the pursuits of cur citiaens have become mi diversified and so many locnl interests have sprung up among thrm that it is almost a vain hope that the election of president ran ever again be eflr , led on llu first trial whether the people v te direct or through the agency of intermedial electors ; and i beema to be no longer doubilul that under ordinary cirrum endment «/•./■■■ constitution juicauv 19 1886 mr urmtiik from the select commiltee to which was referred the several resolutions pro posing amendments to the constitution of tbe united slates reported in part fhepsrt concluded j thus deeply impressed with the evils of consolidation — and looking to the preservation of thc state gov ernments s equally necessary to the well-being of their own citizens and to the pcrpeluation of ihe general lib erty it caunot be mpposed that the committee have wittingly proposed any thing which ends to produce the evil which they deprecate with so much zeal aud sincerity still it is lhe opinion ol tome lhat the rights of tile states will be endangered by the adoption of thc cummittce's plan of amendment ; the committee think otherwise here tl.en is a difference between those who have a common object in view and to decide it the poin's in issue must be fairly stated and candidly examined 1'heae points are : stances the cno.ce mub i'tejl'tc to prevent corruption : 1 multiply the voters 2 keep the candidates from among them 3 avoid pre-existing bodies of electors to prevent violence nnd avoid ccili tions 1 separate the voters the plan of election in the commit tee's amendment both for the fust and second election has been brought to the test of each of these axioms and tound to abide them the voters will consist of millions and cannot he cor rupted : they will he scattered mer lhe territory of ihc whale conlcilera lion oi.il cannot hold an intercourse with thc candidates ; they will vote nt several thousand different places on the same hours of the same day and can neither light nor coalesce ; tbey ar not a pre-existing hod iu ihe sense of the abjection for that term only applies to small si-l_rcted bodies tried by tbe test of these axioms the house of representatives as an electoral college stands condemned upon every one of them 1 it is a small body therefore capa ble of being corrupted 2 it is a pre-existing body there fore capable of being tampered with 3 it sits in the presence of the candidates therefore is subject to be influenced by an intercourse with them 4 it votes in a body therefore is subject to violence and capable ol coa litions in addition to these objections to which lhe house of representatives is subject in common with all sn.all bodies it is yet liable to others pe culiar to itself as a legislative depart ment via 1 the anomaly of a legislature creating he executive 2 the interruption of its regular business ilevolve upon the ilnitso of rmrescn atives i he provision f the consti u.ion intended only for sn emergen cy thus becoming one of ordinary ap plication and hut which the wisdom ofour fathers designed ns the " medi cine af the trite tn be rmotud ,,, only in a dangerous cfiaia is to be come " our daily bread in this view of thr subject it be comes a question which addresses itself to the mind and heart of everv lover of his country whether congress can be safely lntste,l will the choice of lhe chief magistrate of this great and growing republic not as an event which in a series of years may happen ; but which in the ordinary course of affairs must inevitably nnd frequently ,., e,,r the first objec tion and the one which cannot fail to sugg st itself to every mi d is the incompatible nature of in clinics which belong to a legislative assem bly and to ju electoral college no principle ought in ihe opinion ol iho committee to be held more sacred s none certainly i mote plainly recog nized in the whole structure ol our government than that which keeps ibe executive and legislative depart ments separate and distinct thero s'-.-nis indeed to be infused into tho different branches of our government doubtless lor the wisest purposes a jealous spirit which generously cher ished and prop riv directed may bo fruitful of ihe greatest benefits that the legislature should elect the exe cutive is an anomaly il is alt gether inconsistent wilh the most cherished principles ofour system and in prac tice may be found equally fatal to ho purilv of one branch of the govern me d the independence of thc other the reference of this questi n which will call into action the s.iong si and some nl the worst passions of nui inutile m h pre-existing body of 1st the supposed diminution of power in the slate to choose between the legislative the general ticket and the district modes of eleelion 2d in the supposed diminution ol the power of the-svc in concentrating her strength in thnse elections 3d in the supposed tendency of the direct vote towards thc consolidation of all the states these being he points of objection the question is plainly presented whether they amount in reality to any encroachment upon the rights of the states or contain any of those tendencies towards consolidation which have been imputed to them but before proceeding to answer this ques tion it is necessary to fix precise ideas to several terms which are the very hinges of the question itself " state rights — sovereignty of the states nre the terms relerred to by some who use thi-ir terms lhe general as sembltj of the slate is considered as the state itself possessed of all its rights and sovereign powers ; by oth ers the executive officers of the state government are held to be the state and to have the possession du ring iheir continuance in office of the rig/its and sovereignty ofthe state by olbers again the senators and repre sentatives in congress tram a state are supposed to represent the sover eignly of the suite itself and to hold in their hands for the time being the same high rights and sovereign powers all these pinions are held to be enoneoi.s and without accumu lating authorities and quotations it may be laid dun n in brief and plain language the qualified voters of a state to the exclusion ol the oeneral assembly the executive officers and the members ol congress constitute the sovereignty of the suite and hold i.s rights in their hands who ihese qualified voters shall be depends up on themselves through their repre sentatives in convention or general assembly to say ; bu whosoever they may be whether freeholders house holders or holders uf no property at all they hold in their hands the rights and sovereignty of the state and all the public officers are nothing more than iheir servants the members of the general assembly ihe members of congress und ti.e executive ofii rerr are nothing hut agents for the real sovereigns confined to thc exer cise nf delegated powers they become mere usurpers il they presume tn ex ercise the power of sovereignty — from these positions it results lhat these agents may lose a part nf iheir powers nnt only without diminishing ilu sovereignty of a state bnt in real ity to pro luce the effect f increasing that sovereignty bv ; ,„ much as is ta ken from the servants anil restored tn the masters this in believed to be the exart case which is now presented tnr decision in the point of objection the objection that the establish ment of a uniform mode of election by districts will trench upon the rights of the states cannot be admitted — uniformity as such cannot be an evil and if it was the infliction of it could not he avoided by rejecting the committee's plan of amendment for if uniformity by districts is not established by the free consent of the state uniformity by general ticket or legislative ballot mu9t be imposed by necessity for when the large states consolidate their votes to overwhelm the small onea those in their turn ihcii^own strength let resist them a few stales may persevere for some time in what they believe ta be the fairest s tern ; but wheo they see the unity of action which others derive from the general ticket nnd legislative modes of elec tion they will not and with due re gard to their own safety they cannot resist the temptation of following the same plan hence uniformity will he imposed by necessity if it is not adopted from choice with this great difference that the first uniformity will deliver up the votes of the state to the active managers in the general assemblies while the latter would leave them in tho hands of tlie real sovereigns the qualified voters of the whole slate lt can hardly be said that the states would have a choice when the option would bo between falling into the general ticket system und submitting to a material diminu tion of their relative weight in the elec tiorl the question then turns upon the relative advantages of the gencr-l ticket and district modes nf voting one or the other of which must soon universally prevail ; nnd it matters no thing to the sovereignty uf the state whether one shall be established by the constitution nr the other imposed bv necessity ; ami as tin whole point ol this objection is confined tn the mere right ot choice and of changing the systems from lime to time it results that this right can be of no vslne where choice is impossible and change not desirable .-:. i'lu introduction of a iriv test ilwhetiiiosolnieiiibi fl ni i r^l men assembled at he seat ol tjnycnrfl lent and limn their character and situation bl__e^^^kni|n ; dline h 1 thc npprujii^b nee to these elections a new contact with the candidate on whom t the creation of opposition and they can confer the first office in the administration parlies in congress republic and wh in turn can b -- ii the effect of all this upon fair tow upon then brilliant honors and legislation rich rewards must from the very h 7 the further effect of all this up ture of things expose lh m io the v.i on the minds ofthe people the char-jrious influences by which power and ncterof the grovernment and ihe ata patronage have in even nge seduced bility ol r republican institutions men from the path of dutj , nd trmpr there is one point however nnd ed them to betray the most sacred the con in lee arc proud to state it in trusts when ive take into view the which the house ol r pres ntatives as i;rcat and increasing patronage of tho an electoral college must lorever lie executive bnd ol the various l)r rntitlrd to „ preference over any other partmenta under his control l p r i equal numbers which <■:<„ be con ceive how completely i is i his pow stituted it is i the elevation of its er to cause the influence of his office to character in the talents which distin be felt we must shut our eyes lo iho guish and the integrity which enno lights t wisdom and experience if blea .,, and which the pride virtue we do not perceive that the period is and intelligence of lhe people must be not fur distant when lhc • tire l pre forever anxious to preserve ami exalt blent will be conferred fla ihe reward the objections which have been nf open intrigue and the denpeat cor t-u.il against bringing the election in ruptiun but it is not alone against to this house are of such a character a s i open and palpable corruption in be opinion ofthe committee as to that it becomes „, i esinry ," guard — merit tin most serious consideration : a body even id high-minded men and when iheir weight and impor ardently engaged in running the rnce lance are duly estimated it can hard of i on able ambition will alw ij i ■ lv be believed that the frainers nl liable to be deluded by thc fascinations our constitution it they could have ..! office ; an i though ihcy may net foreseen lhc frequent occurrence ul in seduced im iheir course by ihe thr event would have consented to treasures which may bo thrown in heir endanger ibe purity of our govern wav will bo induced to swciv .'■ ni men ami tbe stability of our i„s i ilu u duty by temptations more congen tions by consenting to carry the elec i tl ho i mind ■ and tl ofthe fitness of thc proposed substitute remain to be at tempted that it was the intention of the con stitution in giving to the states in lhe ilm.se of represe natives an equality of votes for president to in crease thc weight and respectability ol the ilrusi and to give o tbe small states a chain to act an efficient pari in lhe election is edually clear from the constitution itself nnd from all the eotempuranrnus exp sitions ol thai instrument upon these grounds the power in question bus often been de fended ; hut il the intention of the constitution has failed ; it the small stairs have not realized tbe chance which was intended lor th m ; il the house nl representatives lias derived no additional weight or respectability irom acting as umpire between presi dential candidates : above all if real evil both to the house ami lu lhe peo ple of the states have been found to result from this contingent power ol election ; then then can be n reason tor preserving a pari of the constitu tion which has failed of its object rmri product ■ - il inst d ol go rt the 1 . the second point in the objection is lhc supposed diminution of the power of lhe state in that tendency to scatter the votes which the district sys tem in admitted to possess amilling that a unity of ils votes may he desirable to a state ; that unity will be produced by lhe dtsiricl sys tem as often as ihe state desires it if llu majorities in nil the clistiicis are of the same opinion liny will create